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Abstract 
This dissertation studied the conflict associated with National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) elections from the perspective of employers. Using systems and structural 
violence theories, the influences that foment conflict were identified and solutions were 
proffered through the lenses of both theories. This mixed methods study contributed to 
the scholarship of NLRB campaign messaging and tactics by incorporating the 
heretofore-omitted voice of the employer, through quantitative correlational analyses of a 
300 NLRB elections database as well as a survey of over 30 employer representatives. A 
third portion of the study incorporated qualitative thematic analysis of semi-structured 
interviews of seven subject matter experts who provided insight into winning NLRB 
election campaign messaging and tactics. Key findings for employers included the 
importance of stipulating or contesting the petitioned-for unit of employees as well as 
extending the campaign duration. For communication of campaign messages employers 
experienced greater success with group meetings and 1-on-1 supervisor/employee 
meetings as well as with letters to employees’ homes. Employers also benefitted from 
explaining the collective bargaining process and the use of strikes, and by providing 
comparisons of employee pay and benefits offered at unionized companies. These 
findings enabled development of the Voice of the Employer: Winning NLRB Elections© 
model graphically illustrating evidence-based winning campaign messaging and 
communication tactics. Keywords: NLRB elections, campaign messaging, appropriate 
unit size, campaign duration, collective bargaining, persuaders, semi-structured 
interviews, thematic analysis, correlational analysis. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Research Study 
The objective of this study was to develop a model to assist employers for what is 
arguably the most contentious conflict that can exist in the American workplace: a 
workplace representation election, supervised by the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB). The intent of a workplace representation election is to determine whether a 
petitioning union has sufficient support to unionize a unit of employees within a 
workplace. This research study developed a model to assist employers in assessing the 
efficacy and success of election-related messages and communication tactics, in order to 
achieve an increase in votes in favor of the employer and a successful election outcome. 
This research study builds upon previously published findings on the topic of 
conflicts inherent within workplace representation elections. While much has been 
studied about why employees join unions and why unions are successful in workplace 
representation elections, little research exists regarding employers’ successful strategies 
during workplace representation elections. Moreover, as detailed below in Chapter Two, 
most research that has addressed employer strategies was not sourced from the employer 
but rather from secondary, tertiary, or other far-removed sources of information. Indeed, 
prior studies detailing employers’ election messaging and other tactics exclusively 
sourced their data directly or indirectly from the union organizer rather than from 
employers. Studies utilizing NLRB allegations of unlawful activity filed by the union 
typically are based upon the perspective of the union organizer filing the charges.  
This study in contrast sought out the voice and opinions of the employer in 
workplace representation elections. Data obtained and analyzed by the researcher 
provided the basis for a proposed model detailing the multivariate influences on winning 
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workplace representation elections, from the important and heretofore often omitted 
perspective of the employer.  
The Impact of the Workplace Representation Election System 
As detailed in Chapter Two, the literature review conducted for this study of 
conflict within workplace representation elections examined the perspectives of scholars, 
researchers, labor relations practitioners, and most importantly, of employees and 
employers. The literature review examined prior studies on election outcomes conducted 
from the perspective of the union organizer. These prior studies exist in contrast to this 
research study’s findings that analyzed both quantitative and qualitative data collected to 
include light on the employers’ viewpoint.  
The researcher conducted a systems theory analysis of the workplace 
representation election system, as well as a review of the parties’ interests that may 
foment conflict during such elections. A systems theory analysis of the workplace 
representation election system relies on its description as outlined in the regulations for 
the National Labor Relations Act (1935); the government agency therein tasked with the 
responsibility of regulating workplace representation elections is the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB).  
In April 2015 the system for conducting workplace representation elections was 
significantly overhauled at the urging of unions, despite their 60%-plus win rate 
(McConville, 2015). One firm that has long represented management before the Board 
characterized the 2015 revisions as the “most significant changes in election practice in 
the history of the [National Labor Relations] Act—and the most controversial” (Bloom, 
Rosen, & Walsh, 2018, p. 1). As detailed further in the literature review below, the 2015 
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revisions also introduced greater complexity and conflict associated with the revised 
election system process. In recognition of the complexity of the 2015 revised system, the 
NLRB itself has sought to resolve criticisms of those changes. Recently on December 18, 
2019, the NLRB published a new set of revised regulations—with a initially scheduled 
effective date of April 16, 2020—that altered many of the April 2015 election revisions. 
In this research study these new revisions will be designated the 2020 revisions.  
Unions’ Reliance Upon Workplace Representation Elections 
Labor organizations and unions utilize representation elections as their primary 
mechanism for achieving increased membership. Union membership is the primary, if not 
the only, source of revenue for organized labor as an ongoing entity. This revenue occurs 
in the form of union dues; a review of Department of Labor (DOL) Labor Management 
(LM) reports accessible online reveals that union dues typically equal 1½ to 2 hours of 
wages per month and are paid directly to the union (Union Reports, n.d.). Most often 
union dues are deducted directly from an employee’s paycheck in what is referred to as 
dues checkoff. This process of payroll deduction ensures that unions receive their 
monthly payment without having to rely upon the employee writing a personal check. 
The employer incurs the full administrative costs to process the dues checkoff revenue on 
behalf of the union.  
According to a Bureau of Labor Statistics report of October 18, 2017, the median 
annual average wage rate for all jobs (union and non-union) in the United States is near 
$44,148 (bls.gov, 2017). The corresponding hourly rate of pay is approximately $20 per 
hour, which can yield nearly $500 in dues per employee per year. Obviously the larger 
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the unit of employees represented by a union, the more dues obtained—and the greater 
costs to employers to administer the dues processing. 
In the same way that corporations are constantly in pursuit of increased sales and 
revenue sources, unions continually seek to increase their membership through the use of 
the workplace representation system regulated by the NLRB. As a result, as compared to 
employers, unions are much more adroit at messaging and communication tactics in the 
highly contentious conflicts associated with workplace representation elections. Since 
unions participate in workplace elections so much more frequently than any employer, 
their skill at winning elections far exceeds that of employers.  
The election win rate is the percent of the time when the union receives a majority 
of the vote; or when the employer receives either a tie or a majority of the vote in a 
workplace representation election. As seen in Bloomberg Law’s graph of union win rates 
(purple line) over time as reproduced in Figure 1 below, the win rate for unions under the 
April 2015 revised election system is near 70%. 
 
Figure 1. Union win rates in NLRB elections, 1988-2019. 
Source: https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-deceleration-
defines-2019-state-of-the-unions (see Combs, 2020). 
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Conversely the win rate for employers under the April 2015 revised election 
system is near 30%. Moreover, as shown in Figure 2 below, a Labor Relations Institute 
(LRI) 2015 analysis of union win percentage by campaign days—for elections during the 
previous decade—shows that the shorter the election period, the greater the union win 
rate. The less time an employer and its employees have to campaign in an election, the 
greater the likelihood the union wins and the employer loses, as do those employees who 
seek to remain union free. 
 
Figure 2. Union win rates by campaign days, elections 2004-2014. 
(LRIOnline.com, 2015). LRI’s analysis shows that in election campaigns lasting just two 
weeks, the union wins nearly 90% of the time. 
A union win rate of 70% indicates that the win rate for employers is only 
approximately 30%. In the private sector, more than 93% of all workers are not unionized 
and therefore not represented by a labor union. According to a Bureau of Labor Statistics 
2018 report on union density, the union representation rate for private employers is now 
less than 7% and 13% when combined with government workers, as shown below in 
Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. U. S. union membership, 1973-2019. 
Source: https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-deceleration-
defines-2019-state-of-the-unions (see Combs, 2020). 
Consequently, most all employers will never experience a single workplace 
representation election and thus will not develop sophistication regarding the workplace 
representation election process. Instead employers faced with an election largely rely 
upon expensive consultants and persuaders. 
The NLRB election win rate for employers in comparison with the union win rate 
ably illustrates that there is a vast difference in sophistication between the parties of the 
election. For the union, success is defined as an election win enabling the union to 
intervene between the employer and the employee at the expense of the interests of the 
company and instead to the benefit of employees and unions. For the employer, success is 
defined as an election win that maintains a direct relationship with its own employees 
without the intervention of a union in its relationship with its employees—in other words, 
remaining union-free. Given their lack of sophistication it is fortunate that relatively few 
employers will undergo a workplace representation election supervised by the NLRB; as 
previously noted, NLRB data indicates most employers will lose their election (nlrb.gov). 
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The Representation System Process 
Analysis of the election representation process begins with the recognition of 
some conflict in the workplace, conflict often fomented by both parties that escalates to 
extremes during the workplace representation election. Again, both direct and structural 
violence manifesting in a contentious spiral are a byproduct of the win/lose system as 
required by the NLRB.  
In its simplest form the workplace representation election system is the system by 
which a union comes to represent employees at an employer’s worksite. The system is 
described at length on the NLRB website (https://nlrb.gov/). Unions typically are familiar 
with the NLRB election system as it is the primary mechanism for unions to increase 
their membership and finance their operations through union dues of new and existing 
members. Most unions maintain an organizing department that identifies employer 
organizing targets and develops campaign strategies, including messaging and 
communication tactics to persuade employees that there is a need for their respective 
union to intervene in the relationship between the employees and their employer. An 
example of the duties and responsibilities of a typical organizing department can be found 
at Boston Teachers Union job advertisement, retrievable at: 
https://btu.org/wp-content/uploads/BTU_DirectorOfOrganizing_Job_Description.pdf  
Unions prompt a representation election by collecting employee signatures on 
authorization cards from at least 30% of an appropriate unit of employees. An appropriate 
unit is typically found on a shift, a department, or other means of illustrating a 
community of interest among a group, a unit of employees. The union then files a petition 
for election with the NLRB requesting an election to unionize [represent] a group of 
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employees, otherwise known as “an appropriate unit” of employees. The petition for 
election must be accompanied by a statement that at least 30% of the select employees 
have signed authorization cards extending the right for the petitioning labor organization 
[union] to represent the employees for the purposes of collective bargaining and 
workplace representation. The petitioning union must also then notify both the employer 
and the NLRB to begin the formal process.  
Once notified, the employer’s first decision of the election process is to decide 
whether to agree (or not) to the union’s assertion regarding which selected employee 
unit(s) are scheduled to vote. This decision has the potential to either speed the election 
period (number of days before the vote), or lengthen the election period if the decision is 
to “contest” the election. The employer’s decision results in either a “stipulated” or 
“contested” election, meaning the employer has agreed or instead contests the union’s 
petitioned employee unit. According to the NLRB, in 92% of all elections conducted 
under the April 2015 election revisions, a stipulated agreement between the employer and 
the union occurred. Therefore, in only 8% of all elections was the union’s petition for 
election contested (National Labor Relations Board, 2019, n. 2).  
If the employer does contest the composition of the union’s petitioned unit, both 
parties are required to participate in a representation hearing to determine those job 
classifications that will be eligible to vote as an employee unit, otherwise known as the 
potential bargaining unit. This hearing is typically held in a Regional Office of the NLRB 
and is facilitated by a hearing officer who is an employee of the NLRB. Under the 2015 
revisions, the hearing could occur as early as the eighth calendar day following 
notification to the employer that a petition for election has been filed. According to 
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attorney C. Thomas Davis, the April 2015 “ambush” election regulations attempted to 
speed up the entire process of scheduling a union election by shortening the time between 
the date a union filed its petition and the date on which the pre-election hearing (in which 
disputes related to the election details are theoretically resolved) was scheduled to open. 
Under the “ambush” rules, the pre-election hearing was generally scheduled to begin 
eight calendar days from the Notice of Hearing. Under the 2020 newly revised rules, the 
pre-election hearing would generally be scheduled to open 14 business days from the 
Notice of Hearing (Davis, 2019). 
Since the union initiated the process, its position on the desired unit would be 
known. If that position is contested (typically 8% of the time), the employer is required to 
provide a “Statement of Position” detailing what it believes is an appropriate unit of 
employees. Under the 2020 revisions, the NLRB introduced a new requirement that the 
petitioning union must respond in writing to the Statement of Position filed by the 
employer. In this new 2020 requirement (referred to as the Responsive Statement of 
Position), the petitioning union must respond to the issues raised within the employer’s 
Statement of Position. In this 2020 revision, the NLRB “serves the purpose of 
transparency by removing any impression that the Board is imposing an onerous pleading 
requirement on the non-petitioning parties without extending a similar requirement to the 
petitioner” (National Labor Relations Board, 2019). 
To assist the hearing officer and the union in the hearing, the employer is required 
to provide a list of voters within the unit requested by the union. The list of voters must 
include a list of names and other personal contact information regarding each member of 
the union’s proposed employee unit, along with a similar list of any alternative proposed 
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employee unit by the employer. This personal contact information must include cell 
phone or home phone numbers if available to the employer, as well as personal email and 
physical home addresses of each employee in the proposed units. This list is referred to as 
the “Voter List.” Bloomberg Law reported that the NLRB’s Chairman John Ring 
announced at the American Bar Association conference in March of 2020 that more 
changes are in store for the voter list requirements (Iafolla, 2020b).  
There is significant case law and regulatory guidance to identify the community 
of interests for hearing officers to assist the NLRB Regional Director in rendering the 
decision on an appropriate bargaining unit. The NLRB Regional Director’s decision 
determines which job classifications will be eligible to vote in the workplace 
representation election. The NLRB Regional Director also establishes a date, time, 
location and method for the election in what is referred to as the Decision and Order [to 
Election]. Most often the location of the vote is held on the premises where the 
employees work, though other options might include mail ballots or other voting 
locations. During the pandemic of 2020, the NLRB changed its balloting practice. From 
April 1 to May 5, 2020, the Board directed that 16 elections be held. In contrast to past 
practice, 15 of those 16 elections will be held using mail ballots rather than an in-person 
election (see Kanu, 2020a). 
An example of a Decision and Order for a workplace representation election can 
be found at 
https://bloximages.chicago2.vip.townnews.com/helenair.com/content/tncms/assets/v3/edi
torial/0/8a/08a43382-8249-5229-8744-0778d09c8ac4/56a0652411f73.pdf.pdf 
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Once in receipt of the decision by the NLRB hearing officer, the employer’s 
messaging and communication tactics formally begin in order to win the employees’ vote. 
Bloomberg Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) reports that historically the cycle time for 
these workplace representation elections from the date of the petition filing to an actual 
vote by employees have ranged from a high of 42 days to its 2018 average of 24 days 
(Combs, 2020; Ferguson, 2018). In December of 2019 the NLRB updated the election 
cycle time data stating that in FY14, the last full fiscal year under the former rules, the 
median number of days from a petition to an election was 37 days in cases where the 
parties reached an election agreement, 59 days in contested cases, and 38 days overall. In 
FY16, the first full fiscal year in which the April 2015 amendments were in effect, the 
median number of days from a petition to an election was 23 days in cases with an 
election agreement, 36 days in contested cases, and 23 days overall (‘‘Median Days from 
Petition to Election,” retrieved at https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/graphs-
data/petitions-and-elections/median-days-petition-election; see National Labor Relations 
Board, 2019, p. 69528, fn. 15). The literature review described below in Chapter Two 
demonstrates that the most impactful of the April 2015 changes to the election system 
was a shorter time period for employers to campaign.  
Traditionally the workplace representation election is referenced as a conflict 
between the employer and the petitioning union. This overly simplified characterization 
of the workplace organizational conflict ignores the wrenching conflict among employees 
themselves. A review of the elections in this study demonstrates that in 95% of the 305 
elections, employees were in conflict with each other in their desire on whether to 
unionize or remain union-free.  
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The campaign messaging exemplifying this conflict follows what Wilmot and 
Hocker (2011) would describe as an escalatory contentious cycle, as both the union and 
employer communicate persuasive messages to the employees to influence their vote. 
Additionally, employees’ desire for unionization, or their desire to avoid unionization, 
also prompts communication among employees supporting or railing against the 
messages of the union or the employer. In one of the most popular union songs Pete 
Seeger characterized the conflict with a refrain asking, “Which side are you on, boy, 
which side are you on?” (Pete Seeger, 1967).  
In selecting messages and communication tactics, unions typically possess an 
advantage as they participate in numerous elections throughout the year and have honed 
and tested their messages for optimal success. As previously noted, most unions are 
supported by an organizing department that specializes in the system of organizing 
workplace representation elections. Such is not the case for a particular employer who 
lacks the experience, background, and competence to excel in this contentious conflict 
environment. Instead employers typically rely upon a small cottage industry of 
consultants and persuaders who support employers who may lack both knowledge about 
the process and a model for election success. Recently, on December 11, 2019, the 
Economic Policy Institute published a study by Celine McNicholas and colleagues of 
3,620 election campaigns and what was referred to as the “union avoidance consultant” 
industry (p. 13). Their review of the Department of Labor reports for the study yielded 
the calculation that employers spent over $338 million per year on workplace 
representation consultants in 2016 alone; McNicholas and colleagues surmised that the 
$338 million spent by employers per year on “union avoidance consultants” is an 
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underestimate. Dividing this estimate of the $338 million spent on union avoidance 
consultants each year into the number of elections held annually yields an approximate 
cost of $186,740 spent by employers per election, without regard to a win or loss.  
With less than a 7% union representation in the private sector, nearly all 
employers lack experience interacting with unions in the workplace. This lack of 
awareness and familiarity with unions, coupled with the financial ramifications of losing 
an election, create the need for advice and guidance on how to respond in the conflict 
with the union during the election. The data of the referenced study by McNicholas et al. 
(2019) indicated not only that it is expensive for employers to participate in an NLRB 
election; it is even more expensive for the employer to lose.  
The costs associated with losing an election can increase an employer’s labor 
costs significantly. In Union Proof: Creating Your Successful Union-Free Strategy, author 
Peter Bergeron (2008) noted that “it is generally accepted that administrative costs are 
25-35% higher in the unionized facilities” (p. 12). Because of both these financial 
ramifications and a general lack of competence on the part of employers, there is a need 
for this mixed methods research study to provide guidance for successful employer 
responses to the workplace representation election process.  
In Organizing to Win: New Research on Union Strategies, editors Bronfenbrenner 
and colleagues (1998) acknowledged numerous studies focusing primarily on worker 
attitudes towards unions and union organizing success. Wheeler and McClendon (1991) 
noted that most studies focused on primary factors, such as job satisfaction attitudes 
towards unions, individual characteristics, campaign characteristics, and the organizing 
14 
 
 
climate. Although older, these early studies still form the basis for much of the 
philosophical tone and research designs of today.  
Bronfenbrenner and colleagues (1998) in Organizing to Win: New Research on 
Union Strategies and others (e.g., Youngblood et al., 1984) have criticized these earlier 
studies as reflecting voter intent rather than results of the election. As further detailed in 
Chapter Two, studies conducted since then addressing workplace elections also typically 
reflect the strategies, messaging, and communication tactics of the union without regard 
to the same options for the corresponding employer in the midst of the election conflict. 
Employers face a problem—with strong financial consequences—of a lack of structured 
guidance for their own strategies for this very costly workplace representation election 
system. This mixed methods study was designed to address that problem as summarized 
below.  
Problem Statement  
The financial consequences of a failed campaign, coupled with an employer’s 
lack of NLRB election sophistication and experience, complicates an employer’s 
selection of messages and tactics for use in the conflict inherent within the workplace 
representation election system. Employers’ lack of experience and competence in the 
confliassociated with workplace representation elections make them an easy target for 
real or fomented conflict. More often than not employers are left to rely on consultants 
and persuaders to respond in this contentious conflict environment, rather than attempting 
to devise their own untested communication strategies. The messages and tactics utilized 
by campaign consultants are driven by anecdotal and qualitative rather than quantitative 
information supporting the likelihood of campaign success. There is a need for 
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quantitative and qualitative data to knowledgeably inform employers’ consideration of 
useful and effective messages and tactics in a workplace representation election. 
Purpose Statement 
This mixed methods research study developed a conceptual model to provide 
guidance that would assist employers’ decisions regarding messaging and communication 
tactics during conflicts associated with workplace representation elections. 
Research Questions 
This study’s five research questions (RQ) asked: 
RQ1 – Do shorter election periods result in more or less employer victories in 
NLRB elections? 
RQ2 – Do contested or stipulated elections favor employers in NLRB elections?  
RQ3 – What type of messages result in an increase of the vote in favor of the 
employer in National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) elections? 
RQ4 – What modalities of communication tactics result in an increase of the vote 
in favor of the employer in NLRB elections? 
RQ5 – Does relying on a campaign consultant increase the vote in favor of the 
employer in NLRB elections? 
Null Hypotheses: There is no significant predictor for NLRB election votes in 
favor of the employer by election periods, contested or stipulated elections, type of 
messages, modalities of communication tactics, or use of campaign consultant. 
Nature of the Study 
Informed by prior studies as discussed in Chapter Two, the investigator selected a 
mixed methods research design. According to Creswell (2013), in order to more fully 
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understand a particular topic of study, mixed methods research valuably combines the 
advantages of two approaches, those of qualitative research methods to explore a specific 
phenomenon, and those of quantitative methods that can provide statistical information 
informing causality, prediction, or generalizability. For this study of worker 
representation elections conflict the investigator conducted an explanatory sequential 
research design (Creswell, 2013), utilizing first quantitative and then qualitative 
analytical processes. Specifically, as diagrammed below in Figure 4 this study’s 
explanatory sequence research design consisted of: 1) a quantitative analysis of over 300 
elections, 2) supported by a detailed analysis of a survey of messages and communication 
tactics in 32 of said elections, and 3) further informed with qualitative interviews of 
subject matter experts.  
 
Figure 4. Voice of the Employer© study's mixed methods research design. 
The independent variables identified as employer messaging and communication 
tactics were informed by prior research featured within the literature review. These 
17 
 
 
messaging and communication tactics, identified as the independent variables, were then 
included in both the survey and the interviews of the subject matter experts, to assess 
their impact on the identified dependent variable, election outcome. Specific steps taken 
to conduct and integrate this study’s triangulation of research components are further 
detailed in Chapter Three. 
Definitions 
There are a substantial number of phrases as well as legal and technical jargon 
that are unique to the workplace representation system. A list of these terms along with 
operational definitions are included in a glossary within Appendix A. 
Assumptions 
The study assumed that the inclusion of a third-party labor organization [union] 
inserted between the employer and its employees acts to escalate conflict, as it is the 
workplace conflict itself which justifies the third party’s inclusion. Consequently, it was 
assumed that the third-party labor organization seeks to foment workplace conflict in 
order to justify its existence and create added value in the workplace. This circular loop 
of fomenting and resolving conflict can be a continuing outgrowth of an employer loss in 
a workplace representation election.  
The study also assumed that the employer representative responding to the survey 
had knowledge of the workplace representation election in question and followed 
instructions included within the survey or interview. It was also assumed that the 
employer is the foremost authority to explain the employer’s actions during a workplace 
representation election. Finally, this study assumed that all parties within the workplace 
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representation election will act within their own self-interest to achieve an election 
victory. 
Scope and Delimitations 
The focal period of this study of workplace representation elections was limited to 
April 14, 2015 to May 1, 2017. This period represents the major portion of the effective 
period of the 2015 election rule; the defined studied period occurred prior to the 
announcement of the Dec 18, 2019 revisions to the current election system.  
There are many decisions which employers must make during the workplace 
representation election process; under the April 2015 election system revisions employers 
had very little time to do so. Along with messaging and communication tactics, the 
employer must also decide whether to employ consultants and lawyers to guide the 
employer’s campaign decisions. Deciding whether to hire consultants or lawyers has 
important consequential financial ramifications; this research study’s collected 
quantitative and qualitative data contributes insight into the employers’ related election 
campaign decisions. This study also yielded data providing insight into whether an 
employer’s election outcome is influenced by the duration of the election itself, as well as 
the employer’s decision whether to stipulate or contest the union’s proposed bargaining 
unit.  
Significance of the Study 
Given the potential costs associated with an employer’s loss of a workplace 
representation election, the potential significance of this study’s proposed evidence-based 
conceptual model to guide employer messaging and communication tactics and thereby 
win workplace representation elections is invaluable, if not incalculable. The study’s 
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incorporation of the employer’s perspective enabled the researcher’s findings and 
recommendations that will contribute to knowledge for scholars, policy makers, and labor 
relations practitioners alike, in anticipation of ample opportunities for testing of the 
study’s contributions in future elections.  
Summary 
The National Labor Relations Act (the Act) was passed in 1935, and its 
regulations have been the subject of some of the most violent and intense workplace 
conflict for over 80 years. The Act has been revised in only a few instances with the most 
significant revision occurring in April 2015, and again recently on December 18, 2019. 
As detailed below in Chapter Two, while there is substantial research and literature 
supporting and informing employees’ and unions’ election decisions, unfortunately they 
have not sourced reliable data from employers regarding NLRB election messaging and 
communication tactics. This research study’s findings contribute to the academic body of 
knowledge by including an ignored perspective, that of the employer. Additionally, the 
findings developed in this study were designed to assist employers in their allocation of 
dollars to efficiently and effectively achieve election victories. The researcher believes 
that the cost savings to employers associated with awareness and implementation of this 
study’s findings and recommendations are significant.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This study addressed the organizational conflict inherent within workplace 
representation elections, which determine whether a union will intervene in the 
relationship between an employer and its employees. The purpose of this study’s research 
design was to utilize a mixed methods approach to gather and analyze data, thereby 
providing guidance that would assist employers’ decisions regarding messaging and 
communication tactics during conflicts associated with workplace representation 
elections supervised by the National Labor Relations Board or NLRB (hereinafter, a.k.a. 
“NLRB elections”). 
The foundational theories, data, and practical information upon which this 
research study relied are contained in this literature review of previously published 
findings on the topic of conflict inherent within workplace representation elections. 
While much has been studied about why employees join unions and why unions are 
successful in workplace representation elections, relatively little research exists on the 
employers’ successful strategies during workplace representation elections. A review of 
the available literature revealed that information regarding employer strategies relied 
upon therein was not sourced from the employer, as discussed below.  
This literature review synthesizes the perspectives of scholars, researchers, 
practitioners, and most importantly, both sides’ perspectives on the conflict within 
workplace representation elections. A review of the literature details the system 
associated with the workplace representation election procedures as outlined in the 
regulations for the National Labor Relations Act (nlrb.gov; see Higgins, Jr., 2019). The 
government agency tasked with the responsibility of regulating these workplace 
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representation elections is the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), formed in 1935 
by the National Labor Relations Act.  
In June of 2011 the University of California Berkeley Labor Center published an 
article entitled “New Data: NLRB Process Fails to Ensure a Fair Vote,” declaring that the 
NLRB’s workplace election system—in place since 1947—was biased against unions. 
The article summarized Kate Bronfenbrenner’s 2009 study entitled “No Holds Barred: 
The Intensification of Employer Opposition to Organizing,” among others, and succinctly 
noted that “the current NLRB election process fails to ensure that workers can freely 
form unions” (Logan, Johansson, & Lamare, 2011, p. 1). In response to the 
Bronfenbrenner 2009 study and many other calls for reform, in April 2015 the system for 
workplace representation elections was significantly overhauled at the urging of unions, 
which at the time enjoyed a 60% plus win rate (McConville, 2015). The 2015 revised 
election rules were met with much derision by employers, and the 2015 revised election 
system began to take on the moniker of “ambush elections” (Iafolla, 2020a, para. 7), 
since unions now could determine whenever and however long they would like to start 
campaigning to unionize. Once the union decided to notify the employer formally 
through a petition for election, an election could in theory be held within 10 calendar 
days (Kanu, 2018a; Yager, 2015).  
Employers have contended the 2015 “ambush” election system prioritized the 
speed of the election in order to limit the time employers have to respond to the union’s 
campaign, which has no time constraints since a union can file a petition whenever filing 
is convenient for the union. After changes in the political party leading the executive 
branch of the federal government in 2016, the NLRB switched from a majority of 
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Democrat members to a majority of Republicans. This Republican composition of the 
NLRB sought to overturn many of the revisions made in the prior Democratic 
administration (Detrick, 2017). In December 2017 the NLRB published a notice 
accepting public comment on revisions to the election system revised in 2015. Over 
7,000 different comments were received, providing advice and guidance on whether 
change was needed and what changes should occur (Iafolla, 2018). One employer 
organization summarized the 2015 “ambush election” amendments as follows: 
This rule was designed to ambush both workers and employers in an effort to tip 
the scales in favor of unions at the expense of open debate. The rule degrades the 
election process by blocking employers’ due process rights and workers’ ability to 
hear from both sides during an organizing drive. The NLRB now has an 
opportunity to undo this inappropriate rulemaking and reestablish balance in 
representation elections. (Coalition for a Democratic Workplace, 2018, p. 1; see 
also Hayes, Duffield & Kisicki, 2018) 
Despite the interests of employers and those of over 7,000 commenters, the 
NLRB in 2018 prioritized changing the 2015 election system as sometime in the “long 
term agenda” in order to prioritize other matters (Kanu, 2018b, p. 1). Nonetheless and to 
the surprise of many, the NLRB on December 18, 2019 issued a final rule revising the 
April 2015 system. This literature review outlines both the 2015 election system as well 
as the relevant significant changes for representation elections announced December 18, 
2019, initially effective April 16, 2020. The status of the effective date of the revisions 
may however be in doubt, as the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (AFL-CIO) recently filed a lawsuit on March 6, 2020, in the U.S. District 
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Court for the District of Columbia, arguing the NLRB violated administrative law by 
issuing the election revisions without utilizing the rulemaking process (Iafolla, 2020c).  
Once a review of the literature revealed the established rules, regulations, and the 
winners and losers in the workplace conflict here studied, the researcher examined 
theories that support victories for the employees and their union as well as those theories 
that support victories for the employers. The literature reviewed included the only 
textbook offering strategy, messaging, and communication tactics for employers: Don 
Wilson’s (1998) Total Victory! The Complete Management Guide to a Successful NLRB 
Representation Election. The literature reviewed also featured prior quantitative studies 
on election outcomes, comprised of data gathered and analyzed from the perspective of 
the union organizer(s). This data was the subject of comparison with this dissertation’s 
collected data, gathered and analyzed to reflect the employers’ viewpoint.  
Governing System for Workplace Representation Elections 
Much of the research and general explanations for the rules governing workplace 
representation elections were available online and in the literature as provided directly by 
NLRB regional directors. However, the most detailed information came directly from the 
regulations as published by the NLRB and available to the public on its website 
www.nlrb.gov. A fact sheet and the published request for information can also be found 
at: https://www.nlrb.gov/news-publications/publications/fact-sheets/nlrb-representation-
case-procedures-fact-sheet. A visual flowchart diagram of the NLRB workplace 
representation system is included below as Figure 5, for an overview of how union 
representation is approved or denied by voting employees.  
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Figure 5. NLRB representation case system process flow. 
Source: https://mysullys.com/elecction-flow-chart/the-nlrb-process-nlrb-6/ 
The system described in Figure 5 has been in existence for decades; it is the system under 
which many labor relations professionals were trained and have become accustomed to 
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navigating. The 2015 revisions upended that system with the net effect of speeding up the 
election process (Ferguson, 2018). 
Because both the 2015 and the December 2019 election procedures are relatively 
recent, there existed very little corresponding research on representation elections in peer-
reviewed journals. There was, however, a substantial amount of information published by 
law firms, consultants, professors, and other practitioners in the labor relations 
profession. This literature review included information from these practical applied 
sources as well as information directly from the NLRB itself. A chart published by the 
NLRB on its website, here reproduced as Table 1, provides a comparison of the election 
system in place before and after the 2015 changes.  
Table 1 
Comparison of Pre-2015 and Revised 2015 Procedures 
Pre-2015 Procedures New 2015 Procedures 
Parties cannot electronically file election 
petitions. Parties and NLRB regional 
offices do not electronically transmit 
certain representation case documents.  
Election petitions, election notices and voter 
lists can be transmitted electronically. NLRB 
regional offices can deliver notices and 
documents electronically, rather than by 
mail.  
The parties and prospective voters 
receive limited information.  
Parties will receive a more detailed 
description of the Agency’s representation 
case procedures, as well as a Statement of 
Position form, when served with the petition. 
The Statement of Position will help parties 
identify the issues they may want to raise at 
the pre-election hearing. A Notice of Petition 
for Election, which will be served with the 
Notice of Hearing, will provide employees 
and the employer with information about the 
petition and their rights and obligations. The 
Notice of Election will provide prospective 
voters with more detailed information about 
the voting process.  
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Pre-2015 Procedures New 2015 Procedures 
The parties cannot predict when a pre- or 
post-election hearing will be held because 
practices vary by Region. 
The Regional Director will generally set a 
pre-election hearing to begin 8 days after a 
hearing notice is served and a post-election 
hearing 21 days after the tally of ballots.  
There is no mechanism for requiring 
parties to identify issues in dispute. 
Non petitioning parties are required to 
identify any issues they have with the 
petition, in their Statements of Positions, 
generally one business day before the pre-
election hearing opens. The petitioner will 
be required to respond to any issue raised by 
the non-petitioning parties in their 
Statements of Positions at the beginning of 
the hearing. Litigation inconsistent with 
these positions will generally not be allowed.  
The employer is not required to share a 
list of prospective voters with the 
NLRB’s regional office or the other 
parties until after the regional director 
directs an election or approves an 
election agreement.    
As part of its Statement of Position, the 
employer must provide a list of prospective 
voters with their job classifications, shifts 
and work locations, to the NLRB’s regional 
office and the other parties, generally one 
business day before the pre-election hearing 
opens. This will help the parties narrow the 
issues in dispute at the hearing or enter into 
an election agreement. 
Parties may insist on litigating voter 
eligibility and inclusion issues that do not 
have to be resolved in order to determine 
whether an election should be held. 
The purpose of the pre-election hearing is 
clearly defined and parties will generally 
litigate only those issues that are necessary 
to determine whether it is appropriate to 
conduct an election. Litigation of a small 
number of eligibility and inclusion issues 
that do not have to be decided before the 
election may be deferred to the post-election 
stage. Those issues will often be mooted by 
the election results.  
Parties may file a brief within 7 days of 
the closing of the pre-election hearing, 
with permissive extensions of 14 days or 
more.  
Parties will be provided with an opportunity 
to argue orally before the close of the hearing 
and written briefs will be allowed only if the 
regional director determines they are 
necessary.  
Parties waive their right to challenge the 
regional director’s pre-election decision if 
they do not file a request for review before 
Parties may wait to see whether the election 
results have made the need to file a request 
for review of the regional director’s pre-
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Pre-2015 Procedures New 2015 Procedures 
the election. This requires parties to 
appeal issues that may be rendered moot 
by the election results. 
election decision unnecessary and they do not 
waive their right to seek review of that 
decision if they decide to file their request 
after the election.  
Elections are delayed 25-30 days to 
allow the Board to consider any request 
for review of the regional director’s 
decision that may be filed. This is so 
even though such requests are rarely 
filed, even more rarely granted and 
almost never result in a stay of the 
election. 
There will be no automatic stay of an 
election. 
The Board is required to review every 
aspect of most post-election disputes, 
regardless of whether any party has 
objected to it. 
The Board is not required to review aspects 
of post-election regional decisions as to 
which no party has raised an issue, and may 
deny review consistent with the discretion it 
has long exercised in reviewing pre-election 
rulings.  
The voter list provided to non-employer 
parties to enable them to communicate 
with voters about the election includes 
only names and home addresses. The 
employer must submit the list within 7 
days of the approval of an election 
agreement or the regional director’s 
decision directing an election. 
The voter list will also include personal 
phone numbers and email addresses (if 
available to the employer). The employer 
must submit the list within 2 business days 
of the regional director’s approval of an 
election agreement or decision directing an 
election.  
 
Note. https://www.nlrb.gov/news-publications/publications/fact-sheets/nlrb-
representation-case-procedures-fact-sheet 
While the NLRB again elected to provide an overview of the 15 major changes 
included within its 302-page lengthy revisions of December 18, 2019, the Board did so in 
narrative form rather than in a chart, as was provided for the 2015 revisions (NLRB, 
2019):  
1. The pre-election hearing will generally be scheduled to open 14 business days 
from notice of the hearing, and regional directors will have discretion to 
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postpone the opening of the hearing for good cause. Under the prior rules, pre-
election hearings were generally scheduled to open 8 calendar days from the 
notice of hearing. The additional time will permit parties to more easily 
manage the obligations imposed on them by the filing of a petition and to 
better prepare for the hearing, thus promoting orderly litigation. The 
additional time is also necessary to accommodate changes to the Statement of 
Position requirement (summarized below); in conjunction with those changes, 
the additional time will also help facilitate election agreements and further 
promote orderly litigation. 
2. The employer will now be required to post and distribute the Notice of 
Petition for Election within 5 business days after service of the notice of 
hearing. The prior rules required posting and distribution within 2 business 
days. The additional time will permit employers to balance this requirement 
with the other obligations imposed on them by the filing of a petition, and—in 
conjunction with the additional time between the notice and opening of the 
hearing—will guarantee that employees and parties have the benefit of the 
Notice of Petition for Election for a longer period of time prior to the opening 
of the hearing than is currently the case. 
3. Non-petitioning parties are now required to file and serve the Statement of 
Position within 8 business days after service of the notice of hearing, and 
regional directors will have the discretion to permit additional time for filing 
and service for good cause. Non-petitioning parties were formerly required to 
file and serve the Statement of Position 1 day before the opening of the pre-
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election hearing (typically 7 calendar days after service of the notice of 
hearing). The additional time will permit non-petitioning parties more time to 
balance this requirement with the other obligations imposed on them by the 
filing of a petition, and it will also permit them slightly more time to prepare 
the Statement of Position, which will in turn promote orderly litigation. 
4. The petitioner will also be required to file and serve a Statement of Position 
on the other parties responding to the issues raised by any non-petitioning 
party in a Statement of Position. The responsive Statement of Position will be 
due at noon 3 business days before the hearing is scheduled to open (which is 
also 3 business days after the initial Statement(s) of Position must be 
received). Timely amendments to the responsive statement may be made on a 
showing of good cause. The prior rules required the petitioner to respond 
orally to the Statement(s) of Position at the start of the pre-election hearing. 
Requiring the response in writing prior to the hearing will facilitate election 
agreements or result in more orderly litigation by narrowing and focusing the 
issues to be litigated at the pre-election hearing. 
5. Although acknowledging that the primary purpose of the pre-election hearing 
is to determine whether there is a question of representation, disputes 
concerning unit scope and voter eligibility—including issues of supervisory 
status—will now normally be litigated at the pre-election hearing and resolved 
by the regional director before an election is directed. The parties may, 
however, agree to permit disputed employees to vote subject to challenge, 
thereby deferring litigation concerning such disputes until after the election. 
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The prior rules provided that disputes “concerning individuals' eligibility to 
vote or inclusion in an appropriate unit ordinarily need not be litigated or 
resolved before an election is conducted.” The final rule represents a return to 
the Board's procedures prior to the 2014 amendments, and it will promote fair 
and accurate voting as well as transparency by better defining the unit in 
question prior to the election. Further, by encouraging regional directors to 
resolve issues such as supervisory status prior to directing an election, the 
final rule will give better guidance to the employees and parties and will help 
avoid conduct that may give rise to objections or unfair labor practices. At the 
same time, expressly permitting the parties to agree to defer litigation on such 
issues continues to honor the Act's fundamental interest in encouraging 
agreement between parties where possible, which promotes promptness and 
efficiency. The choice is theirs, not mandated by the Board. 
6. The right of parties to file a post-hearing brief with the regional director 
following pre-election hearings has been restored and extended to post-
election hearings as well. Such briefs will be due within 5 business days of the 
close of the hearing, although hearing officers may grant an extension of up to 
10 additional business days for good cause. Under the prior rules, such briefs 
were permitted only upon special permission of the regional director. 
Permitting such briefs as a matter of right after all hearings will enable parties 
more time to craft and narrow their arguments, which will in turn assist the 
regional director (and the hearing officer, in post-election proceedings) in 
focusing on the critical facts, issues, and arguments, thereby promoting 
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orderly litigation and more efficient resolution of disputes. Extending the right 
to file post-hearing briefs to post-election proceedings also promotes 
uniformity. 
7. The regional director's discretion to issue a Notice of Election subsequent to 
issuing a direction of election is emphasized. The prior rules provided that 
regional directors “ordinarily will” specify election details in the direction of 
election. Reemphasizing the regional directors' discretion in this area will 
eliminate confusion that may have led to unnecessary litigation and may 
facilitate faster issuance of decisions and directions of election in some cases, 
although the Board anticipates that regional directors will still “ordinarily” 
include the election details in the direction of election. 
8. The regional director will continue to schedule the election for the earliest 
date practicable, but—absent waiver by the parties—normally will not 
schedule an election before the 20th business day after the date of the 
direction of election. As explained in item nine below, this period will permit 
the Board to rule upon certain types of requests for review prior to the 
election. The prior rules simply provided that the regional director “shall 
schedule the election for the earliest date practicable.” The final rule is largely 
consistent with Board procedures prior to the 2014 amendments, which 
provided that the regional director would normally schedule an election 25 to 
30 days after the issuance of the direction of election. Permitting the Board to 
rule on disputes prior to the election will reduce the number of cases in which 
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issues remain unresolved at the time of the election, thereby promoting 
orderly litigation and fair and accurate voting. 
9. Where a request for review of a direction of election is filed within 10 
business days of that direction, if the Board has not ruled on the request, or 
has granted it, before the conclusion of the election, ballots whose validity 
might be affected by the Board's ruling on the request or decision on review 
will be segregated and all ballots will be impounded and remain unopened 
pending such ruling or decision. A party may still file a request for review of a 
direction of election more than 10 business days after the direction, but the 
pendency of such a request for review will not require impoundment of the 
ballots. This represents a partial return to the Board's procedures prior to the 
2014 amendments, which removed the provision for automatic impoundment. 
By reinstating automatic impoundment in these narrow circumstances, the 
final rule promotes transparency by removing the possibility for confusion if a 
tally of ballots issues but is then affected by the Board's subsequent ruling on 
the pending request for review. Consistent with the 2014 amendments, 
however, parties remain free to wait to file a request for review until after the 
election has been conducted and the ballots counted. By preserving this 
option, which encourages parties to wait to see whether the results of the 
election moot the issues for which they would otherwise seek review, the final 
rule also continues to promote efficiency. 
10. Formatting and procedural requirements for all types of requests for reviews 
have been systematized. All requests for review and oppositions thereto are 
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now subject to the same formatting requirements. Oppositions are now 
explicitly permitted in response to requests for review filed pursuant to 
§ 102.71. And the practice of permitting replies to oppositions and briefs on 
review only upon special leave of the Board has been codified. All of these 
provisions are consistent with the Board's longstanding practice and promote 
transparency and uniformity. 
11. A party may not request review of only part of a regional director's action in 
one request for review and subsequently request review of another part of that 
same action. The prior rule was not clear whether parties were permitted to 
proceed in such a fashion. Disallowing such a piecemeal approach promotes 
orderly litigation, administrative efficiency, and more expeditious resolution 
of disputes. 
12. The employer now has 5 business days to furnish the required voter list 
following the issuance of the direction of election. Under the prior rule, the 
employer had only 2 business days to provide the list. Permitting additional 
time for the voter list will increase the accuracy of such lists, promoting 
transparency and efficiency at the election and reducing the possibility of 
litigation over the list. 
13. In selecting election observers, whenever possible a party will now select a 
current member of the voting unit; when no such individual is available, a 
party should select a current nonsupervisory employee. The prior rules simply 
provide that parties may be represented by observers. Providing guidance for 
the selection of observers promotes uniformity and transparency and will 
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reduce litigation over parties' choices of observers and thus promote 
administrative efficiency. 
14. The regional director will no longer certify the results of an election if a 
request for review is pending or before the time has passed during which a 
request for review could be filed. Under the prior rules, regional directors 
were required to certify election results despite the pendency or possibility of 
a request for review; indeed, in cases where a certification issued, requests for 
review could be filed up until 14 days after the issuance of the certification. 
As a result, a certified union would often demand bargaining and file unfair 
labor practice charges alleging an unlawful refusal to bargain even as the 
Board considered a request for review that, if granted, could render the 
certification a nullity. By eliminating the issuance of certifications until after a 
request for review has been ruled on, or until after the time for filing a request 
for review has passed, the final rule eliminates confusion among the parties 
and employees and promotes orderly litigation of both representation and 
consequent unfair labor practice cases. To promote transparency and 
uniformity, the final rule also provides a definition of “final disposition.” 
15. The final rule also makes a number of incidental changes in terminology, and 
updates internal cross-references, consistent with earlier changes that were 
effective on March 6, 2017(see 82 FR 11748). In addition, for the sake of 
uniformity and transparency within the representation case procedures, the 
Board has converted all time periods in subpart D to business days, and it has 
also updated § 102.2(a) to define how business days are calculated, including 
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clarification that only federal holidays are implicated in time period 
calculations (NLRB, 2019) 
Since 1947 there have been three methods by which a workplace is unionized: 
1. Most employees vote to be unionized through a workplace representation 
election overseen by the NLRB, the subject of this research study;  
2. A majority of employees sign cards authorizing the union as their 
representative for the purposes of collective bargaining, and the employer 
recognizes the union’s majority status voluntarily (Schwartz, 2003); and 
3. By acquiring a previously unionized workforce, where the acquiring employer 
becomes a successor employer and is required to recognize the union. (see 
NLRB v. Burns, 1972)  
Of the foregoing listed methods, the most complicated is unionization through a 
workplace representation election overseen by the NLRB. To petition for an election, a 
group of employees, or a union, must obtain authorization card signatures from at least 
30% of an appropriate unit within the workplace to authorize the union as their 
representative for the purposes of collective bargaining. To obtain authorization cards 
from the required minimum of 30% of an appropriate unit within the workplace, it is 
necessary for the union to solicit employees’ signatures. Figure 6 is an example of an 
authorization card utilized by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers union: 
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Figure 6. Example of union representation authorization card. 
Source: http://ibewlu363.org/htdocs/index.html 
There is not now nor has there ever been a requirement that unions notify 
management that an organizing campaign of authorization card signing is underway. 
Most unions attempt to conduct their organizing without the employer’s knowledge, in 
what employers typically refer to as an “ambush election” (Hayes et al., 2018). Reclaim 
Democracy, an organization opposed to corporate influence, published Walmart’s 
guidance to managers for responding to union organizing. In “Walmart: A Manager’s 
Toolbox to Remaining Union Free,” Walmart advises its managers that: “Most union 
organizing will begin as ‘covert’ (undercover) activity. By keeping all union activity 
covert, the organizer is hoping management will not be alerted to his/her organizing 
efforts” (http://reclaimdemocracy.org). In his book A Troublemaker’s Handbook: How to 
Fight Back Where You Work and Win, author Dan La Botz (1991) extensively addressed 
the strategies and procedures for influencing employees to sign union authorization cards.  
Numerous additional literature sources provided insight into the tactics that 
unions use to obtain signatures on authorization cards. In one example, Professors Ruth 
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Milkman of UCLA and Kim Voss of UC Berkeley (2004) wrote Rebuilding Labor: 
Organizing and Organizers in the New Union Movement to provide specific guidance to 
unions on organizing messaging and tactics to obtain the required 30%. The first chapter 
featured Kate Bronfenbrenner’s 2004 study “Changing to Organize: A National 
Assessment of Union Organizing Strategies”, which prophetically summarized the future:  
The coming years will be a period of enormous risk and challenges for the 
American labor movement. Almost all unions, locally and nationally, understand 
that both their political power and their bargaining power will be severely 
undermined unless they organize on a massive scale across every sector of the 
economy. (Bronfenbrenner & Hickey, 2004, p. 53)  
This literature review conducted for this study primarily focused on what occurs 
after a sufficient showing of interests (a minimum 30% of an appropriate unit) is 
obtained. Often it is only after the petition is filed publicly with the NLRB that an 
employer first becomes aware of the union organizing campaign. In her article “Three 
Lessons for Winning in November and Beyond: What Union Organizers can Teach 
Democrats,” Jane McAlevey (2018) noted that the workplace representation election 
system “makes people associate the unionization election itself with the pain and 
discomfort of the polarized, harsh language coming at them from all sides: ‘The sooner 
the election goes away the better they will feel’” (p. 1). The language McAlevey used to 
describe the election process validates the notion of organizational conflict inherent 
within representation elections. Pain, discomfort, polarized and harsh language—all are 
descriptions which Galtung (1967) himself might characterize as both direct and 
structured violence.  
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Understanding that the company will likely campaign against unionization, most 
unions file their petition with well over 30% of an appropriate unit. A study by Mehta and 
Theodore (2005) entitled Undermining the Right to Organize: Employer Behavior During 
Union Representation Campaigns found that in over 91% of the workplace representation 
elections studied, the union filed its petition for election with over 50% of the workers 
having signed authorization cards denoting their interest in authorizing the union to 
represent their interests in collective bargaining.  
Companies vary in the extent of their acceptance of the unions’ right to organize 
the employer’s employees. Some employers have a reputation for fighting stringently 
against employee unionization (Greenhouse, 2015). In one example, Gizmodo magazine 
analyzed Amazon’s “anti-union” tactics in a 45-minute video. Illustrating Amazon’s 
“anti-union” approach, according to Gizmodo, the video quotes Amazon as saying: “We 
do not believe unions are in the best interest of our customers, our shareholders, or most 
importantly, our associates. Our business model is built upon speed, innovation, and 
customer obsession—things that are generally not associated with unions” (Menegus, 
2018, p. 1). Similarly, John Mackey, the co-founder and CEO of Whole Foods, described 
his opinion of unions: “The union is like having herpes. It doesn’t kill you, but it’s 
unpleasant and inconvenient and it stops a lot of people from becoming your lover” 
(Keller, 2013, p. 1). Robert Slater (2003), author of the The Wal-Mart Decade: How a 
New Generation of Leaders Turned Sam Walton's Legacy into the World's #1 Company, 
claimed that “[Sam Walton] would not permit anyone to unionize a store, passing word 
that he would rather close the place than accept unions” (p. 33). It is perhaps the 
vehement assertions of Walmart’s founder that act as a catalyst to organizing activity, and 
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for many, it is personal. As the largest private business in the world, Walmart is indicative 
of employers’ response to organizing activity, and therefore attracts union organizing 
campaigns from multiple unions (Hemphill, 2008).  
According to union organizing consultant Jason Mann (2012), unions: 
… aim to have at least 60% of cards signed prior to filing a certification 
application. Generally, through employer interference, [unions’] support level will 
drop by 10 percentage points. To have a shot at getting 50% of the vote [unions] 
can’t go in with less than 60% of cards signed at the application [for a petition for 
election]. (p. 11) 
A 2005 study of workplace representation elections revealed that in 31% of the 
elections studied, the union and workers abandoned their organizing campaign after 
management became aware of the organizing effort, which then prompted the union to 
withdraw their petition without a vote (Mehta & Theodore, 2005).  
Much of the strategy of collecting signatures for authorization cards is conducted 
by what Cornell University professors Fletcher and Hurd (1998) referred to as volunteer 
internal organizers. These are typically unpaid organizers who are employees of the 
subject employer. Their chief objective is to obtain as many signed authorization cards 
without the knowledge of the employer (Bronfenbrenner, 1998). Figure 7 presents an 
example of guidance provided to organizers from the Laborers International Union, 
explaining the need for organizing secrecy and advising them to “Keep it Quiet.” 
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Figure 7. Laborers' union advice on ambush organizing: Keep it quiet! 
Source: http://www.liunalocal1290pe.com/Local1290PE/Organizing 
It is this secretive and non-transparent approach to workplace organizing that is 
most onerous to employers. A systems theorist might suggest a solution requiring unions 
to publicly register their card-signing campaign with the NLRB, thereby enabling 
employees and the employer to campaign simultaneously. The NLRB subsequently could 
prohibit elections in circumstances where the card signing period was not publicly 
announced to employers and employees and other stakeholders. This would resolve the 
problem of a lack of transparency by unions. In the current system a union can campaign 
indefinitely without the knowledge of the employer, and the signed authorization cards 
are good for approximately one year (Knuth, 2017). Consequently, the union can 
campaign secretly; once it is both the most optimal time for the union and the most 
disadvantaged time for an employer’s business operations, the union can file a petition 
for election and “ambush” the employer with a short election period.  
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It is the unions’ ability to disadvantage the employer with the unscheduled 
distraction from the organizational mission that potentially has been the cause of the 
union’s tremendous election success rate. Petitioning for a union election just before 
Christmas or Black Friday is an ideal strategy for unions attempting to organize retail 
employers. A system theorist might suggest a strategy for equilibrium that mandates 
elections must be spread out or available during only certain portions of the year. Unions 
themselves recognize the value of this system control, as evidenced by the common union 
practice that only allows members to withdraw their membership from the union for just 
one specified month per year (Wallender, 2019). This system control enhancement would 
create efficiencies within the system, as it eliminates surprise and creates more 
transparency and predictable demands upon the election system and the actors within it. 
This forces the employer to reprioritize its business operations as was required by the 
2015 revisions, since it must respond to the election within two days and the election vote 
can occur within as little as 10 days (Yager, 2015).  
In its response to the NLRB’s Request for Information regarding the 2015 revised 
election procedures (Griffin & NLRB, 2015), the American Federation of Labor and 
Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) solicited Craig Becker, a former 
member of the NLRB’s five member board, who admitted that “the [2015] amendments 
shortened the time between petition and election” (Becker & Rhinehart, 2017, p. 3). In 
the AFL-CIO’s most recent study of workplace representation elections, John-Paul 
Ferguson (2018) analyzed 2.5 years of data collected both before and after the 2015 
amended election system was revised. In a report entitled “Assessing the Impact of the 
April 2005 [sic] Amendments To the NLRB Representation Case Procedures,” Ferguson 
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found that “it becomes immediately obvious there was a major reduction (nearly half) in 
election lag (elapsed time between petition and vote) in the immediate wake of the rule 
change. The reduction happened quickly and persisted for the rest of the study period” (p. 
2).  
Understanding that it is one of the most significant decisions a worker will make 
in their entire career, companies seek to provide as much information about unions as 
possible during the short period of what employers refer to as the “ambush” election 
system. A systems theorist would lengthen rather than shorten the time to allow for an 
election. If the mark of a righteous argument is one comfortable with scrutiny, then the 
system should allow for robust debate on what may be the most important decision a 
worker will make in their career. Put succinctly, once an employer becomes aware of the 
card-signing activity, an employer response is imminent (Hurd, 2004; Hurd & Uehlein, 
1994). A systems theorist might suggest a minimum 42-day election period to create 
equal input by both sides of the election conflict. The 2015 election system enabled one 
party—the union—to obtain a system advantage by capitalizing on a lack of transparency 
of its campaign, followed by a quickie election. A minimum 42-day campaign, the 
average of the election cycle time prior to the 2015 revised election system, provided a 
historically adequate electioneering period, even though unions won in excess of 60% of 
the elections. The 2020 revisions to the election system add greater transparency to the 
election by extending the time period for electioneering by all parties (see National Labor 
Relations Board, 2019, p. 69525). 
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Election Messaging by Employers 
Much has been written regarding the content, tone, pace, and structure of the 
employer’s response to the union’s petition for election. There are few accounts of 
campaign tactics as bombastic as those of the self-described unethical union buster 
Martin Jay Levitt. His co-authored book Confessions of a Union Buster was a hot seller 
among union circles and contains a compendium of “dirty tricks” he employed in his 18-
year career as a consultant to employers during workplace representation election 
campaigns (Levitt & Conrow, 1993).  
Perhaps one of the most successful organizations providing consultation to 
employers involved in workplace representation elections is the Labor Relations Institute. 
Its founder Donald P. Wilson in 1998 literally wrote the book on how employers should 
respond. Entitled Total Victory! The Complete Management Guide to a Successful NLRB 
Representation Election, Wilson’s approach truly does cover all facets of the election 
process. The majority of the employers’ messaging and communication tactics identified 
and examined as independent variables in this research study are listed in Wilson’s 1998 
book.  
Once a group of employees or a union files a petition for election, the NLRB 
requires the union to submit its minimum 30% sufficient showing of interest to process 
the petition for election. In the interim, the NLRB requires the union to then notify the 
employer that a petition for an election has been filed. Then the NLRB seeks the 
employer’s position on whether it stipulates (agrees) or contests the union’s petitioned 
appropriate unit of employees. Specifically, the NLRB seeks to know whether the 
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employer accepts the list of job titles of employees who should vote in a workplace 
representation election on whether to accept union representation.  
If the employer and the union agree on the appropriate unit, an “uncontested” or 
“stipulated” election is then scheduled (NLRB, 2016). If the employer and the union do 
not stipulate to the appropriate unit, a contested election will occur. This means that it is 
necessary for the NLRB to determine the appropriate unit of employees. To do so, the 
NLRB will conduct what is referred to as an “R Case” (representation case). As described 
in the NLRB’s Casehandling Manual (2017) in section 11428, the NLRB takes testimony 
and evidence from both the union and the employer to decide which employees will be 
eligible to vote in an appropriate unit. Typically, these R Case hearings are held at the 
office of the NLRB and can last anywhere from a portion of a day to several weeks. After 
the last portion of testimony is taken, both parties historically each could submit a written 
brief outlining legal support for its position. However, the 2015 revised rules did not 
require the hearing officer to allow post-hearing briefs from the parties. Again, a systems 
theorist would suggest that the adjudicator of the election conflict should not 
disadvantage either’s system input and consequently should be required to enable both 
parties to the hearing to submit post-hearing legal briefs. The December 2019 revised 
rules did exactly this and adopted a systems theory approach, creating equilibrium 
through increased rather than decreased information for the decisions that are to be made 
during elections.  
The NLRB’s Casehandling Manual (2017) states that the NLRB will then 
consider the testimony from the hearing, along with written briefs if appropriate, and 
render a decision on the appropriate unit (Section 11430). This decision is referred to as a 
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Decision and Order (Direction to Election) and is explained in detail in Section 11436. 
The NLRB’s decision also includes notification regarding the date on which the election 
will be held as well as the manner of the vote (e.g., voting on the premises, mail ballot). A 
systems theorist would suggest that all elections be held on the premises of the employer 
where the employees work. This enables the NLRB personnel that remains on the 
premises for the vote to monitor the election and electioneering behavior. Such controls 
do not exist with mail ballots. Before the 2015 revised election rule changes, the goal was 
that the election would be held within 42 days of the petition for election filing. Since the 
2015 revised election rule, the time allowed for employers to campaign has been cut 
nearly in half (Ferguson, 2018). The newly revised 2020 rules will certainly allow more 
time for all parties to campaign during the election.  
After the Decision and Order (Direction to Election) is issued, the NLRB provides 
the employer with posters in the workplace to notify the voters within the appropriate unit 
of the election location and date. Most of the time this election is held on the employer’s 
premises, often in training rooms, conference rooms, or even warehouses. The hearing 
officer has the discretion though to order alternative means to vote, including mail 
ballots.  
Once the Decision and Order (Direction to Election) has been issued by the 
NLRB, both parties—the union and the employer company—begin their campaigns in 
earnest (Bergeron, 2008).  
On the day of the election, to coordinate the election the NLRB seeks the 
assistance of observers that are designated by both the employer and the union. These 
observers are required to be employees of the employer and they serve as the first point 
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of contact when a voting employee enters the voting area. The voting employee will 
approach the observers, who review the list of names within the appropriate unit to 
determine the eligibility of the voting employee. If either the union or the employer’s 
observers feel that the voting employee is not eligible to vote, each can challenge the 
ballot of the voting employee. If the voting employee is to vote a challenged ballot, the 
employee receives a ballot from the NLRB (see Figure 8 below) and then walks to the 
voting booth.  
 
Figure 8. Sample NLRB official secret ballot. 
Source: http://sternburgerwithfries.blogspot.com/2015/02/seiu-uhws-dave-regan-loses-
another-nlrb.html  
After marking their ballot, the voting employee then places the ballot in an envelope 
rather than in a ballot box, and provides this envelope to the Election Coordinator from 
the NLRB. The coordinator ensures the envelope is sealed correctly and places the ballot 
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envelope inside the box under the watchful eyes of the voting employee and all 
observers. 
As is evident in Figure 8, the ballot itself is a simple one. The wording on the 
ballot is different for every election, as it includes the unique name of the company and 
the union. Nonetheless every ballot simply asks one question, whether the voting 
employee seeks to be represented by the union, allowing for a YES or NO vote. Beneath 
the representation question are two boxes, one for marking YES and the other for NO. 
(see e.g., https://www.google.com/search?q=NLRB+Election+Ballot&client=firefox-b-1-
d&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj63pWixszgAhVGmuAKHerQCyUQ
_AUIDygC&biw=1366&bih=604#imgrc=7vsjvUbaGYWTGM). While voting is 
underway, only voting employees, the observers (both union and company observers), 
and the NLRB representatives are allowed in the voting area. The NLRB does not allow 
electioneering in the voting area or while individuals are in line waiting to vote. 
Once the voting period has expired, regardless of whether any or all employees 
have voted the voting portion of the election is completed. As it is often necessary for the 
observers and election coordinator to leave the voting room for brief periods of time after 
the polls close, the ballot box is sealed to prevent tampering. The process for sealing the 
ballot box is an elaborate one that requires the observation of all election observers. 
Typically, the box is taped shut; seams joining the sides of the cardboard box are taped 
strongly to close any crevice or opening. The observers sign the tape covering the seams 
to enable anyone to determine if the tape was replaced, thus indicating an adulteration of 
the security of the ballot box. Once the ballot boxes are secured to the satisfaction of the 
observers and the NLRB Election Coordinator, the voting room location is opened. It is 
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only after the polls close that the employer’s representatives and the union’s 
representatives are allowed in the voting room. Often the ballots are counted immediately 
after the closing of the polls. 
To count the ballots, the observers monitor the NLRB Election Coordinator who 
opens the ballot box and removes the ballots. Sometimes the ballots are dumped into a 
pile and sometimes the NLRB Election Coordinator neatly stacks each ballot. With all 
parties watching, the NLRB Election Coordinator reads aloud the ballot indication, either 
a Yes or No. The observers then affirm the NLRB Election Coordinator’s decision on the 
voter’s intent. In those circumstances when a ballot does not allow the determination of 
the voter’s intent, such as when both the Yes and No choice contain marks of some kind, 
the NLRB on May 14, 2020,  determined that such ballots will be designated void and not  
included within the ballot count (see Bloomberg Law, 2020; Kanu, 2020b). 
After all votes are tallied, if the petitioning union receives the most ballots cast, it 
becomes the employees’ elected representative for the purpose of collective bargaining. 
In other words, the union won the election. The challenged ballots, placed separately in 
individual envelopes within the ballot box, are not counted as part of the initial tally. 
However, if the number of challenged ballots is determinative of the outcome of the vote, 
it becomes necessary to resolve the challenge for each ballot. The forum for resolving 
these challenges is a hearing typically held at the regional office of the NLRB.  
Once a determination is made on the challenged ballots, meaning it is determined 
that they are either in the appropriate unit or not in the appropriate unit, it then becomes 
necessary to ascertain the intent of the challenge ballot. The tally of the challenged ballots 
is added to the tally of the non-challenged ballots to arrive at the election outcome, either 
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a win for the union or the company. Both sides have seven calendar days to challenge the 
results of the election by filing objections with the NLRB. If no objections are filed, the 
election ballot tallies are certified (Higgins, Jr., 2012). Prior to the 2015 revisions, on 
average this process historically took from 42 to 38 days (Dowd, 2012). Many unions 
claimed, however, that the workplace representation system took too long and was 
manipulated by employers. As a result the system was revised in 2015, resulting in far 
less time for employers and employees to campaign. Again, a systems theorist would 
suggest returning to a minimum of the 42-day average for campaigns; the 2020 revisions 
will likely accomplish this objective.  
Princeton University’s Henry Farber (2015) conducted an extensive quantitative 
analysis of over 140,000 workplace representation elections coordinated by the NLRB 
between 1973 and 2009. Farber (2015) contended that a deteriorating [election] 
environment prompts unions to focus on larger potential bargaining units and on elections 
where they have a larger probability of winning. It was the deteriorating election 
environment that prompted the NLRB in 2015 to change its long-standing workplace 
representation election procedures (Walsh & Rosen, 2015). 
Changes in Workplace Representation Elections 
Understandably, given the relative newness of the revised election procedures—
those occurring in 2015 as well as those effective in 2020—there is little research on 
workplace representation elections in peer-reviewed journals. There is, however, a 
comparably substantial amount of information published by the federal government, law 
firms, consultants, professors, and other practitioners in the labor relations field. Since the 
focal period of the elections in this study occurred during the active period of the 2015 
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election revisions, it is important to understand the details of the system and structural 
violence of the 2015 revised election system.  
On April 14, 2015 the NLRB changed its rules and procedures governing the 
elections it oversees to determine workplace representation by unions. It was perhaps the 
biggest overhaul of the election process since the formation of the NLRB on July 5, 1935. 
The most significant change to the new election system was the reduced cycle time from 
the petition for election to the tally of the ballots (Ferguson, 2018). Under the prior 
election procedures, the cycle time was decreasing from 42 to 38 days. However, the 
2015 revised regulations resulted in a cycle time of a mere 23 days (Becker & Rhinehart, 
2017; Hardie and Murphy, 2016; National Labor Relations Board, 2019). In theory an 
employer faces the possibility of a workplace representation election vote within 10 days 
(Yager, 2015). Along with a change in political leadership at the NLRB, it was the 
overwhelming criticism of the business community which may have prompted the Board 
to revise the election system in 2019 to lengthen the cycle time of electioneering.  
Systems Theory and the Workplace Representation Election 
Workplace representation elections are a fulfillment of the democratic process. 
Former NLRB Regional Director Bernard Samoff (1968) succinctly stated that the 
workplace representation system enables workers a process for self-determination on 
whether a majority of voting employees seek or reject union representation. The end 
result is a recognized and certified vote which reflects the wishes of the voting 
employees.  
While systems theorists seemingly view life and all within it as systems process 
flows, the workplace representation system maintained by the NLRB lends itself readily 
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to analysis within systems theory. The foundation of systems theory is its focus on stock 
and flow. It is a simple theory dealing with physical exponential growing systems, in 
which a reinforcing loop drives system growth, and a balancing loop constrains the 
growth in order to achieve systems process equilibrium (Meadows, 2008). A systems 
stock is the present status of the flow within the system. It is the number of elections 
existing without a finalized certified vote result.  
Systems process anomalies occur when process flow is insufficient, and an over 
accumulation of stock occurs. Disruptions in the process flow can occur for a number of 
reasons. An increase or decrease in the number of petitions for elections in the NLRB 
system flow can occur based upon general economic conditions, as well as on the 
collective behavior of either unions or employers. Perhaps most influential are the 
changes in regulations, making it easier or more difficult for one or all parties to the 
election system. Navigating the system regulating the behavior of unions and employers 
during the workplace representation system process is a complex process requiring the 
expertise of experienced campaigners. Lawyers are an important resource to both 
understand and utilize the process flow within the system (Elite Lawyer, n.d.). Major 
regulatory changes to the election system, particularly after decades of system stability 
without major change, can have a confounding effect on all parties seeking to navigate 
the system process. Such changes can inhibit the input to the system process flow. 
Similarly, such regulatory instability can also slow or speed the processing of the stock 
(elections).  
The workplace representation system is directed through a five-member 
regulatory agency which is subject to political influence. This influence can change 
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dramatically depending upon which political party oversees the executive branch of the 
federal government. Some view that political oscillation as amplifying its impact on the 
flow of the workplace representation election system. This effect was lamented by Labor 
Law Professor Samuel Estreicher (1985) writing in the American Bar Association’s 
Administrative Law Review: 
The NLRB (NLRB) has made the labor law professor’s job a nightmare. A labor 
law professor’s dream, like that of any other serious academic, is to deal with a 
relatively inert body of law, to be able to read the decisions and statutes once—
and only once—and then work up a fairly decent set of notes which can be used 
year after year, leaving time for the more worthwhile pursuits of life. This federal 
agency simply won’t let us be. These days the BNA [Bureau of National Affairs] 
labor service treats us to a reversal a week by the NLRB.  
While Estreicher’s heartfelt complaint was widely shared in 1985, the actions of the 
NLRB in 2015 that revised the regulations impacting the stock and flow of the workplace 
representation election system have been similarly denounced by employers claiming the 
reduced cycle time of allowable campaigning inhibits employees’ ability to participate 
fully in the election system (Bernstein & Vickery, 2019; Hayes, Duffield, & Kisicki, 
2018; National Labor Relations Board, 2019).  
This reduced cycle time meant the median election period for employers to 
campaign was reduced to an average of 23 days since the revised election rules were 
made effective in April 2015. A history of the election cycle time is vividly demonstrated 
in the NLRB’s own election data, as shown below in Figure 9.  
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Figure 9. NLRB election cycle time, 2009-2018. 
Source: https://screenshots.firefox.com/OOUM8lifxPLw3OWu/www.nlrb.gov 
It is a central tenet of systems theory that there are natural and physical limitations 
on the growth of any system (Meadows, 2008). However, unnatural influences, 
anomalies, and oscillations can be readily introduced by those overseeing the system, 
which can tilt the stasis in favor of one of the parties to the conflict. With unions winning 
nearly three of every four elections, it is no wonder that employers sought the overhaul of 
the 2015 workplace representation election system. Kuhn and Hacking (2012) suggested 
that:  
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If an anomaly is to evoke crisis, it must usually be more than just an anomaly. 
There are always difficulties somewhere in the paradigm-nature fit; most of them 
are set right sooner or later, often by processes that could not have been foreseen. 
The scientist who pauses to examine every anomaly he notes will seldom get 
significant work done … We therefore have to ask what it is that makes an 
anomaly seem worth concerted scrutiny. (p. 82) 
The April 2015 major changes to the workplace representation election system were 
viewed by employers as just such a system anomaly warranting “concerted scrutiny.” 
Bernstein and Vickery (2019) further characterized the 2015 revised regulations as having 
removed long-standing due process rights that had been available to employers, shrinking 
the election timeframe and limiting employers’ ability to educate workers on the facts 
surrounding union representation. 
Given the rising win rate for unions within the shorter cycle time of the workplace 
representation election process, it was reasonable to believe that more petitions for 
elections would have been filed by unions thus increasing their membership and dues 
collection. Absent the 2020 regulatory revisions, the expedited cycle time for elections 
and resulting failure from an excess flow of elections could have had dire consequences 
to the actors within the system. A popular episode of I Love Lucy depicts her productivity 
on the candy manufacturing assembly line which is insufficient to process the speed and 
flow of the assembly line. In the YouTube video I Love Lucy: Candy Factory, comedy 
ensues as Lucy attempts to mitigate the bottleneck of the assembly line by eating the 
chocolates on the fast-moving line. This attempt to eliminate the excess flow is a 
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common response by actors in a nonfunctioning system. Employers may be concerned 
that they were the chocolate on the NLRB assembly line.  
Ideally successful equilibrium is created when the system stock and flow are free 
of bottleneck, equilibrium is established, and the stock and flow move as designed. 
Employers argued that the April 2015 major changes to the system were the equivalent of 
expediting elections without regard to allowing employees the full benefit of a campaign 
of information sharing. Reversing the 2015 election revisions will return the election 
system to a closer state of equilibrium. It is important to remember that the actors within 
the system are critical in determining the process flow. However, author Donella 
Meadows (2008) reminded us that “the bounded rationality of each actor in a system may 
not lead to decisions that further the welfare of the system as a whole” (Meadows & 
Wright, 2008, p. 110). It is reasonable to believe that the employer actors sought to act 
and influence the NLRB to act in the interests of the employer and at the expense of 
unions or employees. It is reasonable to expect that the unions will similarly seek to 
revise and overturn the 2019 election revisions and return to the 2015 revisions.  
Unlike the humor of the I Love Lucy episode, the 2015 major changes in the 
workplace representation election system created system process complications, such as: 
• Employees voting with less information otherwise shared in a longer 
campaign; 
• A perceived inequity of the process by all actors effected within the systems; 
and 
• An unstable flow of elections as actors advance through the learning curve of 
the revised election system. 
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From a system theory perspective, several solutions that can create system homeostasis 
include: 
• The greater transparency resulting from the NLRB having revised the April 
2015 election system on December 18, 2019;  
• Congress should amend the National Labor Relations Act requiring that every 
workplace election campaign period enable affected employees a minimum of 
42 days from petition to vote for consideration of the representation issue;  
• The NLRB should accept petitions for election only during a short period of 
time in any one NLRB Region. For example, in NLRB Region 10 petitions 
should be accepted only during a particular month, with Region 12 accepting 
petitions the following month; 
• The NLRB should create systems revisions to spread out the elections held 
during the year by eliminating year-round acceptance of election petitions; 
• Unions should create additional transparency in the system by registering their 
intent to organize on a public clearinghouse website maintained by the NLRB 
and viewable by all, in order to enable all actors within the system to avoid the 
surprise or ambush of an election; 
• In order to change whether a unit of employees is unionized or not, the NLRB 
should require a majority of all unit employees’ support, not just a majority of 
those voting; and 
• A myriad of additional recommended employer solutions can be found in the 
CDW’s response to the NLRB’s request for information (see Hayes, Duffield, 
& Kisicki, 2018). 
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Winning and Losing Parties in the Election Conflict 
To better understand the context for this workplace conflict it is necessary to 
understand the winners and losers in the 2015 revised election system. It is the elections 
held during the active period of the 2015 election system that were the focus of this study, 
as further detailed in Chapter 3.  
Prior to April 14, 2015, unions were winning in excess of 60% of workplace 
representation elections. However, the economy was growing at rates faster than the 
percentage of elections that were both filed and won by organized labor (Multinational 
Monitor, 2003). Consequently, unions gained more dues-paying members, although not at 
the rate the rest of the union-free economy was growing. While the labor movement’s 
percent of the workforce which is unionized (known as union density) declined from 
1955 to today, union leadership salaries remained substantially above those whom they 
represented (Sherk, 2015). Additionally, in order to demonstrate their efforts to support 
workers, unions negotiated for provisions in contracts which limited the flexibility of 
companies and their ability to compete (Sherk, 2009).  Notably, during the decline of 
unions American companies became increasingly more regulated by the federal 
government and undertook workplace improvements to remain competitive to recruit and 
hire (Zickar, 2004). Over time the collective actions of employers have decreased the 
demand for workplace representation elections. In order to compensate for their 
decreased representation, unions have sought to disadvantage employers by eliminating 
the employers’ ability to campaign about whether their employees should obtain union 
representation.  
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Theories on Employee Vote Influencers 
A portion of the literature review presented in Chapter Two examined system 
theory and other theories associated with an employee’s decision to vote on behalf of the 
union rather than the employer. The literature review conducted also focused on 
leadership theories applicable to the conflict within workplace representation elections. A 
workplace representation election is one of the most significant conflict events that can 
occur in an organization’s history. The election itself demonstrates a loss of trust and faith 
in executive leadership. American leadership scholar Warren Bennis stated: “Trust is the 
lubrication that makes it possible for organizations to work” (Newhouse, 2014, p. 36).  
University of Minnesota Professor John Fossum (2012) has chronicled the labor 
movement that declined since 1955 when union membership was near 35% of the 
American work force. Today’s membership—approximately 10.3% of the combined 
government and private workforce—represents a dire circumstance for the future of 
organized labor (U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020). Fossum contended that as a 
result unions have come to the realization that their decline was supported by legislation 
that inhibited unions’ ability to organize. In the foreword of his book The Twilight of the 
Old Unionism, Leo Troy (2004), an economics professor at Rutgers University, suggested 
that the basis for the decline in union density is neither management exploitation of rules 
nor an unfavorable political and legal climate. Economist Troy instead suggested the 
unions’ steady erosion of union representation density is “largely due to market forces 
and competition rather than managerial resistance” (p. xi); he further termed this decline 
“Old Unionism” (p. xi).  
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A Pew Research Center study in 2018 noted the long-term decline of unionization 
has affected most parts of the U.S. economy, but not uniformly. Pew further noted the 
biggest declines in unionization are in industries that were and still are “the foundations 
of the American labor movement” (DeSilver, 2018, para. 3). The decline of unionism 
however is not uniform throughout the nation. A more recent comparison of workplace 
representation elections by Bloomberg Law’s Robert Combs and Gayle Cinquegrani 
(2018) observed that the first half of 2018 showed the win rate for unions was 68.9%, a 
slight decline behind the 2017 union win rate of 70.8%. Additionally, the authors noted 
that the win rate in states without right-to-work laws had a union success rate of 71.1%, 
in comparison to the 64.1% union win rate in states with right-to-work laws (Devinatz, 
2015).  
Structural Violence 
Organizational conflict researchers note there is structural violence associated 
with the conflict within workplace representation elections that results in changes in 
union density. Any actor who has participated within the workplace representation 
election system recognizes there is much conflict involved in the system. Technically in 
this modern era relatively few employees are victims of direct violence, as Johan Galtung 
(1969) defined the term in Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. His article defined four 
distinctions of violence.  
The first distinction is between physical and psychological violence. It is the 
distinction involving somatic hurt to human beings and can include violence against the 
soul – brainwashing, indoctrination, and threats, etc. The second distinction is between 
negative and positive approaches to influence; it is simply the tendency to reward or 
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punish noncompliance. The third distinction is whether or not there is an object that is 
hurt. Galtung (1969) notes that the mere threat of violence is sufficient to constitute 
“structural violence” (p.171). The fourth distinction is the most important one and hinges 
upon whether or not there is a subject (person) who acts (see pp. 169 -170). Galtung 
referred to the type of violence where there is an actor that commits the violence as 
personal or direct. This is the type of violence most consider when defining violence – 
physical violence. Violence where there is no such actor is structural or indirect violence 
(see p. 170). 
Johan Galtung (1969) is recognized as a preeminent theorist on peace research. 
He developed two typologies of peace – positive and negative peace. He defined negative 
peace as the absence of violence, absence of war, the absence of direct violence. He 
defined positive peace as the integration of human society. Galtung defined peace as 
something attainable rather than a utopian construct. Few however would suggest that the 
absence of a workplace representation election within any particular workplace denotes 
positive peace. Most would prefer the term “labor harmony” rather than Galtung’s 
positive or negative peace. He suggested peace is not only the absence of personal 
violence but also the absence of structural violence, which he defined as the cause of the 
difference between the potential and the actual. To illustrate, Galtung used the example of 
a death of tuberculosis in the 18th century, which would not result from structural 
violence. However, in the 21st century, given our ability to prevent tuberculosis, a 
corresponding death would constitute structural violence. With the difference between the 
potential and the actual defined as structural violence, the very violence associated with 
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workplace representation elections—whether structural or direct—itself epitomizes 
structural violence.  
All actors in the workplace representation system seem resigned to accept the 
existing process with its tendency for violence. Galtung (1969) might suggest that each of 
the actors in the workplace representation election system is a participant in the structural 
violence associated and perpetuated by the NLRB and the election system it regulates.  
To eliminate the structural violence inherent within the existing workplace 
representation election system, structural violence theorists might suggest the elimination 
of any and all advantages either party possesses when implementing their strategies 
within the system. A structural violence theorist would develop a system to represent the 
interest of all employees without the violence associated with a workplace representation 
election system. Such solutions would include: 
• Creating greater transparency of information within the election system;  
• Requiring any union seeking to represent [unionize] a group of employees to 
register their interest on the NLRB’s website, which is publicly available to all 
actors within the workplace representation system; and 
• Revising the National Labor Relations Act to mandate that any change in 
representation status within a workplace require a majority vote of all 
employees within an appropriate workplace unit, rather than a majority of 
those voting. 
Strategies Employed by Unions and Employers 
The literature reviewed in this chapter provided insight into the traditional and 
successful strategies utilized by both unions and employees to achieve victory over 
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employers in workplace representation elections. This information forms the context for 
the corresponding counter-strategies identified for use by employers which were the chief 
focus of this research study. The literature reviewed featured several professors’ prior 
research regarding employers’ strategies used during the election. However, this 
researcher supports the notion that it is biased to collect data from secondary, tertiary or 
other actor/observers far removed from the actual employer itself. It is equally inaccurate 
to collect data on the unions’ strategy, not from the union but from the employer. This 
study addressed the described data collection insufficiency evident in the literature of 
utilizing union organizers’ perceptions of the employers’ actions while omitting the 
employer’s perceptions. 
One of the most preeminent, prolific, and prominent researchers in the field of 
labor relations is Kate Bronfenbrenner. Most labor relations practitioners are familiar 
with her work: she is recognized for her decades of research on workplace representation 
election behavior and strategies. Her research and opinions are continuously sought by 
academics, practitioners, and journalists, and she is a featured columnist or media 
commenter on seemingly a near-weekly basis. Her work over the last 30 years continues 
to frame the analysis of workplace representation elections. As recently as December 11, 
2019, researchers at the Economic Policy Institute recreated her significant 2009 study 
entitled No Holds Barred; The Intensification of Employer Opposition to Organizing 
(Bronfenbrenner, 2009; see McNicholas et al., 2019). 
Kate Bronfenbrenner is Director of Labor Education Research and a senior 
lecturer at Cornell University's School of Industrial and Labor Relations, where she 
teaches and conducts research on union and employer strategies in organizing and 
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bargaining in the global economy. Bronfenbrenner has also done extensive research on 
the impact of trade policy on employment, wages, and unionization. Prior to joining the 
Cornell faculty in 1993, Bronfenbrenner was an assistant professor in labor studies at 
Penn State University; she worked for many years as an organizer and union 
representative with the United Woodcutters Association in Mississippi and with Service 
Employees International Union (SEIU) in Boston, as well as a welfare rights organizer in 
Seattle, Washington. 
Bronfenbrenner, who received her Ph.D. from Cornell in 1993, is the co-author 
and editor of several books on union strategies, including Global Unions: Challenging 
Transnational Capital Through Cross Border Campaigns (2007); Union Organizing in 
the Public Sector: An Analysis of State and Local Elections (1995); Organizing to Win: 
New Research on Union Strategies (1998); and Ravenswood: The Steelworkers' Victory 
and the Revival of American Labor (2000). She also has published numerous articles, 
book chapters, and monographs on labor policy, employer and union behavior in public 
and private sector organizing and first contract campaigns, comprehensive campaigns, 
union leadership development, women and unions, and global trade and investment 
policy. Her most recent study on the timing of employer serious unfair labor practices—
"Election Timing, Employer Free Speech, and Unfair Labor Practice Occurrence: Whose 
Rights are at Risk?"—played a central role in informing the NLRB's 2015 election 
revisions (see Bronfenbrenner, 2016, para. 2). 
Because of her expertise in contemporary labor issues and her research on union 
and employer behavior in certification election campaigns, Bronfenbrenner has been 
brought in to testify as an expert witness at Labor Department and Congressional 
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hearings and is frequently quoted in the major news media. An example of her 
contemporary impact is provided by Mark Gruenberg (2016), who reported on 
Bronfenbrenner’s lobbying the NLRB to prohibit management’s unilateral use of captive 
audience meetings where workers sit in closed meetings to hear what Bronfenbrenner has 
referred to as antiunion rhetoric. Bronfenbrenner noted that unions get no right of reply, 
and such meetings can often contain explicit or implied threats of closure of the plants 
and loss of jobs. Gruenberg further reported that her 2016 study found that nine of every 
10 union organizing drives are subjected to what Bronfenbrenner referred to as 
intimidating and one-sided captive audience meetings by employers.  
Bronfenbrenner’s 2016 study also found a 73% union-win rate in representation 
elections without captive audience meetings, and a 47% union-win rate in campaigns that 
did include them (Gruenberg, 2016). As a result, Bronfenbrenner’s findings were 
included in a January 15, 2016 proposal to the NLRB that unions should be given equal 
time and an equal voice at employers’ so-called “captive audience” meetings that are used 
in a workplace representation election campaign; the proposal was authored by 
Bronfenbrenner and 106 other labor law professors asking that the NLRB engage in rule-
making to level the playing field.  
Bronfenbrenner’s early involvement in the study of organizing tactics was 
influenced by a study funded by the AFL-CIO of 189 union election campaigns in units 
of over 50 eligible voters between 1986 and 1987. Unfortunately, the AFL-CIO sample 
excluded or underrepresented several major unions, especially those organizing in the 
service sector (Bronfenbrenner, 1991a). In a two-part study entitled Successful Union 
Strategies for Winning Certification Elections and First Contracts - Report to Union 
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Participants, Bronfenbrenner (1991a, 1991b) in cooperation with the AFL-CIO surveyed 
100 chief negotiators regarding the unions’ election victory and first contract status. The 
quantitative study resulted in quantifiable guidance to union organizers to maximize their 
success in workplace representation elections. The study generated the following 
pertinent findings and recommendations (see Bronfenbrenner, 1991a, p. 13, Table 5) for 
union organizers with regard to organizing variables: 
Impact of Organizing Survey Variables on Election Outcome in Favor of Unions 
Variables showing strongest positive impact on election outcome 
1. Number of days between election and petition 
2. Other units of the employer unionized 
3. Percent minority in unit 
4. Lead organizer on international staff 
5. Union had representative organizing committee 
6. Percent of units sign up on cards when petition was filed 
7. Majority of unit house called before the election 
8. Solidarity days used 
9. Bargaining committee chosen before election 
10. Union focused on issues such as dignity, discrimination and quality 
Variables showing moderate positive impact on election outcome 
1. Percent unemployment rate 
2. Percent union density 
3. Unit average wage $5.00 or less 
4. 60% or more of the unit is female 
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5. Organizer has 1-5 years rank- and-file experience 
6. Union used small group meetings 
7. Percent of units surveyed regarding contract before the election 
Variables showing slight positive impact on election outcome 
1. Employer offered good benefit package before the election 
2. Lead organizer female or minority 
3. Rank-and-file volunteers from other unionized firms did house calls 
Variables showing strong negative impact on election outcome 
1. Number of eligible voters in unit 
2. Average age of unit 
3. Company profitable before the election 
4. Organizer has a college degree 
5. Company gave wage increase during campaign 
6. Company made promises during the campaign 
7. Company used anti-union committee 
8. Number of captive audience meetings by company 
9. Number of union letters mailed 
Variables showing moderate negative impact on election outcome 
1. Stipulated or board ordered unit different than unit union petition for 
2. Company had participation or QWL plan before campaign 
3. Number of company letters during campaign 
Variables showing no statistically significant impact on election outcome 
1. Unit in manufacturing sector 
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2. Organizer class background 
3. Management consultant used 
4. Workers discharged for union activity, not reinstated before the election. 
The results of this two-part study by Kate Bronfenbrenner were published in 
1991; it remains still today one of the most significant and important studies conducted 
on strategies for unions’ winning workplace representation elections. However, the 
limiting factor of the study was the unilateral collection of data from only one party to the 
workplace representation election: the union organizer. Additionally and as previously 
noted, Bronfenbrenner has addressed the fact that the union organizer is not granted equal 
access within the workplace and therefore is dependent upon others’ descriptions of 
developments occurring within the campaign. Most often those reporting such employer 
actions are not labor relations professionals; consequently, data corruption is a potential 
result. Again, another hallmark of Bronfenbrenner studies is the failure to directly contact 
employers regarding their own messaging and tactics employed during the campaign and 
an overreliance on, at best, second-hand information as reported by the union organizer. 
Bronfenbrenner published another survey in 1994 involving a random sample of 
261 NLRB workplace representation elections with 50 or more eligible voters that took 
place between July 1986 and June 1987. The study was reported in a chapter entitled 
“Employer Behavior in Certification Elections and First-contract Campaigns: 
Implications for Labor Law Reform” (Bronfenbrenner, 1994). This 1994 study 
documented the union organizers’ perceptions of the pervasive nature of aggressive 
employer antiunion behavior during organizing campaigns. Again, the described study 
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unfortunately relied exclusively on representations made by the lead union organizer for 
each campaign. 
With a dependent variable of “union win rate” the 1994 Bronfenbrenner survey 
study considered several independent variables (see Bronfenbrenner, 1994 [2001 
electronic], p. 79, Table 5.1): 
1. Number of days from petition election 
a. 60 days or less 
b. 60 – 180 days 
c. 180 days or more 
2. Percent sign the cards 
a. More than 50% 
3. Pre-campaign participation plan 
4. Unit changed after petition 
5. Management consultant used 
6. Discharge is not reinstated 
a. All units with discharges 
7. Company gave wage increase 
8. Company made promises 
9. Antiunion committee used 
10. Number of captive audience meetings 
a. No captive audience meetings 
b. 20 or more meetings 
11. Number of company letters 
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a. No company letters 
b. More than five letters 
12. Supervisor campaigned one on one 
13. ULP charges filed 
a. Complaints won on charges filed 
This 1994 study of the union organizers’ responses found that more than 75% of 
the employers engaged in active antiunion tactics. These tactics included discharging 
union supporters, captive audience meetings, supervisor one-on-one meetings, wage 
increases, promises of improvements in wages benefits or other working conditions, 
antiunion committees, and letters. The study found that each of these independent 
variables resulted in statistically significant impacts on the election outcome. 
Bronfenbrenner’s 1994 study also found that 71% of the employers in the sample 
utilized a labor relations consultant during the election campaign. Under the Labor 
Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, a labor relations 
consultant is defined as “[a]ny person who for compensation, advises or represents an 
employer, employer organization, or labor organization concerning employee organizing 
or collective bargaining activities” (Public Laws, 1959). Ironically the win rate for unions 
in which the employer used an outside consultant was 40%, in comparison with a union 
win rate of 50% in campaigns where no employer outside consultant was used. The 
independent variable of the use of an external consultant was not statistically significant; 
the researcher surmised that it was a result of employers hiring such competencies in-
house or relying on staff, rather than outsourcing to an external consultant. The future for 
outsourcing the labor relations support for employers may increase though, as the union 
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density continues to decrease in the American workplace. Outsourcing solutions, instead 
of hiring or maintaining in-house labor relations specialists, is one strategy accounting for 
the decreased number of available labor relations jobs. In September of 2019 the US 
Bureau of Labor Statistics forecast that the available number of labor relations specialist 
jobs will decrease by 8% from 2018 to 2028 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, n.d.).  
In April 2019 Ruth Mayhew published an article on the advantages of employing 
labor relations professionals, alleging that there is a relationship between which party is 
leading the country and the potential increase in union organizing, which in turn drives 
the demand for hiring labor relations professionals. If Mayhew is correct then low union 
density rate today (less than 7% in the private sector) bodes poorly for those labor 
relations professionals seeking in-house jobs. Employers instead are likely to hire such 
consultants only when needed, as in an NLRB election.  
An earlier study of the use of labor relations consultants predated the 
aforementioned 1994 Bronfenbrenner study. Thomas Patrick Frazier’s 1984 dissertation 
study entitled Consultants, Unions, and NLRB Elections chronicled the use and efficacy 
of consultants in workplace representation elections held during 1982, noting that their 
use resulted in increased success for employers. His study relied on data collected by the 
AFL-CIO, which again sourced its information from union organizers. Frazier’s work 
foreshadowed the weakness of most studies that would follow, noting the data collected 
from the union organizer “reflect the subjective judgments of the field organizer involved 
in the election. Obviously, care should be taken in any interpretation of results based 
upon these subjective judgments” (p. 28).  
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The previously noted and recently published 2019 study by McNicholas and 
colleagues analyzed, among other topics, employers’ use of workplace representation 
election campaign consultants. While the study did not address the percentage of 
elections featuring a consultant, it estimated that over $338 million was spent by 
employers annually during the span of the 2015 revised election rules. 
Employer Tactics to Win Elections  
According to the lead union organizers surveyed in the Bronfenbrenner (2009a, 
2009b) study, union supporters in 30% of the workplace representation election 
campaigns were terminated from their employment during the campaign. Interestingly, 
however, charges were filed in 87% of the earlier referenced 30% of campaigns. Of that 
87% of the 30%, the NLRB rejected 57% of these charges. It is noteworthy that the 
author could have reported after the above-mentioned statistics that only 11.6% of all 
campaigns contained the termination of a union supporter during the campaign.  
The more recent aforementioned study by McNicholas and colleagues (2019) 
examined unfair labor practices (ULP) allegations, charges, and filings; the authors found 
employers are charged with illegally firing workers in nearly a third (29.6%) of all NLRB 
supervised elections. Unfortunately, it is not until a late-appearing footnote that the study 
notes “the filing of a charge itself is not a determination of a violation of the National 
Labor Relations Act” (p. 14, fn. 2). The lead union organizers reported that employers 
granted wage increases in 30% of the workplace representation election campaigns, and 
made promises to improve wages, hours, and working conditions in 56% of the 
campaigns. Both of these actions are unlawful. The study indicated that the number of 
captive audience meetings and number of company letters sent also significantly 
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impacted the union’s ability to win the workplace representation election. Union win 
rates declined dramatically as the number of employer captive audience meetings and 
employer letters to employees’ homes increased. This resulted in a 40% union win rate 
for campaigns in which no captive audience meetings were held or letters sent, down to 
an 18% union win rate when the employer held 20 or more captive audience meetings 
and a 37% union win rate where the company sent more than five letters during the 
campaign (see Bronfenbrenner, 2001). 
In 2004 Cornell University published a study by researchers Satish Deshpande 
and Christina Stamper who similarly studied a set of variables influencing union win 
rates in workplace representation elections within the hospitality industry. With the 
dependent variable of a union win rate, their study identified the following independent 
variables that most affect the election outcome:  
• union involved; 
• number of unions on the election ballot; 
• the number of days from petition filing for the election until the election is 
held; 
• whether the employer is in a Right-to-Work state;  
• size of the prospective bargaining unit; and 
• percentage of eligible unit members who vote in the election (turnout). 
(p. 198). 
The researchers studied 190 workplace representation elections occurring between 
January 1999 and December 2001, and research findings were published in the Cornell 
Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly on May 1, 2004. For each of the 
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identified independent variables studied, researchers found that there were two factors 
predominantly impacting the union success rate: 1) the size of the prospective bargaining 
unit, and 2) the presence of more than one union on the ballot seeking to represent the 
employer’s employees. The study’s authors presented their findings for each of the 
independent variables identified. For unit size, of the 190 elections studied the average 
unit contained 56 employees. Unions won 54% of the elections with an average 77% of 
the votes. The researchers found that multi-union elections were positively correlated 
with union victories. Interestingly, of the 190 elections studied the researchers found that 
the ballots were counted on average 61 days after the filing of the petition for election 
and that voter turnout averaged 88% (Deshpande & Stamper, 2004). 
On May 20, 2009, the Economic Policy Institute published perhaps the most 
significant Bronfenbrenner (2009a) study, No Holds Barred: The Intensification of 
Employer Opposition to Organizing.  This study included a random sample of 1,004 
workplace representation elections with 50 or more employee voters conducted January 
1, 1999 to December 31, 2003. Bronfenbrenner again surveyed lead union organizers 
only, using mail, phone, email, personal interviews; she correlated her findings with 
NLRB charges [of unlawful conduct] and election data. Bronfenbrenner reported her 
study provided "a well-documented portrait of the legal and illegal tactics used by 
employers in NLRB representational elections" (Bronfenbrenner, 2009a, p. 2).  
The findings of this Bronfenbrenner (2009a) study are routinely reported even 
today. A notable excerpt in said findings stated: “Employers threatened to close the plant 
in 57% of elections, discharged workers in 34% and threatened to cut wages and benefits 
in 47% of elections… In 63% of elections employers used supervisor one-on-one 
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meetings to interrogate workers about who they or other workers supported, and in 54% 
used such sessions to threaten workers" (p. 2). 
Ironically Bronfenbrenner (2009a) anticipated criticism of her study's data 
collection methodology that focused on the lead organizer's supposed knowledge of 
others’ experiences in the workplace. She acknowledged some critics have raised 
questions as to the reliability of union organizers as a data source. Her response was that 
university institutional review boards would not approve any study of employees due to 
risks to the worker. Additionally, she suggested that "it is simply not possible to use 
employers as an alternative source" (p. 5). She elaborated:  
As we have demonstrated in previous studies, the overwhelming majority of 
employers are engaging in one or more illegal behaviors (at minimum 75% of the 
employers in the current sample are alleged to have committed at least one illegal 
action). Not only would it be next to impossible to get employers to complete 
surveys in which they honestly reported on illegal activity, but that kind of 
question would not be permitted by university institutional review boards.  
(pp.5-6). Bronfenbrenner defined such illegal activity by the allegations and charges filed 
by the lead organizers or representatives. An accusation of an unlawful act is not proof of 
its existence, however.  
An ongoing criticism of the Bronfenbrenner (2009a) study is again the sole 
reliance on only one side to the conflict within workplace representation elections. The 
suggestion that employers would not respond to surveys in opposition to their interests is 
seemingly not considered as a driver of behavior for both sides of the conflict. 
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Nonetheless, even with their shortcomings Bronfenbrenner’s studies remain today among 
the most significant workplace representation election analyses ever conducted. 
On March 26, 2014, Jonathan Lepie published a study entitled “Is There a 
Winning Formula for Union Organizing” as an extension of the Bronfenbrenner studies 
conducted between 1995-2004. Lepie asserted that no other literature was as influential 
on union strategies as the Bronfenbrenner studies. Bronfenbrenner sought to provide 
union organizers with tactics that would increase their win rate by interviewing union 
organizers and learning what worked and what did not. Lepie stated that Bronfenbrenner 
"claimed to have discovered a winning formula for certification elections” (p. 138). Chief 
among the winning strategies included house calling or the process of unannounced visits 
to the homes of employees who will vote in the workplace representation election. 
However, Lepie pointed out that even after Bronfenbrenner's widely-read study, union 
win rates declined (p. 138). 
Lepie (2014) reminded readers that three years later Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 
(1998) further refined their formula in “It Takes More Than Housecalls: Organizing to 
Win with a Comprehensive Union-building Strategy.” After a continued decline in union 
win rates, he noted, Bronfenbrenner again refined the union organizing formula in 2004 
with a co-authored chapter entitled “Changing to Organize: A National Assessment of 
Union Strategies” (Bronfenbrenner & Hickey, 2004). Again union win rates were not 
improved with the release of this 2004 study. Lepie noted that Bronfenbrenner and 
Hickey interviewed hundreds of organizers, identifying their tactics and quantifiable 
correlating tactics with election wins. Lepie stated "nobody claimed to have detected 
flaws in Bronfenbrenner's methodology” (p. 138).  
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Lepie (2014) spent the bulk of his career as a union organizer and retired from the 
Service Employees International Union (SEIU) as Director of Organizing in 2001. Lepie 
sought in his own work to advance the Bronfenbrenner studies but again elected to 
interview only the union organizers for perspective. His rationale for doing so would 
seem to hinge upon his adversarial perception of management. As a result, he interviewed 
10 and only 10 union organizers as the basis for his study. Lepie deliberately limited his 
2014 study to ten organizers to ensure he captured the opinions of only lead organizers 
with more than ten campaigns and who had won at least one campaign opposing a 
professional “union buster” (p. 140). The phrase “union buster” is typically a reference to 
a consultant hired by the employer to consult and manage the employer's response to a 
workplace representation election. Union organizers presume that union busters seek to 
eliminate unions, although ironically doing so would eliminate the "union busters'" 
profession. Lepie's use of the “union buster” phrase provides insight into his perspective 
as a researcher. 
Not surprisingly, Lepie's 2014 study of lead union organizers found that the 
number one predictor of organizing success is the quality and skill of the organizer. 
However, Lepie did critique Bronfenbrenner's formulaic approach to unions’ winning 
strategies in workplace representation elections. He noted that elections are two-party 
contests, so studying the strategy of one player to the contest without assessing the 
context of the other is ineffective. He suggested the context of an election should drive 
the determination of the union's campaign strategy. However, Lepie’s characterization of 
the election as a two-party contest fails to acknowledge the important role that employees 
themselves have in campaigning amongst themselves. Employees are effectively the most 
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important actors in the election system. They are not only the sole party to vote; 
employees themselves also campaign to persuade other employees to join or not join a 
union. 
Lepie (2014) noted another problem with Bronfenbrenner's model is that it 
assumes not only that employers behave the same, but also that voting employees behave 
the same in workplace representation elections. Lepie concluded by noting 
Bronfenbrenner's dissatisfaction with national union leadership for failing to adopt her 
formulaic list of tactics that she correlated with union success in workplace representation 
elections.  
Lepie (2014) suggested that union success in workplace representation elections 
hinges on placing greater value on the cooks rather than the cookbook. However, a more 
recent example illustrates the frustration of unions and their distaste for employers’ use of 
management consultants. In October of 2018 a majority of the 1,400 employees at 
Luxottica Group’s McDonough, Ga., distribution center voted against the union in the 
workplace representation election (Wallender, 2019). The employees are part of the 
world’s largest eyewear company, which owns brands that include Ray-Ban, Oakley and 
others. The Milan-based company released a statement on October 22, 2018, declaring 
their support for the employees’ decision to eschew union representation. Edgar Fields, 
president of the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union Southeast Council, stated 
that the employer “had consultants there around the clock talking to employees, and it 
worked” (Wallender, 2018, p. 1). 
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Summary 
The National Labor Relations Act was passed in 1935 and its regulations have 
been the subject of some of the most violent and intense workplace conflict ever since. 
There is substantial research and literature supporting employees’ decisions to vote in 
favor of unions, unfortunately without regard to reliable data on the employers’ strategies 
and messaging. As indicated in the review of the literature discussed, an employer’s 
viewpoint has been largely ignored in academic research studies on winning strategies for 
workplace representation elections coordinated by the NLRB. The general premise of the 
prior studies examined is that employers had a vested interest in justifying the legality of 
their actions. This of course presumes that employers are individually and collectively 
disingenuous. Such a subjective assertion cannot be proved. However, to completely 
ignore the perspective of the employer creates and extends a gap in credible research. It 
can also be said that the source of information in prior studies, the union organizers 
themselves, share the same potential for bias. This dissertation research study contributes 
to the existing academic and professional bodies of knowledge by including an ignored 
perspective, that of the employer. While the ultimate value of this research is admittedly 
difficult to predict, it is believed that this mixed methods study may aid and assist 
employers in reducing the conflict associated with an NLRB election loss.  
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology 
This mixed methods research study developed a conceptual model to further 
inform contentious workplace conflict of representation elections supervised by the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB elections). As previously noted, the intent of a 
workplace representation election is to determine whether a petitioning union has 
sufficient support to unionize a unit of employees within a workplace. Such a unit might 
include a department, job classification or any other means of identifying a group of 
employees sharing a community of interest.  
This dissertation research study built upon previously published findings on the 
topic of conflict inherent within workplace representation elections. While much has been 
studied regarding why employees join unions and why unions are successful in 
workplace representation elections, there is little research on employers’ successful 
strategies during workplace representation elections. There has not been a study yet 
representing the perspective of the employers; that perspective is the central focus of this 
research. As noted in Chapter Two, information related to employer strategies was not 
sourced in previous studies from the employer but instead from secondary, tertiary, or 
other far-removed sources of information. Specifically, prior studies detailing employers’ 
election messaging and tactics exclusively sourced their data from the union organizer 
rather than the employers themselves. This study therefore included the heretofore 
omitted voice of the employer to identify multivariate influences upon winning 
workplace representation elections.  
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Research Rationale & Design 
As described below in each section of this chapter on methodology, for this study 
the researcher systematically collected and analyzed information from three sources in 
order to triangulate their meaning and implications for a model that could assist 
employers to understand key factors that influence the percent of the vote in their favor 
during workplace representation elections.  
Mixed Methods Research Design 
The selection of the research design in this study involved a mixed methods 
approach, employing both quantitative and qualitative methodology to answer the 
research questions identified, as those questions are further detailed below. Mixed 
methods was selected as an appropriate research design for the instant study because the 
researcher determined that both quantitative and qualitative data, together, provided a 
better understanding of the research problem than either type by itself (see Creswell, 
2008). A mixed methods approach was appropriate here to build from previous study 
phases by following up quantitative research qualitatively, to obtain more detailed 
information (see Creswell, 2012).  
For the researcher’s investigation of variables affecting the outcomes of worker 
representation elections, understanding their aspects from the perspective of the employer 
was facilitated by a particular design within the mixed methods approach, that of 
triangulation. The term ‘triangulation’ was originally coined by two quantitative 
psychological methodologists, Donald Campbell and Donald Fiske (1959), who used the 
term to advocate for the use of additional measurement instruments to capture 
psychological traits (Kelle, Kühberger, & Bernhard, 2019). Qualitative social researcher 
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Norman Denzin (1977) took up this idea and expanded the concept in his monograph The 
Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods, explaining that 
methodological triangulation would involve “a complex process of playing each method 
off against the other in order to maximize the validity of field efforts” (p. 310). 
One way to understand the concept of methodological triangulation is as a 
“combination of methods and/or data with the aim of describing a research field or a 
topic more comprehensively and explaining it better with the help of different but 
complementary results” (Kelle et al., 2019, p. 11, citations omitted). In triangulation 
research design the results obtained through different methodologies can be viewed in 
combination to provide a richer or more accurate description of the phenomenon being 
studied. By mixing both quantitative and qualitative research and data, this researcher 
gained understanding in breadth and depth of aspects of the subject phenomenon more 
accurately by approaching it from different vantage points.  
Successful triangulation required careful analysis of the type of information 
provided by each method, including its strengths and weaknesses. The combination of the 
advantages of each methodology applied in the instant study and outlined in this chapter 
(e.g., large sample sizes for both quantitative research efforts, rich contextual explication 
gleaned from qualitative structured interviews of experts) greatly worked to overcome 
disadvantages of each (e.g., information limitations of NLRB database, survey response 
rate, or the relative size of the expert pool consulted). Those advantages and 
disadvantages will be addressed in the analyses for each methodological component as 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
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As first introduced and visually presented in Figure 4 in Chapter One, the 
methodological processes followed for this mixed methods study allowed for the 
compilation, analysis, and triangulation of information on workplace representation 
elections available from three different sources. The specifics of the explanatory 
sequential (Creswell, 2013) methodological steps followed for the study are here more 
fully described. First, the researcher collected information from the literature reviewed to 
identify and then quantitatively analyze independent variables in an existing 
governmental database available on the National Labor Relations Board website 
(https://www.nlrb.gov/; hereinafter NLRB database) that permitted specific focus on 
information available for elections in certain jurisdictions over a certain period of time. 
The researcher next developed, piloted, and administered an original survey instrument 
that gathered data on campaign messaging and communication tactics, yielding detailed 
information regarding the campaign messages and communication tactics in 32 elections. 
The study finally utilized qualitative methodology to conduct semi-structured interviews 
of subject matter experts in campaign strategy, regarding their perspectives on employer 
campaign messaging and communication tactics, in order to then conduct thematic 
analysis of the interview responses and contribute those findings to this study’s enhanced 
understanding of the examined topic. 
Quantitative Methodology 
Two quantitative research methodologies were applied to investigation of the 
subject phenomenon: correlational research and survey research.  
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Correlational Research Methodology 
Informed by the review of the literature as described in Chapter Two, an analysis 
of those independent variables (IVs) existing within the governmental database described 
below (specifically, 305 elections contained therein) was conducted using quantitative 
analyses, including correlation coefficient analysis. Certain IVs for which data was not 
available within the 305 elections database were addressed separately in the design of the 
original survey entitled Voice of the Employer Survey©, discussed below in the section on 
survey research. 
Population. The population for this study’s quantitative research included the 305 
representation elections supervised by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in 
Regions 10, 12, 15 and 16 for private non-government employers’ workplaces. The 
population is the southeastern portion of the United States, which constitutes the largest 
percentage of states that allow right to work, itself an important demographic population 
to be studied. In states allowing right to work, employees cannot be compelled to join a 
union as part of their employment terms and conditions. If the employee is employed in a 
unionized workplace, the employee also cannot be required to financially support the 
union (Wallender & Smith, 2019). 
As is evident from data in Figure 10 reproduced and described below, since 2008, 
across the entire United States on average 1,434 NLRB supervised elections occur each 
year. The number of elections actually held is approximately one-third less than the 
2,108-average number of elections annually requested (petitioned). These elections are 
conducted under the auspices of the Regional Directors of the NLRB within each of the 
26 regions of the NLRB (www.NLRB.gov/who-we-are/regional-offices). Employees or a 
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union may file a petition for a representation election (RC) after collecting signatures 
from at least 30% of workers in the potential bargaining unit. Petitions that are not 
withdrawn or dismissed result in an NLRB-conducted election. A simple majority of 
votes decides the outcome, and in order for the petitioning union to win the election it 
must have a majority of the votes cast. Conversely if an employer receives a majority or 
even a tie in number of votes cast, it results in a win for the employer. On its website 
(https://www.nlrb.gov), the National Labor Relations Board publishes the database of all 
workplace representation elections for a ten-year period. It should be noted that some 
petitions filed in a given year may not have had an election until a subsequent year; the 
number of petitions thus may not equal the total number of dispositions in a given year. 
Table 2 charts workplace representation election activity for every single NLRB region 
across the United States and its territories for the recent decade of fiscal years 2008-2017. 
Table 2 
NLRB petitions, elections, and results, FY 2008-2017 
https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/data/petitions-elections/representation-petitions-rc 
Fiscal 
Year 
Petitions 
Filed 
Elections 
Held 
Won by 
Union 
Lost by 
Union 
Petitions 
Dismissed 
Petitions 
Withdrawn 
FY08 2418 1614 1028 586 48 784 
FY09 2082 1335 915 420 46 657 
FY10 2380 1571 1036 535 37 725 
FY11 2108 1398 935 463 43 667 
FY12 1974 1348 868 480 38 597 
FY13 1986 1330 852 478 27 607 
FY14 2053 1407 952 440 24 586 
FY15 2198 1574 1120 480 39 663 
FY16 2029 1396 1014 401 38 610 
FY17 1854 1366 940 375 29 493 
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The National Labor Relations Board website provides a listing of the employer 
and union involved in all of its supervised workplace representation elections. This study 
in particular focused its election outcome inquiries on data available for elections within 
National Labor Relations Board Regions 10, 12, 15 and 16, specifically stakeholder 
employers experiencing elections during the period of April 1, 2015 through May 1, 
2017. These NLRB Regions represent the southern portion of the United States and 
include 305 elections during the period of study. The dates of the period of the study 
coincide with the April 2015 enactment date of the major changes to the NLRB election 
process as described in Chapter Two and include two years of election activity. 
Figure 10 illustrates the four regions’ jurisdictional coverage in the maps below.  
 
Figure 10. Map of NLRB Regions 10, 12, 15, and 16. 
Source: https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/regional-offices 
According to the NLRB’s website, Regions 10, 12, 15, and 16 serve the states of Florida, 
Georgia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Louisiana, 
Arkansas, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, Missouri, Texas, Georgia, North Carolina, 
Alabama, and Tennessee (https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/regional-offices). As noted, 
for the regions considered during the time period described, the size of the population 
studied numbered 305 elections.  
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Correlational Research Results. In the quantitative data that was available for 
this research study, it was the size of the population and sample, 305 elections, that 
readily lent itself to the study of the relationships among available variables and 
specifically to correlation coefficient analysis. This methodology afforded quantitatively 
identifying the strength of the relationships of the variables. This in turn enabled the 
testing of a null hypothesis for research questions 1 and 2: 
RQ1 – Do shorter election periods result in more or less employer victories in 
NLRB elections? 
RQ2 – Do contested or stipulated elections favor employers in NLRB elections? 
Correlational Research: Null Hypothesis Testing 
The importance of null hypothesis testing cannot be overstated. Null hypothesis 
significance testing is a widespread method for assessing any hypothesis or theory. One 
hypothesis suggests that an effect exists (the alternate hypothesis) and the other says the 
effect doesn’t exist (the null hypothesis). This testing is accomplished by creating a test 
statistic that represents the alternative hypothesis, and then calculating the probability that 
one would get a value as big as the one obtained if the null hypothesis were true. If the 
probability is less than .05 we reject the null hypothesis and represent that a statistically 
significant finding exists. If the probability is greater than .05 we do not reject the null 
hypothesis and represent that a non-statistically significant finding exists (Field, 2013). 
In Hypothesis Testing and Sampling, Peter Rogerson (2001) suggested studies 
should begin by establishing a null hypothesis. In this study the null hypothesis was: 
H0:  The percent of election vote is not influenced by any identified independent 
variable, the election period, voter turnout, or the size of the unit.  
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There are two results that this study relied upon: 
• The null hypothesis is true, and the employers’ decisions do not influence the 
workplace representation election vote percentage in favor of the employer; or 
• The null hypothesis is false, indicating that statistically significant data shows 
how precisely unusual it would be to obtain our sample if the null hypothesis 
were true (see Rogerson, 2011). 
A correlation coefficient analysis was conducted on 305 elections to determine if 
the independent variables involved shorter election periods and whether elections 
contested or stipulated covary with the percentage of vote in favor of the employer. 
Informed by the review of the literature as described in Chapter Two, identification and 
then analysis of certain independent variables (IVs) existing within the described 
governmental database (specifically, 305 elections contained therein) was conducted. It 
should be noted here that certain IVs of possible influence on workplace representation 
election outcomes for which data was not available within the 305 elections database 
were addressed separately, through the design of the original survey entitled Voice of the 
Employer Survey©, as discussed below in the section on survey research. 
The dataset of the 305 elections provided by the National Labor Relations Board 
is presented in categorical variables (see https://www.nlrb.gov/reportsguidance/reports/ 
election-reports, among them importantly one continuous dependent variable and 3 
continuous independent variables within the dataset. As further detailed below, Percent of 
the Vote in Favor of the Employer was the dependent variable for this study. The 
independent variables selected for assessment of their relationship to that dependent 
variable were: 
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• Election Period, the cycle time or duration of the election campaign leading to 
the vote, 
• Number of Eligible Voters, a measure of the unit size in the workplace, and 
• Turnout, the percent representing of the Number of Eligible Voters that voted. 
Dependent Variable 
Percent of the Vote in Favor of the Employer. The named dependent variable for 
this study’s quantitative analysis of the NLRB dataset—Percent of Vote in Favor of the 
Employer—is the principal objective of the employer involved in the election, and the 
sole determinant of success for a party’s campaign messaging efforts. The question 
presented to voters is whether the voting worker seeks to be represented by the 
petitioning union; the voting worker is only presented with a single choice: Yes or No.  
The dependent variable is mathematically determined by dividing the total 
number of NO votes by the total number of all votes cast. This dependent variable is used 
to assess the strength of its relationship to the independent variables, those variables 
influencing the dependent variable. The practical significance of the Percent of the Vote 
in Favor of the Employer, to unions, employees and employers, is one threshold 
determination: whether the petitioning union obtains a majority of the vote. If so, the 
petitioning union wins the election and the right to represent the workers; conversely, the 
employer loses the election. In other words, an employer victory in an NLRB election 
only occurs when the employer receives as many, or more, votes than the petitioning 
union.  
The significance of an employer election loss manifests itself in financial costs 
and continued conflict, as the petitioning union along with workers seek to exert power to 
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influence the employer to agree to the union’s contractual negotiations. Additionally, 
while the conflict between the union and the employer may continue or even escalate, it 
is important to remember that the overwhelming majority of elections contain differences 
of opinions among the workers themselves on whether union representation is desired in 
the workplace. Thus, whether the employer wins the election or not (as measured by the 
Percent of the Vote in Favor of the Employer) is one of the most substantive variables a 
worker or employer will encounter in their career. 
Independent Variables 
This study’s quantitative analysis of the data for the described 305 elections in the 
NLRB database sought to assess the strength of influence of the following independent 
variables on the described dependent variable. 
The Election Period. This independent variable is simply the elapsed time 
between the date on which the union files its petition for an election and the date on 
which the vote occurs. This independent variable is measured in number of days. As 
noted in the literature review, the duration of the election period is a strong predictor of 
whether the employer will lose the election. The less time an employer has to campaign 
with its messaging on why workers should reject union representation, the smaller will be 
of the Percent of the Vote in Favor of the Employer. As noted in the literature review, if 
the petitioning union can obtain an Election Period of 14 days or less, the union has a 
near 90% win rate; conversely the employer wins only 10 % of the time when the 
election period is 14 days or less in length. The Election Period length thus is perhaps one 
of the most controversial variables in an NLRB election and it is the variable that affected 
parties most seek to change to create advantage.  
90 
 
 
Number of Eligible Voters. The independent variable Number of Eligible Voters 
is colloquially known as Unit Size; it is the number of workers in the voting unit. Often 
this is a portion of a department, a location, or even an entire company. It is simply 
measured in number of people eligible within the workplace to vote. Most understand the 
simple concept that it is easier to obtain a consensus of a few rather than to obtain a 
consensus among thousands of workers.  Analysis of this variable in the database of the 
305 elections addressed the relationship strength to election outcome of size in number of 
votes cast, as discussed in Chapter Four.  
Turnout. This independent variable is measured as the percent of the Number of 
Eligible Voters who submit a ballot to vote. Historically NLRB elections have high 
turnout; it is an objective of the employer to convince employees of the importance of 
their vote. A correlation coefficient analysis of this independent variable in comparison to 
the dependent variable Percent of the Vote in Favor of the Employer was conducted to 
yield the extent to which these two independent variables covary when changes occur in 
turnout.  
In response to research questions RQ1 and RQ2, results of the quantitative 
analysis of the 305 elections listing the relationship between the dependent and three 
independent variables discussed are presented in Chapter Four. 
Survey Research Methodology 
Unions view the workplace representation election as the mechanism for taking 
power away from management (Bradbury, Brenner, & Slaughter, 2016). From the 
perspective of the employer, the workplace representation election system presents 
conflict involving whether to utilize election campaign messages and communication 
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tactics in an attempt to retain power and prevent having it seized by a union. In turn 
employees are affected to varying degrees by the employer’s campaign messaging and 
communication tactics, such as through website statements, social media, letters to 
homes, and other means of communication.  
Because information on certain independent variables (IVs) with possible 
influence on the outcome of workplace representation elections were not available within 
the 305 elections database, the researcher addressed those IVs through the design of an 
original survey entitled Voice of the Employer Survey©, discussed below.  
Survey Population and Sample 
The Voice of the Employer Survey© instrument was designed to be administered 
to employers who participated in a workplace representation election during the research 
period. The survey population and sample size were the same for this methodological 
component of the study as it was for the study’s correlational research component 
previously described: 305 employers experiencing a workplace representation election in 
NLRB Regions 10, 12, 15, and 16 during the research period of April 1, 2015 through 
May 1, 2017. 
Pilot Test. In the course of the Voice of the Employer Survey© instrument’s 
design and before its administration to identified employer representatives for the 305 
elections, pilot testing of the instrument was a methodological necessity. As Litwin 
(2003) noted in Pilot Testing –The Survey Kit: How to Assess and Interpret Survey 
Psychometrics, “pilot testing is a necessary and important part of survey development” 
(p. 58). It enables the researcher to identify the context and process by which subjects 
will understand and provide responses (and thereby data) to the researcher’s instrument. 
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Litwin suggests the pilot test is among the most critical steps in assessing the practical 
application of the instrument. In Pamela Alreck and Robert Settle’s (2004) The Survey 
Research Handbook, the authors noted that the advantages of a pilot survey include the 
ability to understand the degree of variance and confidence intervals that can be expected 
from the actual survey. They also observed that the pilot survey “need not even use the 
same data collection method as that for the main survey, and [pilot surveys] can often be 
completed easily, quickly and inexpensively” (p. 69). 
To conduct the pilot study, three subject matter experts were selected from 
program speakers on the topic of labor relations and workplace representation elections at 
recent industry and professional conferences during 2018; one such conference is 
reflected below in Figure 11.  
 
Figure 11. Fall 2018 CUE conference flyer. 
Source: https://www.cueinc.com/fall-2018-cue-conference-powerful-and-resilient-
ensuring-success-together/ 
The advantage of such an approach is the validation of the subject matter experts’ 
knowledge as recognized by their peers within the industry or profession. Each of the 
three individuals was contacted by phone requesting their review of the drafted 
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instrument (Appendix B). The subject matter expert was asked to complete the survey as 
a would-be respondent while on the phone with the researcher. The objective of the pilot 
test of the instrument was not data collection but rather testing of the instrument. This 
then enabled the researcher to accomplish the objectives of the pilot study, which 
included: 
• observe the completion of the sample survey under controlled conditions; 
• identify the elapsed time to complete the survey; 
• identify any misunderstandings of the wording, context, or operational 
definitions within the items; and 
• identify any problematic format design choices. 
The input provided by three different iterations of the pilot test of the survey instrument 
reinforced the utility and understandability of the instrument as drafted (Appendix B). 
Procedures for Recruitment and Data Collection. The final version of the survey 
is included in Appendix C. The accompanying packet of information included a 
welcome, definitions of the independent variables, an explanation of participant rights, 
and a thank you letter unique to each survey recipient (Appendix D).  
The survey itself was administered utilizing traditional paper and pencil 
methodology. While it is understood that this surveying methodology is atypical of 
modern research, there are distinct advantages to using the traditional paper and pencil 
method. The chief benefit is that the survey respondent has an immediate understanding 
of the complexity and time required to complete the survey. An additional benefit of 
using a paper and pencil survey was the ability to brand the survey to increase the 
likelihood of an employer’s response. 
94 
 
 
Employers received the survey instrument mailed through the U.S. Postal Service 
inquiring about their specific election experience. A traditional mail survey can expect no 
better than a 20% response rate when no response incentives are provided (Bourque & 
Fielder, 2003). The 32 respondent employers considered for analysis within this study 
have a significant vested interest in the study results. Access to a model of winning 
employer campaign messaging and communication tactics would be particularly 
beneficial to employers and no doubt influenced some or all to volunteer for this research 
study by submitting their election experience and information. The response rate and data 
obtained are addressed in greater detail in Chapter Four.  
Dependent Variable. The dependent variable identified to assess its relationship 
to the independent variables was defined as the Percentage of the Vote in Favor of the 
Employer. This dependent variable importantly indicates the election outcome, 
specifically whether the employer won or lost. This was measured by the percent of the 
votes obtained by the employer. An employer victory in a representation election 
supervised by the NLRB occurs when the employer receives more votes than the 
petitioning union or when the vote is a tie. In other words, the petitioning union must 
receive most of the votes for the employer to lose the election.  
Independent Variables. Below are the operational definitions of the independent 
variables that the literature review anticipated to be the best predictors of the election 
outcome, namely the percent of the vote in favor of the employer that is determinative of 
either winning or losing the election. These independent variables were the subject of 
inquiry for the survey instrument design. 
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As noted in Chapter Two, in his book Total Victory! The Complete Management 
Guide to a Successful NLRB Representation Election, Donald Wilson (1998) chronicled 
and defined typical employer communication messages and tactics (e.g., meetings, 
letters, posters, Facebook, Twitter). Wilson described many of the independent variables 
that were determinative of employers’ election success. The book was published after a 
long career of providing consultation to employers both directly and indirectly in 3,500 
elections. Drawing on his extensive experience, Wilson highlighted the recommended 
messages and communication tactics most predictive of the vote in favor of an employer. 
Unfortunately, his book has not been updated nor generated repeated published studies 
since its initial 1998 release. This mixed methods research study expanded upon and may 
be compared with Wilson’s research, as well as with other studies included within the 
literature reviewed addressing the contemporary election environment faced by 
employers during the 2015 – 2017 timespan covered by the 2015 election revisions.  
Chief amongst Wilson’s (1998) identified independent variables determinative of 
employer’s election success are the following, providing guidance for the independent 
variables used in this study. 
Posters. Wilson (1998) defines a poster as literature displayed conspicuously 
throughout the workplace. Typically, such employer campaign posters include no more 
than a few words and can be easily understood, require only a moment to read, and are 
posted in the workplace for only a short time – one or two days. Such posters vary 
significantly in tone and purpose (cf. Appendix E). A rather benign but thematically 
integrated poster might include a photo of a bowling ball and bowling pins with the 
phrase “only this kind of strike is fun” (Wilson, 1998, p. 167). For this study measures of 
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the independent variable posters included asking employers if posters were used in their 
campaign, and if so to identify the total number of posters used: 0-5; 6-10; 11-15; 16+. 
Captive Audience Meetings. The captive audience meeting is simply a gathering 
of employees in which management conveys its position or persuasive communication 
supporting its position in the workplace representation election. Such meetings are 
facilitated by the employer’s management and conducted “on the clock” (paid time), 
often in small groups of typically 10 or less employees. In his book Total Victory Wilson 
(1998) referenced the experience of over 3,500 representation elections. He suggested 
there is a direct correlation between the number of captive audience meetings and the 
likelihood that management will win the representation election. He stated that his 
company, Labor Relations Institute, has shown a correlation between the number of 
captive audience meetings conducted by the employer and the prediction that 
management will receive more of the vote, a greater chance that management will win 
the election. His data provided an excellent operational measurement and inquiry for the 
employer regarding number of captive audience meetings held: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5+.  
Wilson’s (1998) data showed the following operational link to the chance that 
management will win the election, as reproduced below in Table 3. 
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Table 3 
Captive audience and employer win rate (Wilson, 1998, p. 198) 
Number of Captive Audience Meetings Chance Management Will Win 
Representation Election 
5+ 92.7% 
4 79.6% 
3 69.5% 
2 58.9% 
1 45.2% 
0 32.1% 
However, given the importance and predictive ability of captive audience 
meetings, the use of such a communication tool is the subject of ridicule by unions. 
Figure 12 presents an image that is a recent example of the International Association of 
Machinists’ Facebook page; it provides the union’s viewpoint of captive audience 
meetings in a campaign communication for its February 2019 election. 
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Figure 12. Union campaign poster, Walgreens 2019 election. 
Source: 
wwww.facebook.com/goiamwalgreens/photos/a.840379849334575/2448496711856206/?
type=3&theater 
Letter to Employees’ Homes. To reach not only the employee but also influential 
members of the employee’s family, employers often will mail letters to employees’ 
homes communicating the employer’s position. Such an independent variable lent itself 
to a simple measure of the number of different types of letters mailed to employees 
during the campaign. This independent variable provided an operational measurement for 
the employer’s use of different types of letters mailed to employees’ homes: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 
5+.  
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The Strike Calculator. A common employer message centers upon the extent and 
context for unions’ use of strikes to pressure employers at other companies. A strike is 
one of the more effective tools that unions can use to influence and impact the 
employer’s bargaining position. However, strikes can have a significant financial and 
economic impact upon employees of the employer. During a strike, employees do not 
receive pay and often do not receive benefits. During representation campaigns 
employers often use a strike calculator to illustrate the amount of money an employee 
would lose from a strike. The calculation is based upon their wages and a potential wage 
increase, along with the estimated strike duration, which then yields a calculation of how 
long it will take to recover the lost income. This dichotomous independent variable was 
measured simply by whether it was used or not.  
Use of Attorney, Consultant, or Paid Persuader. The use of an attorney, 
consultant or paid persuader was amongst the chief independent variables identified by 
the subject matter experts as most predictive and impactful upon the percentage of the 
vote in favor of the employer. The use of an attorney, consultant or paid persuader 
represented three different dichotomous variables.  
The operational definition for attorney includes the hiring of a licensed 
professional to provide legal advice and guidance for the employer’s strategy and 
decisions made throughout the workplace representation election. The attorney’s chief 
asset is the knowledge and use of the employment and labor law. The operational 
definition for a consultant includes that person who chiefly guides the strategy and 
decisions made throughout the campaign. The chief difference between an attorney and a 
consultant is that a consultant’s chief asset is experience during campaigns, which may or 
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may not include legal expertise. Finally, the operational definition for a paid persuader 
includes an individual who is chiefly hired to speak directly to employees to persuade 
employee votes. The chief asset of paid persuaders is their experience in campaigns and 
ability to relate to the voting employees.  
Notably, consultants and paid persuaders are not inexpensive; $3,000 per day fees 
plus travel and expenses are common charges. To illustrate, the government issues reports 
called LM-20 reports, in which consultants and persuaders are required to disclose the 
scope of their services and their fee to each client employer (Greenhouse, 2016). An 
example of such a report is reproduced in Appendix F. The LM-20 report reflects the 
consultancy fees ($3,000 per consultant per day, plus travel expenses) charged the 
employer for the Walgreens workplace representation election in February 2019 in 
Jupiter, Florida; Walgreens won the election, with 280 votes cast in favor of Walgreens 
and 210 votes cast in favor of voting for union representation by the International 
Association of Machinists union. 
Each of the aforementioned dichotomous independent variables was measured by 
whether the employer utilized any of these three types of campaign experts. Descriptive 
statistics were conducted to describe each of the independent variables. It should be noted 
that the use of descriptive analyses can create methodological limitations and such 
representations may yield correlations and yet not represent causal relationships 
(Mondore et al., 2011). These were then presented in the form of frequency tables 
including measures of central tendency and dispersion when applicable to each variable, 
as further discussed in Chapter 4.  
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Qualitative Methodology 
To collect qualitative data for this study’s mixed methods approach seeking 
answers to the identified research questions, the researcher first reviewed all available 
and applicable prior studies; Chapter Two contains extensive information on prior studies 
regarding employers’ use of messaging and communication tactics during NLRB 
elections. The researcher then utilized a specific and highly informative qualitative 
research methodological tool, the semi-structured interview, to inform, supplement, and 
complement this study’s collected quantitative survey data about said messaging and 
communication tactics. A thematic analysis was conducted on the semi-structured 
interview data following the method outlined by researchers Virginia Braun and Victoria 
Clarke (2006), as detailed in Chapter Four. As next discussed, the specific population and 
sample of subject matter experts provided information critical to a fuller understanding of 
the conflict topic that is this study’s focus.  
Participant Selection Rationale 
For the qualitative component of this mixed methods research study, purposive 
sampling criteria was based upon choosing participants who are recognized as subject 
matter experts by virtue of their selection as industry or professional conference 
presenters on the topic of this research study. Bernard (2006) defines this purposive or 
judgment sampling as “you decide the purpose you want informants to serve, and you go 
out and find some” (p. 189). The seven employer representative interviewees selected 
have significant experience in numerous workplace representation elections; each 
participant was a speaker at one or more professional conferences on the subject of 
102 
 
 
workplace representation elections. Each has numerous campaign elections in their career 
experience and is recognized in the labor relations profession as a subject matter expert.  
To participate in this study each of the seven subject matter experts was provided 
the Interview Respondent Participation Agreement (Appendix G). During the interviews 
each expert reflected upon their experience and actively shared the rationale for decisions 
they had employed regarding campaign messaging and communication tactics with the 
ability to influence the named dependent variable, the Percent of the Vote in Favor of the 
Employer.  
While the database and survey quantitative research portions of this study 
collected information from employers and their representatives, the qualitative interviews 
with the described seven subject matter experts provided a third and complementary 
methodological component for triangulation (see Creswell, 2013, p. 251) of data to more 
fully describe a conflictual topic or phenomenon: employer decisions regarding the 
selection of election campaign messaging and communication tactics. The subject matter 
experts themselves have used or considered using each of the independent variables listed 
in the survey, and thus were uniquely capable of responding to this study’s remaining 
three research questions: 
RQ3 – What type of messages result in an increase of the vote in favor of the 
employer in National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) elections? 
RQ4 – What modalities of communication tactics result in an increase of the vote 
in favor of the employer in NLRB elections? 
RQ5 – Does relying on a campaign consultant increase the vote in favor of the 
employer in NLRB elections? 
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The subject matter experts commented on each of these three research questions 
that were the primary focus of the interviews and their qualitative analysis. The resulting 
collective responses were synthesized into a unified statement for each of the foregoing 
research questions, as discussed in Chapter Four. 
Structured Interviews: Participation & Instrumentation 
While there are numerous qualitative approaches available to study the 
phenomenon of workplace representation election messaging and communication tactics, 
Creswell (2013) recommends the researcher starts with the outcome: what the approach is 
attempting to accomplish. For workplace representation election messaging and 
communication tactics, it was important to enhance the researcher’s understanding of the 
quantitative analyses conducted on both the database and the survey administered to 
employers. Semi-structured interviews provided a tremendously useful additional 
qualitative research tool to fulfill this study objective.  
Researchers Barriball and While (1994) noted that the semi-structured interview 
method is “well suited for the exploration of the perceptions and opinions of respondents 
regarding complex and sometimes sensitive issues and enables probing for more 
information and clarification of answers” (p. 330). The conflict within the NLRB election 
system is fraught with complexity and nuances, thereby rendering the semi-structured 
interview as an ideal methodology for capturing the opinions of the subject matter 
experts. 
When presented with the opportunity to inform this study all seven subject matter 
experts yielded 100% participation. Each was contacted by email or phone and presented 
with the Interview Respondent Participation Agreement (Appendix G). The format of the 
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guide prompted the researcher to confirm each participant’s understanding of the study, 
their receipt of the agreement as well as their understanding of voluntary participation 
and their ability to terminate the interview at their discretion, and finally that their 
identity would be coded and anonymous in order to facilitate open, forthright comments. 
The subject matter experts’ knowledge and experience, along with their availability and 
willingness to share perspectives on their historical use of NLRB election campaign 
messaging and communication tactics, were all crucial factors satisfying the purposive 
judgment sampling criteria for this research study (see Bernard, 2006, pp. 189-190).  
The researcher determined that conducting structured interviews by telephone 
would be highly conducive to successful aea cquisition of information. Telephone 
conversations naturally follow an agenda‐driven format that is initiated by the caller, 
similar to the process followed in semi‐structured interviews. Cachia and Millward 
(2011) found that the telephone medium and the semi-structured interview modality are 
complementary. Notably, the previously discussed introductory statements provided to 
participants remained separate and apart from the subsequent interview questions (see 
Appendix H; see also Frey, Fink, & Oishi, 1995). For these initial portions of the 
interview the researcher used a smooth conversational tone for instructions, probes, and 
prompts. As Frey, Fink, and Oishi (1995) noted, the interview’s beginning establishes the 
tone for the entire interview, creating a “rapport effect” (p. 100) that builds trust and 
enhances willingness to participate in the interview. 
With the participants’ approval, the interviews were audio recorded and 
transcribed. The interviews lasted approximately 15 to 25 minutes in duration. Each of 
the interviewees were assigned a participant number in order to maintain confidentiality 
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and eliminate the possibility of potential harm from their participation in this research 
study, in accordance with ethical obligations as discussed below. However, as a subject 
matter expert each interviewee was known to the researcher, and all interviewees know 
each other well. Each of the interviewees was offered and each requested a copy of the 
final research study. 
In conducting the participant phone interviews, it was important to establish a 
degree of comfort between the researcher and participant. This was accomplished by 
asking how long the participant had been involved in campaign messaging and 
communication tactics, and then proceeding afterward with the other focal points of 
inquiry. Depending upon the interviewee’s response, follow-up inquiry followed 
Moustakas’ (1994) technique of inquiry, asking open-ended questions such as “How 
successful did you feel each campaign messages or communication tactics were at the 
time you typically decided on its use? How has the campaign messaging and 
communication tactics experience affected how you feel about your involvement in 
workplace representation elections?”  
Role of the Researcher. Qualitative research required a commitment to ethics and 
reflexivity on the part of the researcher, with particular attention paid to the subjective 
nature of this study.  
Researcher as Observer. Given this researcher’s experience serving as both a 
former union member as well as the employers’ representative in numerous NLRB 
elections, a reliance upon document review, database analysis, and the opinions of 
subject matter experts was critically important to ensuring the reliability and validity of 
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the instant research. The researcher’s role in this study was solely that of an observer; the 
researcher did not participate in any election included within this research study. 
Relationships Between Researcher and Research Participants. The researcher is 
known within segments of the employers’ labor relations community; he is known to 
each of the subject matter experts, who also are acquainted with each other. However, the 
researcher maintains no contractual relationships with any of said participants. 
Researcher Bias. As noted previously, this researcher was a union member for 
years; he has served as employer representative in over twenty NLRB elections. For 
several years before and during the course of this research study, the researcher served on 
the Labor Relations Expert Panel of the Society for Human Resources Management and 
participated in several other labor relations-oriented professional organizations. The 
researcher is an adjunct full professor and teaches labor relations for an international 
university. He has published articles on the subject of labor relations and is a frequent 
speaker at conferences on the subjects of labor relations and NLRB elections. For all the 
foregoing reasons it was critically important that the researcher recognize and evaluate 
his own assumptions and biases, in order to most objectively support the research and 
findings in this mixed methods research study. 
To recognize, assess, and maintain awareness of researcher bias, the researcher 
engaged in a collaborative reflexivity exercise with fellow researcher Bruce Lilyea, PhD, 
whose expertise resides in qualitative methodology involving organizational conflict. The 
reflexivity exercise acknowledged the researcher’s participation in over 20 workplace 
representation elections, along with the researcher’s involvement in selecting messaging 
and communication tactics to influence the percent of the vote in favor of the respective 
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employers. The exercise included a review of the researcher’s career history, 
participation in election messaging and communication tactics, and teaching experience 
on the subject of NLRB elections, as well as an exploration of the researcher’s biased 
assumptions based upon prior experience. The objective of the exercise was to reflect and 
maintain an awareness of the existing bias in order to design and evaluate the qualitative 
data collection from an objective perspective. Understanding the need to periodically 
review the result of the reflexivity exercise, the following bracketing statement was 
created to guide the data collection and analysis: 
The researcher will reflect upon and eschew preconceived rationale for the use 
and efficacy of all campaign election messaging and communication tactics for 
the design, collection, and analysis of qualitative data obtained from subject 
matter experts.  
The researcher reviewed this bracketing statement prior to each interview of the seven 
subject matter experts, to carefully and deliberately eschew the influence of his own 
readily available perspectives stemming from personal experience in numerous 
workplace representation election campaigns.  
The focus of the qualitative portion of this study was not on the subject matter 
expert individual participants but rather on their experiential representative comments, in 
order to add insight to the obtained employer survey responses previously discussed. 
Each interview supported an understanding of the collective experience of the subject 
matter experts. The net result of the qualitative portion of this study was generation of a 
meaningful narrative to enhance the understanding of the quantitative survey employer 
response and generate a triangulated response to the research questions.  
108 
 
 
Ethical Procedures 
The researched complied with all requirements of ethical research training as 
mandated by Nova Southeastern University, completing CITI Program training for the 
protection of human subject research participants on May 27, 2018. Further and as 
detailed above, the researcher carefully acknowledged and complied with ethical 
requirements in the wording, instrumentation, and conduct of the interviews with each 
participant, and used bracketing to avoid the influence of researcher bias. 
Record Retention and Audit Facilitation 
To support the credibility of the quantitative survey analyses and qualitative 
structured interview study findings, it was necessary to apply the highest standards of 
organization and structural record retention to facilitate post-research audits and avoid 
duplication of results. The organization and format for this record retention included the 
preservation of: 
• the study’s bracketing statement; 
• notes of all interviews; 
• interview notes of identified horizons; 
• all documents in which the horizons were coded and categorized into thematic 
clusters; 
• all analytic memos; 
• the textural descriptions written for each participant; and  
• copies of all drafts, along with the final dissertation study research report. 
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All of the foregoing described procedures followed for each methodology described in 
this mixed methods research study was approved by the Nova Southeastern University 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) on May 9, 2019, and on February 25, 2020. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Chapter 3 described the three-part mixed methods approach of this research study. 
The three research components included:  
• a quantitative research design for a governmental database of 305 NLRB-
supervised elections,  
• a survey of employer representatives involving 32 elections, and  
• semi-structured interviews with seven subject matter experts, supplemented 
with thematic analysis of content data. 
These three critical quantitative and qualitative research components were designed to 
contribute to a triangulated view of the relationship between the percent of the vote in 
favor of the employer and several independent variables. The investigator’s correlational 
research, analysis of the survey of employer messaging and communication tactics, as 
well as the thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) of the subject matter expert semi-
structured interviews—detailed next in Chapter Four—achieved the triangulation 
(Creswell, 2013) so useful in the mixed methods approach. 
Chapter Three addressed the researcher’s role and personal experience involving 
NLRB elections, outlining steps taken to maintain the reliability and validity of this 
research study’s analyses and findings through the utilization of bracketing techniques to 
mitigate the researcher’s biases, paradigms, and assumptions. The chapter also described 
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steps taken to comply with the ethics protocol of Nova Southeastern University’s 
Institutional Review Board.  
The quantitative and qualitative analytical processes applied to each of the three 
foregoing described and approved data sources along with the researcher’s resultant 
findings are presented in Chapter Four, with implications and recommendations regarding 
workplace representation elections from the perspective of the employer following in 
Chapter Five.  
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Chapter 4: Presentation of the Research Findings 
The objective of this study was to develop a model to assist employers for what is 
arguably the most contentious conflict that can exist in the American workplace: a 
workplace representation election, supervised by the National Labor Relations Board. 
The intent of a workplace representation election is to determine whether a petitioning 
union has sufficient support to unionize a unit of employees within a workplace. This 
mixed methods research study sought to develop a model to assist employers in assessing 
the efficacy and success of election-related messages and communication tactics, in order 
to achieve an increase in votes in favor of the employer and a successful election 
outcome.  
The developed model is the product of a triangulation between three analytical 
research components of the study: 1) quantitative analysis of an existing dataset of 305 
elections, 2) quantitative analysis of results obtained for the researcher’s survey of 32 
elections, and 3) qualitative research thematic analysis of interviews of seven NLRB 
subject matter experts. These analyses were conducted to gain understanding and answers 
for the study’s five research questions: 
RQ1 – Do shorter election periods result in more or less employer victories in 
NLRB elections? 
RQ2 – Do contested or stipulated elections favor employers in NLRB elections?  
RQ3 – What type of messages result in an increase of the vote in favor of the 
employer in National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) elections? 
RQ4 – What modalities of communication tactics result in an increase of the vote 
in favor of the employer in NLRB elections? 
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RQ5 – Does relying on a campaign consultant increase the vote in favor of the 
employer in NLRB elections? 
Correlational Quantitative Research Methodology: 305 Elections 
In this first portion of the study’s research, 305 elections in four NLRB Regions 
as represented in an existing governmental database were analyzed to extract and better 
understand their numerous descriptive and demographic characteristics. Through this 
descriptive data many portions of the research questions were answered. The statistical 
analysis of the database below included scatterplots and the production of a correlation 
coefficient table. The results of the correlation analysis are presented to assess the 
relationship of the percentage of the vote in favor of the employer in comparison with 
three independent variables available in the original 305 elections database.  
As is apparent in the literature reviewed, an NLRB election is one of the most 
contentious conflicts that occurs in the workplace. There is a tendency to frame the 
workplace representation election conflict as one of labor unions versus management. 
However, it is important to remember that the elections are determined by the workers, 
the employees themselves. More often than not the employees themselves are at odds, in 
conflict with each other on whether unionization is desired for their respective workforce. 
The 305 elections studied for this research reflect the decisions of 19,519 employees who 
voted in those 305 NLRB elections. Of these 305 elections studied, only 55 or 18% of 
these were decided by a unanimous vote of the employees. Of these 55, the employer 
received zero votes in an overwhelming 53 of these 55 elections. In only two of the 
elections did the employees unanimously reject union representation. The remaining 250 
(350-55) elections decided by non-unanimous vote illustrate organizational conflict 
113 
 
 
existing not only between the employer and union but also among the employees, since 
some portion wanted union representation and some portion did not. Thus in those 250 
elections with less than 100% of the vote in favor of either the employer or the union, a 
total of 19,134 employees were in conflict with each other, as there was disagreement 
among employees on the question of union representation.  
The 305 elections included within this research occurred between 2015 and 2017 
in four Regions of the NLRB, in what are known as the Right to Work states. In a study 
of all elections across the United States in the first half 2018, employers on average won 
31% of the workplace representation elections. This rate was a slight increase in 
comparison to the 2017 employer win rate of 29% (Combs & Cinquegrani, 2018). In this 
study of 305 elections, the employer won 32.7 percent of the 305 elections studied for a 
total of 100 elections. The minimum percent of the vote in favor of the employer is 50% 
and in these 100 elections where the employer won, the largest percent in favor of the 
employer is 100%. The mean percent of the vote in favor of the employer in the 100 
elections when the employer won the election was 65.35%. The median was 63.1% and 
the most frequent percent of the vote in favor of the employer was exactly 50%, as can be 
seen in the histogram below in Figure 13. With over one-third of the workforce in 
disagreement with the election results, workforce representation elections understandably 
are rife with conflict. 
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Figure 13. Vote in favor of employer in 100 elections. 
The mean percent of the vote in favor of the employer in all of the 305 elections 
held in the four NLRB Regions was 35%, as illustrated in Figure 14 below. 
  
Figure 14. Vote in favor of employer in 305 elections. 
A review of the dataset of the 305 elections revealed categorical variables 
appropriate for this study’s focus of inquiry, most importantly a dependent variable and 
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three continuous independent variables included within the dataset provided by the 
National Labor Relations Board. Notably these selected variables include: 
• Dependent Variable: Percent of the Vote in Favor of the Employer;  
• Independent Variable: Turnout, which is the percent of the number of 
eligible voters which vote;  
• Independent Variable: Election Period, meaning the cycle time or duration 
of the election campaign leading to the vote; and  
• Independent Variable: Number of Eligible Voters (Unit Size), a measure 
(known as the unit size) of the employees eligible to vote in the workplace. 
Field (2013) noted that outliers can bias estimates of parameters such as the mean. 
A review of the 305 elections in the database indicated 5 elections were outliers because 
of their extended election period (exceeding 200 days). After removal of the 5 outliers the 
mean for the election period of the remaining 300 elections averaged 29 days in length.  
Correlations between Dependent and Independent Variables 
Before assessing the strength of the relationships between the dependent and 
independent variables, the researcher assessed whether a correlational analysis was 
appropriate. Laerd Statistics, a publisher of SPSS Statistics guides, publishes seven 
assumptions necessary for the use of the Pearson r statistic used to assess the relationship 
of two variables.  Each of these seven assumptions must be satisfied in order to utilize the 
Pearson r statistic or it becomes necessary to utilize a different statistic.  The seven 
assumptions address: level of measurement, related pairs, absence of outliers, and 
linearity. The chart below summarizes the seven assumptions, each of which was met by 
the data within this study. 
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1. Data is measured on a continuous scale; 
2. Each case has two values [data points], one for each variable; 
3. There is an independence of cases, meaning there are two observations for 
each single case; 
4. There is a linear relationship between the two measured continuous variables; 
5. Both continuous variables follow a bivariate normal distribution; 
6. Homoscedasticity exists as the variances along the line of best fit remain 
similar throughout the line; and 
7. There are no univariate or multivariate outliers. (Laerd Statistics, 2020) 
To assess the strength of the association between any two variables researchers 
utilize descriptive labels to represent this continuum. Generally, the strength of 
association is represented as a small, medium, or large correlation. While researchers 
sometimes vary slightly in their designations, this researcher utilized the Laerd Statistics 
model for designating the strength of correlation as indicated below in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Correlation strength of association continuum 
Strength of Association 
Coefficient, r 
Positive 
Coefficient, r 
Negative 
Small .1 to .3 -0.1 to -0.3 
Medium .3 to .5 -0.3 to -0.5 
Large .5 to 1.0 -0.5 to -1.0 
Source: https://statistics.laerd.com/statistical-guides/pearson-correlation-coefficient-
statistical-guide.php 
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A correlation matrix of the three identified continuous independent variables for 
the 300 elections revealed relationships as illustrated in Table 5. A review of the Pearson r 
correlations indicates there is a small positive correlation between the dependent variable 
Percent of the Vote in Favor of the Employer and each of the three identified independent 
variables. Specifically, there is a small though highly significant relationship with the 
Number of Eligible Voters (Unit Size) with an r = .200, p = .000; a small though 
significant relationship with Turnout having an r =.136, p = .019; and lastly a small 
though not significant positive correlation for Election Period with an r= .074, p = .204.  
Table 5 
Correlations: Study's dependent variable with 3 independent variables 
Correlation Coefficients for the 300 Elections: Study Variables 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
1. Percent of Vote in 
Favor of Employer 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1    
Sig. (2-tailed)     
     
2. Turnout (Percent 
of eligible voters 
who voted) 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.136* 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .019    
     
3. Election period 
(Duration of the 
election 
campaign) 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.074 -.066 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) .204 .257   
     
4. Number of Eligible 
Voters (aka Unit 
Size) 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.200** -.004 .040 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .950 .492  
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Below are results of the analysis of each independent variable. The order that the 
independent variables are reported here was determined by, and corresponds to, the 
ascending significance of each one’s relationship to the dependent variable. 
Consequently, Turnout is addressed first, Election Period second, and last—but most 
importantly—Number of Eligible Voters, which is also known as Unit Size. 
Turnout. An important part of the employers’ campaign is to encourage 
employees to vote when provided the opportunity (Wilson, 1998). Correlating the Percent 
of the Vote in Favor of the Employer with Turnout yields a Pearson r of .136, which is 
statistically significant at p = .019. As illustrated in Figure 15, ambivalence about voting 
is a rarity in these workplace representation elections.  
 
Figure 15. Turnout for 305 elections. 
On average 87.5% of eligible employees voted in the 305 elections studied, which had a 
median 92.8% of the employees voting in the election. The most frequent turnout 
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(voting) percent is 100%, thus illustrating the importance of the election to the voting 
employees. 
Election Period (Elapsed Cycle Time of the Election). Many of the complaints 
that employers had regarding the 2015 revised NLRB election rules centered upon the 
shortened election period (Hayes, 2018). Prior to the 2015 election changes, nationwide 
workplace representation elections averaged 38 days. However, the 2015 revised 
regulations resulted in an average cycle time of a mere 23 days (see Becker & Rhinehart, 
2018, p. 3; Hardie & Murphy, 2016, p. 1; National Labor Relations Board, 2019). 
Employers were adamant that a mere 23 days was an insufficient period of time for 
employees to make the most important decision of their career (Hayes, 2018).  
It is for this reason that this study asked the important research question: 
Do shorter election periods result in more or less employer victories in National Labor 
Relations Board elections? The null hypothesis states that no difference exists; therefore, 
any positive or negative correlation will result in a rejected null hypothesis. The resulting 
correlation indicates a positive relationship between the dependent variable, Percent of 
the Vote in Favor of the Employer, and the independent variable Election Period, with r = 
.074, p = .204. While not statistically significant there is practical significance in the 
positive relationship between the variables.  
Table 6 below is a frequency chart of the number of calendar days, also known as 
the cycle time for each of the 305 elections studied. As predicted by employers, at least 
one election occurred in as little as 10 days (Yager, 2015). In that election of 11 
employees only one voted in favor of the employer. Table 6 reveals at least 5 of these 
elections exceeded over 200 days and are certainly outliers to the most frequent election 
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period with a mode of 21 days. These 305 elections illustrate that over one half of the 
elections occurred in 24 or less days. Within these 305 elections, over 11,047 days were 
spent in election conflict. 
Table 6 
Frequency chart of the election period in 305 elections 
Frequency Chart of Election Period for 305 Elections 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 10 1 .3 .3 .3 
12 1 .3 .3 .7 
14 2 .6 .7 1.3 
15 2 .6 .7 2.0 
16 8 2.4 2.6 4.6 
17 9 2.7 3.0 7.5 
18 4 1.2 1.3 8.9 
19 7 2.1 2.3 11.1 
20 13 3.9 4.3 15.4 
21 37 11.1 12.1 27.5 
22 27 8.1 8.9 36.4 
23 29 8.7 9.5 45.9 
24 26 7.8 8.5 54.4 
25 10 3.0 3.3 57.7 
26 8 2.4 2.6 60.3 
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Frequency Chart of Election Period for 305 Elections 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
27 14 4.2 4.6 64.9 
28 15 4.5 4.9 69.8 
29 7 2.1 2.3 72.1 
30 7 2.1 2.3 74.4 
31 6 1.8 2.0 76.4 
32 1 .3 .3 76.7 
33 3 .9 1.0 77.7 
34 2 .6 .7 78.4 
35 4 1.2 1.3 79.7 
36 9 2.7 3.0 82.6 
37 5 1.5 1.6 84.3 
38 6 1.8 2.0 86.2 
39 1 .3 .3 86.6 
41 2 .6 .7 87.2 
42 10 3.0 3.3 90.5 
43 2 .6 .7 91.1 
44 2 .6 .7 91.8 
45 3 .9 1.0 92.8 
47 1 .3 .3 93.1 
48 1 .3 .3 93.4 
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Frequency Chart of Election Period for 305 Elections 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
50 1 .3 .3 93.8 
52 1 .3 .3 94.1 
54 1 .3 .3 94.4 
57 1 .3 .3 94.8 
59 2 .6 .7 95.4 
63 1 .3 .3 95.7 
79 2 .6 .7 96.4 
136 1 .3 .3 96.7 
139 2 .6 .7 97.4 
144 1 .3 .3 97.7 
171 1 .3 .3 98.0 
179 1 .3 .3 98.4 
202 1 .3 .3 98.7 
264 1 .3 .3 99.0 
363 1 .3 .3 99.3 
670 1 .3 .3 99.7 
724 1 .3 .3 100.0 
Total 305 100.0 100.0  
A better illustration of the impact that the allotted Election Period has on 
Percentage of the Vote in Favor of the Employer is a comparison of the shortest elections 
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with the longest elections. To accomplish this, the percentage of the vote in favor of the 
employer for the 30 shortest elections was compared with the 30 longest elections. In the 
30 longest elections, employers received 50% or more of the vote in 27 of the 30 
elections for a 90%-win rate. In contrast, in the 30 shortest elections employers received 
50% or more of the vote in only four of the 30 elections, for a win rate of only 13%. A 
review of these 60 elections strongly demonstrated and validated employers’ concerns 
that the shorter the election cycle, the smaller the percent of the vote in favor of the 
employer. Consequently, the employer acts in its own interests by lengthening the 
election cycle time and providing employees as much time to interpret campaign 
messages prior to voting on whether to unionize or remain union-free. 
Thus, the answer to the following research question is distinctively clear: Do 
shorter election periods result in more or less employer victories in National Labor 
Relations Board elections? Yes, shorter election periods result in less employer victories 
in National Labor Relations Board elections.  
In 5 cases within the 305 database elections cases (see Table 7 below) the election 
period exceeded 200 days; their distinction from the other 300 elections warranted 
excluding each as an outlier (Field, 2013) and the correlation output which included those 
five was not significant.  
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Table 7 
Descriptive election period data for 305 elections (including outliers) 
Descriptive election period data: 305 elections 
(including outliers) 
 
N Valid 305 
Mean 36.22 
Std. Error of Mean 3.589 
Median 24.00 
Mode 21 
Std. Deviation 62.685 
Variance 3929.468 
Skewness 8.610 
Std. Error of Skewness .140 
Kurtosis 84.142 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .278 
Range 714 
Minimum 10 
Maximum 724 
Sum 11047 
Removal of outliers left 300 elections for study (see Table 8) to further assess the 
relationship between the independent variable Election Period and the dependent variable 
Percent of the Vote in Favor of the Employer, as shown below in Table 9. 
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Table 8 
Descriptive election period data for 300 elections (excluding outliers) 
Descriptive election period data for 300 elections 
(excluding 5 outliers) 
N Valid 300 
Mean 29.41 
Std. Error of Mean 1.156 
Median 24.00 
Mode 21 
Std. Deviation 20.016 
Variance 400.631 
Skewness 4.979 
Std. Error of Skewness .141 
Kurtosis 29.097 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .281 
Range 169 
Minimum 10 
Maximum 179 
Sum 8824 
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Table 9 
Descriptive election period and employer win data for 300 elections 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
Election Period 29.41 20.016 300 
Percent of Vote in Favor of 
Employer 
34.69% 26.23% 300 
As can be seen in Table 10 below illustrating the correlation between the election 
period and the percent of the vote in favor of the employer for the 300 elections, the 
relationship of the variables remained skewed by the outliers. However, there was a 
positive correlation of .074 between the Percent of the Vote in Favor of the Employer and 
the Election Period, though it was not statistically significant with a p value of .204. 
Table 10 
Correlations: Election period and employer win data, 300 elections 
 Election Period 
Percent of Vote in Favor 
of Employer 
Election Period Pearson Correlation 1 .074 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .204 
N 300 300 
Percent of Vote in 
Favor of Employer 
Pearson Correlation .074 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .204  
N 300 300 
A histogram of the frequency of election period or duration of the election 
campaign illustrates the extent that outliers exist, as seen in Figure 16 below.  
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Election Period and Percent of the Vote in favor of the Employer for 300 elections 
 
Figure 16. Histogram: Election period and percent of the vote in favor of the employer 
data, 300 elections. 
A scatterplot illustrates the impact of the correlation and illustrates six outliers skewing 
the relationship, as seen below in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17. Scatterplot: Election period and percent of the vote in favor of the employer 
data, 300 elections. 
Excluding only 11 outliers of the 305 elections enabled a study of all remaining 
294 elections with an election period of 80 days or less. The most frequent election 
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period remained at 21 days with a median of 24 days and a mean of 26 days. The 294 
workplace representation elections in Table 11 represent over 7,900 days spent in election 
conflict. 
Table 11 
Descriptive election period data, 294 elections (excluding 11 outliers) 
Election Period 
N Valid 294 
Mean 26.93 
Std. Error of Mean .560 
Median 24.00 
Mode 21 
Std. Deviation 9.606 
Variance 92.274 
Skewness 2.057 
Std. Error of Skewness .142 
Kurtosis 6.365 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .283 
Range 69 
Minimum 10 
Maximum 79 
Sum 7916 
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There was virtually no correlation between the dependent variable Percent of the 
Vote in Favor of the Employer relative to the independent variable Election Period due to 
the continued inclusion of outliers; consequently the data set was further reduced to 
exclude any outliers beyond 60 days. The resultant exclusion of 14 outliers resulted in 
291 elections, again with the most frequent election period lasting 21 days. The mean was 
26 days with a median of 24 days. These 291 elections in Table 12 below represent nearly 
7,700 days of workplace representation election conflict: 
Table 12 
Descriptive election period data, 291 elections (excluding 14 outliers) 
Descriptive Election Period Data for 291 Elections 
(excluding 14 outliers) 
 
N Valid 291 
Mean 26.44 
Std. Error of Mean .490 
Median 24.00 
Mode 21 
Std. Deviation 8.355 
Variance 69.806 
Skewness 1.373 
Std. Error of Skewness .143 
Kurtosis 2.012 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .285 
Range 49 
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Minimum 10 
Maximum 59 
Sum 7695 
A scatterplot of the correlation for 291 elections between the dependent variable Percent 
of the Vote in Favor of the Employer and the independent variable Election Period is 
presented as Figure 18 below. 
 
Figure 18. Scatterplot: Election period and percent of the vote in favor of the employer 
data, 291 elections. 
As employers might expect, there was a positive (though very small) relationship 
(a Pearson r of .063) between the election period and the corresponding percent of the 
vote in favor of the employer, as shown below in Table 13. However, this relationship 
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was not statistically significant at .287, even though there was a slightly positive slope 
evident in the fit line in the Figure 18 scatterplot above. 
Table 13 
Correlations: Election period and employer win data, 291 elections 
 
Election Period 
Percent of Vote in Favor 
of Employer 
Election Period Pearson Correlation 1 .063 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .287 
N 291 291 
Percent of the Vote 
in Favor of 
Employer 
Pearson Correlation .063 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .287  
N 291 291 
The encouraging observation for employers is that once notified by the formalized 
filing of a petition for election that a union organizing campaign has begun, an employer 
can influence the election outcome by negotiating with the union and the NLRB for an 
extended rather than shortened election cycle time.  
Unit Size or Number of Eligible Voters. After notification of the filing of a 
petition for workplace representation election, the employer can also influence the size of 
the unit by negotiating with the union and the NLRB regarding which job titles are to be 
included within the unit of eligible voters. A review of Table 14 below illustrates the 
important impact of the decision regarding how many should be eligible to vote in a 
workplace representation election. 
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Table 14 
Correlations: Unit size and percent of the vote in favor of the employer data, 300 
elections 
 Percent Vote Favor 
of Employer 
Number of Eligible 
Voters 
Percent of Vote in 
Favor of Employer 
Pearson Correlation 1 .200** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 300 300 
Number of Eligible 
Voters (aka Unit 
Size) 
Pearson Correlation .200** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 300 300 
The Number of Eligible Voters and its corresponding relationship with the election 
outcome, the Percent of The Vote in Favor of the Employer, indicates that Unit Size is the 
most influential independent variable of those studied. The relationship of these two 
variables, with a Pearson r of .200—although a small strength of association indicates a 
change in the unit size—is a statistically significant covariant with the percent of the vote 
in favor of the employer (r =.200, p = .000).  
Survey Research Methodology 
Once the employer has negotiated the number of eligible voters as the appropriate 
size of the unit and the duration of the election period, the employer and union commence 
their respective campaigns in earnest (Bergeron, 2008). Employers begin their campaign 
by selecting communication tactics to both communicate messages of the campaign as 
well as messages that persuade employees. This chapter describes the Voice of the 
Employer Survey© instrument used to collect additional information from 32 of the 
133 
 
 
identified and previously discussed a database of 305 elections regarding messaging and 
communication tactics employers used during their NLRB elections. This section 
presents the process for survey instrument design, identification of respondents, 
collection of survey data, and the analysis of results obtained.  
Instrument Design and Data Collection 
There are many communication and messaging tactics options available to 
employers facing workplace representation elections; Don Wilson’s (1998) book, Total 
Victory! The Complete Management Guide to a Successful NLRB Representation 
Election, detailed many of those options. Although only one of numerous sources 
reviewed in the literature, the book was instrumental in identifying the independent 
variables used for development of this researcher’s Voice of the Employer Survey© 
submitted to employers and their representatives in the 305 elections (as referenced in 
this chapter’s previous section on database research methodology). The survey sought to 
determine whether messages or communication tactics identified through the literature 
review were used and if so, how influential they were perceived to be at the time of their 
use. This information enabled greater understanding of the election results in an employer 
win or loss outcome.  
In the process of developing the researcher’s Voice of the Employer Survey©, a pilot 
study was conducted to assess the appropriate parameters regarding comprehension and 
time completion for this original instrument. This allowed the researcher to identify the 
context and process under which subjects best could provide response data to the 
researcher’s instrument (Litwin, 2003). Three subject matter experts were identified from 
their involvement in presentations at professional conferences, as described in chapter 3. 
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Each subject matter expert completed the survey while on the phone with the researcher. 
The researcher’s focal points for the pilot survey included: 
• observing the completion of the instrument under controlled conditions; 
• identifying the elapsed time to complete the survey; 
• identifying any misunderstandings of the wording, context, or operational 
definitions within the items; and 
• identifying any problematic format design choices. 
(Litwin, 2003). The resulting input from three iterations of the pilot test of the Voice of 
the Employer Survey© instrument reinforced the utility and understandability of the 
instrument as drafted, and further contributed to ensuring the reliability and validity of 
the final survey instrument (Litwin, 1995). The measured time for completion of three 
pilot study iterations ranged between six and seven minutes, thereby enabling the 
researcher to allow comfortably a six-minute time for survey completion by potential 
respondents.  
In the second quarter of 2019, the survey was mailed to the 305 identified 
employers and their representatives at the physical addresses listed by the National Labor 
Relations Board on the 305 elections dataset utilized for this study. Follow-up reminder 
phone calls were made to available non-respondents throughout the third and fourth 
quarter of 2019. Both methodologies resulted in a combined total response rate of 32 
elections, or 11% of the election database population of 305. The value of the 32 surveys 
is that it provided information regarding the employer representative’s knowledge of the 
messaging and communication tactics used during their election. As noted in Chapter 
Three, no more than a 20% response rate was anticipated given the average for written 
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surveys distributed through the mail to individuals without awareness or anticipation of 
the forthcoming survey. Nonetheless, certain descriptive insights into employer 
messaging and communication tactics were obtained from the sample 32 responses and 
are next discussed. 
Results 
Given the 11% response rate that yielded information on 32 elections, the number 
of responses was insufficient to conduct inferential statistics on the data. However, the 
responses received did supply information about employer messaging and 
communication tactics. When compared to all elections held during the same time period, 
the percent of the vote in favor of the employer for the 32 elections subset compared 
similarly. For example, in the studied 305 elections employers won 32.7%% of the time; 
in the 32 survey responses, employers were slightly more successful, winning 39% of the 
time. This 39% win rate became the baseline for comparison of the efficacy of a 
particular campaign message. Those messages which yielded a 39%+ win rate therefore 
were deemed practically and descriptively important for purposes of this study.  
Before reviewing the messaging and communication tactics, descriptive statistics 
characterizing the 32 elections for this study’s three identified independent variables 
(Turnout, Election Period, and Unit Size) and their relationship to the dependent variable 
(Percent of the Vote in Favor of the Employer) are each here addressed, in the order of 
their significance as identified in the larger database of the 305 elections. Tables 15 and 
16 below respectively display the descriptive statistics derived from the database for the 
32 employer representative respondents and for the 305 elections in the database. 
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Table 15 
Dependent variable and 3 independent variables, 32 elections 
 
 
Percent of the 
Vote in Favor of 
Employer Turnout Election period No. of Eligible Voters 
No. of  Elections 32 32 32 32 
Mean 38.9% 92.2% 38.2 171.2 
Median 43.4% 94.4% 26.5 50.5 
Mode 0.0% 100.0% 28 59 
 
Table 16 
Dependent variable and 3 independent variables, 305 elections 
 
Percent of the 
Vote in Favor 
of Employer Turnout 
Election 
period No of Eligible Voters 
Number of 
Elections 
305 305 305 305 
Mean 34.9% 87.5% 36.2 73.3 
Median 33.3% 92.8% 24.0 31.0 
Mode 0.0% 100.0% 21 4a 
a. Multiple modes exist as 10 elections each had 4, 6, 8, & 15 voters. In the chart the 
smallest number of voters at 4 is shown. 
 
With regard to the percent of the vote in favor of the employer for the 32 elections 
surveyed, the 38% mean compared similarly with the 34% mean for the 305 elections 
population. The 43% median for the 32 responding elections was higher than the 33% 
median for the 305 elections. In both the 32 responding elections as well as the 305 
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elections, the most common percent of the vote in favor of the employer was 0% of the 
voting employees.  
In reviewing the turnout of the 32 survey responses, the mean 92% turnout 
compared favorably with the 87% mean for the 305 elections population. The 94% 
median turnout for the 32 responding elections compared favorably to the 92% median 
for the 305 elections. In both the 32 responding elections as well as the 305 elections, the 
most common turnout of voting employees in the elections was 100%. That complete 
participation by voting employees once again represents the extent of engagement by 
employees on the decision whether to unionize or remain union-free.  
In reviewing the election period of the 32 survey responding elections, the mean 
38-day election period compared favorably with the 36 day mean for the 305-election 
population. Given the long duration of two outlier elections included in both datasets, a 
better measure of the election period was the median duration of the campaign period, 
which is 26 days for the 32 responding elections. This compared favorably with the 
slightly shorter election median election period of 24 days for the 305 elections. The most 
common election period of the 32 responding elections was 28 days, although the second 
most common (in 3 of the 32 elections) occurred in just 24 days. Both of these periods in 
the 32 responding elections compared favorably with the 21-day mode for election period 
in the 305 elections.  
Reviewing the number of eligible voters, also known as the unit size, of the 32 
survey respondents, the mean unit size of 171 was significantly larger than the 73 
employee unit size mean for the 305 elections population. For the 32 responding 
elections, the median unit of 50 voting employees was still larger than the 31 median 
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voting employee unit size for the 305 elections. For the 32 responding elections the most 
common unit size was 59 eligible voters, as compared to the multiple modes identified 
for the 305 elections database, the largest of which was only 15 votes (see Table 16, note 
a). 
Campaign Messages: 32 Elections. The primary value of the 32 elections survey 
dataset of responding employers was the information obtained regarding employer 
messages and communication tactics, when compared to the net result: a win or loss of 
the election for the employer. As mentioned above, 13 of the 32 respondents won their 
elections, a 39%-win rate.  
The Voice of the Employer Survey© identified messages used by both employers 
that won their elections and employers that lost. The administration of the survey enabled 
a comparison of these two groups, thereby adding insight into employer strategies for 
messaging and communication tactics as well as responding directly to the research 
questions. The variables for comparison include the following independent variables 
measured within the Voice of the Employer Survey©, as listed in Table 17 below.  
Table 17 
Voice of the Employer Survey© independent variables 
 
            Winning 
 
            Losing 
Independent Variables Used         Not Used  Used         Not Used 
Campaign Messaging        
What is/Definition of a Union 9  3  13  5 
What is Collective bargaining? May 
include gambling with and realities of 
bargaining 10  2  16  2 
Benefits you have now 9  2  10  6 
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            Winning 
 
            Losing 
Independent Variables Used         Not Used  Used         Not Used 
The Union is a business and needs your 
dues 8  3  13  5 
Layoffs at union companies/Job 
security 6  6  13  5 
Comparing existing company 
benefits/wages with union's contracts 
elsewhere 6  5  9  7 
Analysis of the unions constitution 
/Bylaws 8  3  8  10 
Unions strike history 7  4  7  11 
Calculators showing how much dues 
costs or amount lost in a strike 7  3  10  8 
Give us [employer] another chance 6  5  11  7 
Get out the vote/You need to vote 11  1  15  3 
         
Communication Tactics        
Captive Audience/Group meetings of 
employees (How many with different 
themes) 11  1  14  3 
Posters posted in the work areas (How 
many with different messages) 6  5  5  11 
Letters to employees' homes (How 
many letters with different themes) 8  3  8  9 
1 on 1 meetings (Manager with 
Employee) to discuss election issues 7  4  5  10 
Videos to persuade employees 2  9  8  10 
A Website to persuade employees 1  9  4  14 
Text Messaging to employees as 
company election communication tool 1  9  2  16 
Facebook as company election 
communication tool 1  9  1  15 
A podcast featuring company election 
messages 0  9  0  16 
Online/conference calls to employees 
at remote locations with campaign 
messaging 0  9  2  14 
Twitter for communicating persuasive 
campaign messages 0  10  1  15 
        
Demographics for Company & 
Election        
140 
 
 
 
            Winning 
 
            Losing 
Independent Variables Used         Not Used  Used         Not Used 
Was this the first election at this 
company location? 4  5  12  4 
Is the company unionized at other 
locations? 9  2  15  2 
Is the company unionized at portions of 
this location? 3  8  5  12 
Did the company hire a consultant to 
guide the company's election strategy? 4  8  6  13 
Did the company hire an attorney to 
assist in the company's election 
strategy? 9  2  16  1 
Did the company hire a persuader to 
communicate directly to employees? 4  7  6  12 
Did the company contest the union's 
petitioned for unit of employees? (e.g. 
have a hearing to decide the unit) 3  7  3  14 
Did the company implement a pay 
increase to employees during the 
election? 0  11  0  17 
Did the union file challenges to the 
election result? 1  10  2  14 
With a 39%-win rate among the 32 election respondents, it was important to 
evaluate any messages that yielded a win rate outperforming the overall 39% employer 
win rate. A review of the chart in Table 17 indicated that six of the 11 messages inquired 
about in the survey had a win rate which exceeded the 39% overall win rate. These 
winning messages and their respective win rate included: 
• Analysis of the union’s Constitution/Bylaws (50%) 
• Union’s strike history (50%) 
• Benefits you have now (47%) 
• Get out the vote/ You need to vote (42%) 
• Calculators showing how much dues costs or amount lost in a strike (41%) 
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• Comparing existing company benefits/Wages with union’s contracts elsewhere 
(40%) 
A review of the chart in Table 17 indicated that all of the independent variables included 
in the surveys were used in more than half of the elections, with the exception of the 
message labeled “union’s strike history,” which was used in only 48% of the elections but 
yielded a 50% win rate for the employer, outperforming the 39% overall win rate by 
25%.  
Communication Tactics: 32 Elections. A review of the communication tactics 
used by the 32 election respondents indicated there were four communication tactics most 
frequently used among the 32 elections. Each of the four will be addressed below in the 
order of their frequency of use rather than their possible contribution to a win or loss; 
their frequency of use is shown in Table 17 above.  
With 86% of the 32 elections, by far the most frequently used communication 
tactic was group meetings of employees, often referred to as “captive audience” 
meetings. Although most frequently used, employers only won 44% of their elections 
using this communication tactic.  
The second most frequently used communication tactic was the use of letters to 
employees’ homes in order to convey the employer’s election campaign message. Of 
those elections featuring letters to employees’ homes, the success rate was 50-50. 
Literally half of the elections featuring letters to employees’ homes resulted in victories 
for the employer and half of the time resulted in employer losses.  
The third most frequently used communication tactic involves a manager meeting 
one-on-one with an employee to discuss the employer’s campaign messaging and election 
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issues. While this communication tactic was only the third most frequently used 
communication tactic, employers who used it in the 32 elections won in 58% of those 
elections. Of all of the communication tactics examined, this proved to be the most 
successful.  
Lastly posters were used to communicate the employer’s campaign messages in 
40% of the 32 responding elections. Those employers utilizing posters in their campaigns 
won 55% of the responding elections. The effectiveness of this communication tactic as 
measured by the win rate at 55% outperformed and exceeded the overall 39% win rate. 
Included among those communication tactics found to have been used 
infrequently were numerous social media platforms. For example, just a single winning 
employer employed a website while one other used text messaging. In these cases, 
although seldom used at just 17% and 10% respectively of the 32 responding elections, 
the corresponding win rate for employers was just 20% and 33% respectively. Similarly, 
as popular as Facebook is among the general population, only two employers used 
Facebook as a communication tactic within their elections. The resulting success outcome 
was literally 50-50, with one employer winning and the other losing. What is clear is that 
social media had not been adopted as a campaign communication tactic among the 32 
responding elections. None of the employers surveyed who responded utilized Twitter, a 
podcast, or online conference calls to communicate campaign messaging. 
Survey & Database Quantitative Research: Research Questions 
1. What type of messages result in an increase of the vote in favor of the 
employer in National Labor Relations Board elections? The following six 
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messages and their win rate outperformed the 39% win rate of the studied 32 
responding elections:  
a. Analysis of the union’s Constitution/Bylaws (50%) 
b. Union’s strike history (50%) 
c. Benefits you have now (47%) 
d. Get out the vote/ You need to vote (42%) 
e. Calculators showing how much dues costs or amount lost in a strike (41%) 
f. Comparing existing company benefits/Wages with union’s contracts 
elsewhere (40%) 
2. What modalities of communication tactics result in an increase of the vote in 
favor of the employer in National Labor Relations Board elections? The four 
communication tactics which outperform the overall win rate for all 32 
elections studied included:  
a. Group meetings of employees, often referred to as “captive audience” 
meetings (44%) 
b. Letters to employees’ homes in order to convey the employer’s election 
campaign message (50%) 
c. A manager meeting one-on-one with an employee to discuss the 
employer’s campaign messaging and election issues (58% ) 
d. The use of posters in the workplace to visually communicate the employer 
campaign messaging (55%) 
3. Does relying on a campaign consultant increase the vote in favor of the 
employer in National Labor Relations Board elections? The survey was very 
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clear in distinguishing between consultants, attorneys, and persuaders and 
provided unique definitions for each. Among the 32 elections, attorneys were 
hired by employers nine out of every 10 elections. However, employers won 
only slightly over one third of those elections. While just nearly a third of the 
employers hired a persuader to speak directly to employees during the 
campaign, the use of a persuader resulted in winning 40% of the surveyed 
elections. Clearly persuaders outperformed their usage. Lastly, consultants 
were hired in just over one third of the elections and resulted in winning 40% 
of the elections. The data obtained raises the possibility that survey 
respondents did not distinguish between the definition of consultant and 
persuader. It is possible that survey respondents viewed persuaders as also 
consultants. Regardless both types of resources outperformed their usage. 
Consequently, the research question was answered in the affirmative. 
4. Do shorter election periods result in more or less employer victories in 
National Labor Relations Board elections? Yes. As previously noted, the data 
from the NLRB database of 305 employer’s resoundingly answers this 
question in the affirmative: shorter election periods result in fewer employer 
victories in NLRB elections. As expected by employers there is a very slight, 
though positive relationship (Pearson r of .063) between the election period 
and the corresponding percent of the vote in favor of the employer; however, 
this relationship was not statistically significant at .287. 
5. Do contested or stipulated elections favor employers in National Labor 
Relations Board elections? The data indicated that contesting the unions’ 
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petitioned-for unit favors the employer. In 22% of the responding elections, 
the employer contested the unions’ petitioned-for unit of employees. Of that 
22%, half of the employers won their elections and half lost their elections. 
Since a significant reason for contesting the union’s petitioned-for unit of 
employees is to expand and enlarge the size of the unit, it was important to 
analyze whether the number of eligible voters would increase the percentage 
of the vote in favor of the employer. Among the 305 elections within the 
NLRB database, the correlation between the Number of Potential Voters 
(a.k.a. Unit Size) and the Percent of The Vote in Favor of the Employer 
revealed the most significant independent variable impacting the percentage 
of the vote in favor of the employer, at a Pearson r of .200; it is statistically 
significant at .000. Therefore, the NLRB database of 300 elections indicated 
very clearly that the larger the size of the unit, the greater the percent of the 
vote in favor of the employer. Conversely the smaller the unit size, the smaller 
the percent of the vote in favor of the employer. 
Qualitative Method: Semi-structured Interviews 
In order to triangulate the information obtained from the large NLRB database of 
305 employer elections and from the 32 election respondents to the Voice of the Employer 
Survey©, it was necessary to interview subject matter experts to provide insight and 
interpretation of the quantitative data.  
Demographics 
Seven subject matter experts were selected from conference speakers on the 
subject of NLRB elections. These seven subject matter experts are frequent speakers at 
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industry and professional association conferences. Each subject matter expert has directly 
participated in numerous NLRB elections, collectively amounting to over 150 elections. 
Four have also advised employer representatives contractually in a significant number of 
elections as a consultant or persuader. This study’s group of consultants and persuaders 
included a mix of five men and two women. 
In keeping with the interview participant agreement and in order to protect the 
anonymity of each of the interview subject matter experts, each subject’s identity was 
coded. Without regard to a participant’s gender, each was assigned a name from the 2020 
hurricane season (Farmers’ Almanac, n.d.). Each subject matter expert was assigned the 
name of a hurricane alphabetically based upon the order in which each was interviewed. 
For example, the very first subject matter expert interviewed is coded as Arthur, without 
regards to the actual gender of the subject matter expert. The coded list of names for the 
subject matter experts included: 
• Arthur 
• Bertha 
• Cristobal 
• Dolly 
• Edouard 
• Fay 
• Gonzalo 
Data Collection 
Interviews of the subject matter experts were conducted in the first quarter of 
2020. Given the prominence of each subject matter expert, and since the subject matter 
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experts are known to the researcher as well as to each other, there was a risk of 
coordination among the interviewees. In order to prevent coordination or collaboration 
amongst interviewees, it was necessary to conduct one interview after another in 
relatively quick sequence to minimize the potential for collaboration amongst the 
interviewees. All interviews were conducted within a four-day period; in only one 
circumstance was an interviewee aware that another subject matter expert had been 
interviewed. In that case when questioned it was discovered that the subject matter expert 
was only aware an interview had taken place; the content of the interview had not been 
discussed among the subject matter experts.  
At the request of two of the seven subject matter experts, the interview was 
conducted in person; the remaining five interviews were conducted over the telephone. 
Each interview lasted between 15 and 30 minutes. Each interview conversation was 
recorded on a handheld recorder and transcribed thereafter. The researcher maintained 
copious notes during the interview in order to inform the transcribed conversation as well 
as to account for any technological recording mishap.  
Immediately prior to each interview, the researcher reviewed the reflexive 
exercise and bracketing statement discussed in Chapter 3. At the beginning of each 
interview it was confirmed the subject matter expert had read and consented to the 
interview participant agreement, understood participation was voluntary, and further that 
they could terminate the interview at any point (see Appendix G). Each subject matter 
expert agreed, and all completed their interviews.  
Each interview was conducted utilizing the semi-structured interview guide of 
subject matter experts in NLRB election campaigns (Appendix H) containing eight 
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interview questions designed to add insight to the quantitative data findings and to help 
answer the five research questions. 
Data Analysis 
In “Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology” researchers Braun and Clarke (2006) 
outlined a six-phase process for conducting thematic analysis of transcribed interviews to 
a full qualitative report. That analytical six-phase process was followed for this study’s 
methodology, as described below. 
PHASE 1: Familiarizing yourself with the data. Braun and Clarke (2006) 
emphasized that in this phase that it is vital to immerse oneself in the data in order to 
maintain familiarity with the depth and breadth of the content. It requires a repeated 
reading of the data while searching for meetings and patterns. It is a time-consuming 
process; the researchers suggested it is the bedrock for the other phases of thematic 
analysis. In order to accomplish this first phase the recorded interviews were transcribed, 
printed on paper, and read and reread in order to achieve the awareness necessary for the 
next phases. 
PHASE 2: Generating initial codes. After familiarization of the data from Phase 
1 it was necessary to produce initial codes from the data, in essence organizing the data 
into meaningful groups. Braun and Clarke (2006) noted that the organizing occurring 
during this phase is not the development of themes, which are often broader. To 
accomplish Phase 2 the printed transcripts from Phase 1 were again each reviewed, in the 
order in which the interviews occurred. Each of the major operative points of the first 
interview were highlighted, noting a descriptive phrase for each within the margin. All 
subsequent interviews similarly underwent the same process. While coding each of the 
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seven interviews this researcher did not attempt to limit the potential themes annotated as 
the full spectrum of potential categories would not emerge until the last interview was 
completed.  
PHASE 3: Searching for themes. Braun and Clarke (2006) suggested this phase 
requires the sorting of the different codes into potential themes. It is in this phase that an 
analysis of the data begins as it is necessary to consider how the different codes can 
combine to form a more generalized set of themes. The net outcome of this phase of 
coding the data from the seven interviews was the collection of candidate themes.  
The coded data of the seven subject matter interviews was sorted into the 
following codes: 
• Academia is biased and distrusted by business 
• NLRB is biased 
• NLRB database may list front-line supervisors, not campaign decision-makers 
• Employers must protect their brand 
• It is logistically easier to obtain the experience from a small group of 
organizers 
• Antagonize a union with which they have an existing relationship  
• Campaign messaging has a more positive emphasis 
• Standard messaging in a campaign 
• Collective bargaining process  
• Each election is unique 
• Elections are emotional/personal 
• Trust 
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• Factual information 
• Face to Face 
• Communication tactics 
• Family and spouses 
• One-on-one meetings 
• Junk mail 
• Frontline supervision 
• It’s complicated and expensive to challenge the unit 
• Compromise 
• Educate not persuade 
• Credibility as former union organizers 
PHASE 4: Reviewing themes. In this phase it is necessary to refine the candidate 
themes from Phase 3. It is in this phase in which it is important to evaluate the themes’ 
subject and essence in relationship to each other. This often results in a thematic map, 
although in this particular research endeavor a map was deemed unnecessary given the 
influential nature of the research questions upon the interview questions. At the end of 
Phase 4 the emergent themes became evident.  
The major themes identified within this phase included: 
• Sourcing employer data 
• Communication messaging 
• Communication tactics 
• To stipulate or not to stipulate 
• Hiring a consultant or persuader 
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PHASE 5: Defining and naming themes. After having identified the relationship 
between themes from Phase 4 it became necessary to “define and refine” in order to 
identify the “essence” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 99) of each theme, what it is that is 
interesting about each theme and why. The net outcome of this phase was to clearly 
define the identified themes as well as to identify respective comments for each theme 
included in the Phase 6 report below. 
PHASE 6: Producing the report. Braun and Clarke (2006) suggested that this 
phase creates the story that consists of the collection of the data accompanied by selected 
vivid examples; for this study relevant quotations from subject matter experts were 
included in the results below.  
Results  
Braun and Clarke’s (2006) six-step analysis resulted in the following summarized 
themes and sub-themes from the interviews of seven subject matter experts, as shown in 
Table 18. 
Table 18 
Themes and Sub-themes from Subject Matter Expert Interviews 
THEME SUB-THEME 
1. Sourcing employer data • Academia is biased and 
distrusted by business 
• NLRB is biased 
• NLRB database may list 
supervisors, not campaign 
decision-makers 
• Employers must protect their 
brand 
• It is easier to obtain the 
experience from a small group of 
organizers 
• Antagonize a union with which 
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they have an existing 
relationship  
2. Communication messaging • Campaign messaging has a more 
positive emphasis 
• Standard messaging in a 
campaign 
• Collective bargaining process  
• Each election is unique 
• Elections are emotional/personal 
• Trust 
• Factual information 
3. Communication tactics • Face to Face 
• Communication tactics 
• Family and spouses 
• One on ones 
• Junk mail 
• Frontline supervision 
4. Stipulate or not stipulate • It’s complicated and expensive 
to challenge the unit 
• Compromise 
5. Hiring a consultant or persuader • Educate not persuade  
• Credibility as former union 
organizers 
 
The developed five major themes outlined above in Table 18 are described in detail with 
accompanying comments below. 
Theme 1: Sourcing Employer Data. In this theme respondents provided their 
speculations and understanding about why researchers typically do not collect 
information from employers. The subject of bias was frequently mentioned by nearly all 
respondents, explaining that both academia as well as the NLRB are not to be trusted, due 
to their pro-labor sentiments. As Gonzalo put it: “When you’re dealing with the NLRB, 
you don’t know if the guy investigating you is the union steward for his unit back at the 
NLRB.” 
Another emergent sub-theme centered upon an employer’s interest in protecting 
its brand. The subject matter experts pointed out that employers are reluctant to comment 
153 
 
 
for fear of how the information will be used or edited. Two of the subject matter experts 
noted that we in society are all busy, and that to give up time with family or work for 
strangers is just not likely.  
An additional sub-theme that emerged was the practical efficiency and ease of 
collecting information from union organizers involved in numerous elections rather than 
having to contact each individual company participating in an election. Thus, Dolly 
noted: “Union organizers have a strong motivation to participate in these types of surveys 
in order to explain and justify why they may have lost the election or why it was so costly 
to campaign.” 
Theme 2: Communication Messaging. Based upon their numerous prior NLRB 
election experience the subject matter experts relayed their guidance for selecting 
campaign messaging to increase the vote in favor of the employer. Among the seven there 
was a wide variety of opinions regarding overall strategies and the tone of campaigns. All 
subject matter experts indicated that there is typically a standard set of communication 
messaging. Arthur indicated there are approximately 10 standard messages and named 
some: “…definition of a union, the union is a business and needs your dues, analysis of 
the union’s constitution and bylaws, what you have now may not be what you end up 
with, analysis of the union’s existing collective bargaining agreements…” 
Subject matter expert Edouard uses only three to five major themes or messages 
in a campaign, stating: “It’s important to listen to the employees and respond to their 
request. I also focus significantly on the realities of collective bargaining, especially that 
workers can get more, less, or stay the same. Often employees don’t understand 8d 
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[Section 8d of the National Labor Relations Act] that neither party can be compelled to 
agree with the other party.” 
Most of the subject matter experts commented to various degrees upon the 
importance of including trust in the major themes and specifically in messaging for the 
employer. Each mentioned the importance of rebuilding trust, as the election decision by 
employees is an emotional decision. Bertha commented that ultimately the employees 
have to decide “who can you trust the most – the company or the union?” Cristobal 
added, “the campaign starts with acknowledging the loss of trust in the employer. The 
employer has to reacquire that trust by supporting its assertions with facts during its 
campaign messaging.” Edouard stated, “It’s not that the standard messaging isn’t 
important, but people want to trust their company. The employer, though, has to win back 
the trust of the employees.” Dolly summed up the subject matter experts’ reliance and 
emphasis on the use of messages involving trust: 
We used a lot of the standard messaging and lost elections. Once we shifted our 
messaging to rebuilding trust, before we could ever provide the facts about 
unionization we saw a shift to remaining union-free and winning elections. The 
union is not the solution to the lack of trust in the workplace.  
Only one subject matter expert referenced the importance of the voting 
employees’ happiness after the conclusion of the election, which is ultimately the 
intended consequence of the NLRB election. Edouard noted: “It’s also important to 
provide factual information on how the relationship changes once a company is 
unionized. I showed them their own satisfaction data from our surveys that illustrate a 
significant difference in job satisfaction between the unionized portion of the workforce 
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and the union-free portion of our company. Union members are vastly less satisfied in 
their work.”  
In conversation subject matter experts were quick to add that reliance solely on 
traditional or standard messaging in a campaign is unartful and not likely to lead to 
success. A common phrase used among the subject matter experts was “each election is 
unique” and dependent upon the campaign issues, company culture, and the relationship 
between the workers and management. Over half of the subject matter experts, however, 
had a specific messaging each felt was critical to campaign success for the employer. 
Most of the interviewed participants felt it is the responsibility of the employer to 
accurately describe the realities of collective bargaining, with a description of the 
logistics, legal requirements of the participants, and possible outcomes. This was summed 
up in a statement by Fay: 
Many employers focus on the tried and traditional messaging that I no longer use. 
They’ll talk about strikes, union corruption, the salaries of the union leaders, 
super seniority, and on and on. And I no longer discuss those because I view them 
as ineffective. I think what employees want to hear about is whether they can trust 
their management, what their leaders are feeling, and it’s especially important that 
they understand the intricacies and nuances and frankly, the realities of collective 
bargaining. 
Theme 3: Communication Tactics. In discussing the subject of communication 
tactics, or how messages should be delivered to the employees who will vote on whether 
to unionize or, it was not surprising that the subject matter experts were quite animated 
and opinionated. All subject matter experts conveyed that face-to-face communication is 
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the single most effective communication tactic available to the employer. One suggested 
it is the only way management can be present when the message is delivered to the 
employee. 
Without prompting, several of the subject matter experts referenced the 
importance of utilizing front-line supervisors to communicate factual information 
regarding the union experience. Edouard said, “You’ve really got to use every 
communication method available in today’s world. Social media is an excellent method 
of communicating to employees’ families. But the bottom line is you can’t run a 
campaign by flyers alone.” 
However, two of the interview participants cautioned that if frontline supervision 
is not committed to remaining union-free, “you’re going to end up losing the election” 
(Fay). Gonzalo also felt that frontline supervision is not as committed to remaining 
union-free as it has been historically. 
Only a couple of the subject matter experts referenced the importance of 
maintaining a website, and only Edouard referenced the importance of social media. Both 
experts’ comments seem to center on the importance of including the familial impact of 
the employee’s decision on whether to unionize or remain union- free. Bertha noted, “It’s 
very important to communicate to the family and spouses, so we sent postcards to 
employees’ homes that also included the website address so the entire family could see 
our messaging.”   
Arthur relied upon the website as foundational for all of the campaign 
communications, utilizing it as a link to create integration of all messaging and to involve 
the family:  
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I have found websites to be very effective … using emails and text messages to 
remind people to go to the website. The website was a home base for the 
campaign communication and other communication tactics were designed to send 
people to the home base website. Once we used this hub and spoke 
communication method, we found our website hits went up dramatically.  
Theme 4: To Stipulate or Not to Stipulate. The importance of this theme cannot 
be understated. It is the first of the decisions an employer is required to make once it 
becomes aware that a petition for election has been filed with the NLRB. The stipulation 
decision involves two major subcomponents: the size of the unit, meaning the number of 
employees eligible to vote, and the opportunity to negotiate a duration for the election, 
meaning the time period for which employees will be able to campaign amongst each 
other and the duration that the employer will be allowed to deliver campaign messaging 
to employees. It is the initial decision an employer makes in the campaign, and it must 
decide first whether or not to accept, to stipulate to the size and scope of the unit/group of 
employees who the union believes should be eligible to vote on representation by the 
union. Second, the employer must decide whether it wants to stipulate to the first decision 
(the unit) and gain the opportunity to potentially negotiate a longer period to campaign in 
the hopes that it can convince employees to remain union-free. Fay summarized this 
important—perhaps the most important—employer decision of the campaign, stating: “if 
they’re [the employer] stipulating to the unit, they obviously believe they’ve got a chance 
at winning.” 
Every single subject matter expert referenced the complexity associated with 
challenging the union’s petitioned-for unit. It can be extremely expensive, as Dolly 
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observed: “A community of interest may be worth fighting for, but that is, and can be, a 
lot of time and money.” 
As the literature review revealed, in less than 10% of all NLRB elections 
employers challenge rather than stipulate to the union’s petitioned-for unit. Edouard 
stated:” You can negotiate with the NLRB and the union, and obtain concessions. It’s 
probably better than going to a hearing, since the NLRB is biased against employers 
anyway, and an employer may not get a favorable hearing and decision.” 
Theme 5: Hiring a Consultant or Persuader. As might be expected, the 
consultants and persuaders among the subject matter experts believed strongly in the 
value of hiring consultants and persuaders for NLRB elections. Cristobal opined: “if you 
don’t use a consultant, you going to get your lunch eaten by the union because it has lots 
of experience in elections.” 
Several of the subject matter experts conveyed the concept that effective 
persuaders do not seek to persuade but rather to educate on the union experience: “good 
persuaders don’t persuade, they educate” (Cristobal). However, as evident in the literature 
reviewed in Chapter 2, consultants and persuaders are not inexpensive. Thus Fay 
observed: “The most important determinant of the company’s success in an NLRB 
election is the company’s commitment by its senior leadership. Specifically, on whether it 
wants to remain union free and whether it’s willing to incur the significant costs 
associated with hiring consultants and persuaders to influence the outcome of the 
election.” 
There was universal agreement on the value and necessity for using consultants 
and persuaders; it was also mentioned that hiring an attorney is a must, should an 
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employer decide to contest the election. In Fay’s view, “Hiring an attorney, and a separate 
consultant or persuader (pause)… that’s an easy answer because the NLRB election 
process is so complex, highly technical, and fraught with dangers for employers whose 
mistakes can be extremely costly, and have long-term ramifications for the viability of the 
employer.” 
Collectively the group of subject matter experts were highly opinionated and 
animated; without exception each was enthusiastic to participate in this research project. 
Each and every interview participant was thankful for the research study and indicated 
they looked forward to receiving a copy of the project’s results.  
Summary 
The quantitative portion of this study analyzed a database of 305 NLRB elections 
and identified three critical independent variables impacting the percent of the vote in 
favor of the employer: the percentage of the voting unit of employees who turn out to 
vote, the duration of the election, and lastly the size of the voting unit of employees. 
While each of the three independent variables had small positive correlations, it was the 
size of the unit which was statistically significant as a covariant for the percentage of the 
vote in favor of the employer.  
The second most covariant variable was the election duration. In the 30 longest 
elections, employers received 50% or more of the vote in 27 of the 30 elections for a 
90%-win rate. In contrast, in the 30 shortest elections employers received 50% or more of 
the vote in only four of the 30 elections for a win rate of only 13%.  
Lastly, the greater the percent of the turnout the greater the percent in favor of the 
employer. Consequently, these three variables are an important part of the 
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recommendations for action by employers as more fully detailed in Chapter 5: increase 
the number of voters, increase the duration of the campaign, and increase the turnout of 
employees voting.  
The data triangulated in this study included that collected from a survey involving 
32 elections, in which employer representatives provided information on the campaign 
messages and communication tactics used during their election. Armed with the surveyed 
election results, a practical rather than statistical comparison was conducted to evaluate 
the success of different campaign messages and communication tactics.  
The most frequently used campaign messaging centered upon first, the realities of 
collective bargaining and an analysis and comparison of the union’s collective bargaining 
agreements at other companies. A second most frequently used message for employers 
centers upon the union’s strike history and the realities of a strike. The third most 
frequently used message for employers was to educate employees on their current 
benefits and to compare those with the benefits offered at other companies which are 
unionized.  
The net result of the interviews with the subject matter experts yielded 
recommendations to employers on how to use the messaging and communication tactics 
identified in the survey. Their practical tips and recommendations are further detailed 
next in Chapter 5. A summary of the findings of the interviews of the subject matter 
experts regarding employers’ campaign messaging includes: explanations of the 
collective bargaining process along with examples and comparisons of the union’s other 
negotiated agreements, a thorough discussion of strikes, and educating employees on 
their benefits as compared to benefits offerings with other unionized companies. 
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The most frequently used communication tactic was group meetings; they were 
used in 86% of the elections although their use yielded only a 44% win rate for 
employers. As previously noted, these meetings are often referred to as “captive 
audience” meetings. However, the most effective tactic included one-on-one meetings 
with individual voting employees. The benefit these one-on-one meetings offer is to 
communicate the company’s messaging as well as to answer the individual employee’s 
questions. Although only 46% of the surveyed employer’s representatives used one-on-
one meetings, those employers which did use this tactic won 58% of the time.  
The qualitative methodology portion of this mixed methods research study 
contributed to a model to assist employers in assessing the efficacy and success of 
election-related messages and communication tactics, in order to achieve an increase in 
votes in favor of the employer and a successful election outcome. This study’s approach 
of methodological triangulation integrated both quantitative and qualitative methods 
yielding the results of the study (see Patton, 1990). The researcher’s resultant model is 
the product of a triangulation between an analysis of a quantitative dataset of 305 
elections, a survey of 32 elections, and qualitative interviews of seven subject matter 
experts. This triangulation of quantitative and qualitative methodology, when combined 
with the theoretical solutions involving structural violence and systems theory, will 
benefit not only employers who are responding to an NLRB election but also all actors 
within the NLRB election system, as further discussed in Chapter 5.  
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
The objective of this study was to develop a model to assist employers for what is 
arguably the most contentious conflict that can exist in the American workplace: a 
workplace representation election, a process supervised by the National Labor Relations 
Board. The intent of a workplace representation election is to determine whether a 
petitioning union has sufficient support to unionize a unit of employees within a 
workplace. This research study developed a model, the Voice of the Employer Model for 
Winning NLRB Elections©, to assist employers in assessing the efficacy and success of 
election-related messages and communication tactics, in order to achieve an increase in 
votes in favor of the employer and a successful election outcome.  
This research study built upon previously published findings on the topic of 
conflicts inherent within workplace representation elections. While much has been 
studied about why employees join unions and why unions are successful in workplace 
representation elections, little research exists regarding employers’ successful strategies 
during workplace representation elections. Moreover, as detailed in Chapter Two, most 
research that has addressed employer strategies was not sourced from the employer but 
rather from secondary, tertiary, or other far-removed sources of information. Indeed, prior 
studies detailing employers’ election messaging and other tactics exclusively sourced 
their data directly or indirectly from the union organizer rather than from employers.  
This study analyzed a dataset of 305 NLRB elections held between 2015 through 
2017 in four NLRB regions. A survey was conducted of the representatives of employers 
involved in the 305 NLRB election population. That data collection instrument entitled 
the Voice of the Employer Survey© resulted in identifying campaign messages and 
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communication tactics used in 32 NLRB elections. In order to inform the quantitative 
information contained in the study, interviews with seven subject matter experts in NLRB 
elections were conducted to add insight to the quantitative information collected 
regarding campaign messages and communication tactics and to directly respond to the 
study’s research questions. Data obtained and analyzed from each of these three sources 
provided the basis for a model detailing the multivariate influences on winning NLRB 
workplace representation elections, from the important and heretofore often omitted 
perspective of the employer.  
Triangulation of all three data sources yielded the following key findings for 
employers when confronted with an NLRB petition for election:  
• the NLRB election process is complex and complicated, and mistakes can be 
extremely costly for employers; 
• NLRB elections are expensive to win and even more expensive to lose; 
• the larger the group of employees in a voting unit of employees, the greater 
the percentage of votes in favor of the employer; 
• the longer the duration of the campaign, the longer employees can campaign 
with each other, as well as listen to and respond to the campaign messaging of 
all actors within the NLRB election system; 
• there is a wide variety of campaign election durations, and no defined 
minimum campaign duration; 
• employer campaign messaging should focus first and foremost on re-
establishing the trust of the voting employees; 
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• it is important that voting employees fully understand all aspects of collective 
bargaining; 
• it is important that voting employees fully understand the union’s use of 
strikes; 
• employees ultimately want to know whether they will get more, less, or stay 
the same in their pay and benefits through unionization;  
• employees need to understand their existing pay and benefits as well as how 
they compare with similarly situated employees at other companies which are 
unionized; and 
• the regulations governing NLRB elections in 2015 significantly reduced the 
election period, the time allowed for employer and employee campaigning.  
Interpretation of the Findings 
The literature review indicated that there is an absence of information which is 
sourced directly from the employer. Having mailed the short six-minute survey to 
employers experiencing elections during the 2015–2017 period in the four NLRB 
Regions, the difficulty of obtaining information from employers was realized and 
understood. The qualitative portion of this study overwhelmingly revealed that there 
exists a distrust of the NLRB, academia, and others who would seek such information, 
and that a perception of anti-employer/pro-union bias exists that inhibits an employer 
response.  
The resulting 11% survey response rate inhibited statistical findings, including a 
wave analysis and other means of comparative testing. The response rate limitation 
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thereby prohibited inferential statistics and generalizable comparisons beyond the scope 
of this study.  
However, other significant findings of the survey yielded important 
interpretations for employers. For example, in order to increase the percent of the vote in 
favor of the employer, this study’s research found that employers should retain an 
attorney and consultant to guide campaign legal strategies and communicate with 
employees. The inclusion of an attorney is critically important because the attorney has 
more experience in responding to NLRB elections. The need for employers to avail 
themselves of appropriate legal expertise was made clear during the course of this study’s 
research process, as next described.  
The literature review indicated that less than 7 percent of the private workforce is 
unionized; therefore the overwhelming majority of private employers (93%) are not 
unionized and lack experience in NLRB elections. The findings of this study indicated 
the earliest decisions of the employer are among the most important of the whole 
campaign. Once notified that a petition for election to determine whether a company 
should be unionized has been filed, the employer is immediately thrust into a 
circumstance in which it is likely the least experienced and adept at handling the matter at 
hand, since the NLRB and unions literally handle thousands of elections. It is first 
necessary for the employer to review the union’s petition to identify the group of 
employees the union seeks to unionize. At this point the employer or their designee 
begins discussion with the union’s leadership to accept the union’s assertion by 
stipulating to the unit or negotiating a more favorable unit that represents a larger 
community of interest within the employer’s operations. This decision impacts the size of 
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the unit, which this study determined is the most significant variable impacting the 
percentage of the vote in favor of the employer. Given the magnitude and ramification of 
this decision and potential legal pitfalls and consequences, employers should hire an 
attorney to handle communications with the union and the NLRB in order to negotiate for 
a more favorable unit or to contest the unit in an NLRB hearing. 
Should an employer contest the unit rather than stipulate, the process to adjudicate 
an appropriate unit likely increases the election period. This allows more time for 
employees to campaign amongst each other as well as enables the employer to distribute 
its own campaign messages. Unions contend that employers who avail themselves of this 
legal process to adjudicate the union are using a delay tactic. However, since unions can 
determine when to file a petition for election it is likely the only people surprised by the 
petition are both the employer and those employees who were not solicited by the union. 
Another major finding of this study is the greater the election duration, the greater the 
percentage of the vote in favor of the employer. One interpretation of this parameter is 
that if employees and employers are given more time to campaign, employers have a 
greater chance at winning the election. 
When the campaign does occur, it is evident that at least some portion of the 
workforce seeks a representative to interact with their employer on their behalf. The 
resounding message from the NLRB election subject matter experts interviewed for the 
study was that an employer must first and foremost reestablish trust with their employees. 
It was suggested this be accomplished by ensuring that any campaign messaging and 
assurances should be fact-based and supported by references which enable employees to 
verify and validate the employer’s assertions.  
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Another important campaign message addresses the issue of collective bargaining. 
In the survey of employers in 32 elections, a key finding was that a focus on collective 
bargaining is a message which wins election at slightly greater percentages than its 
frequency of use. Some of the NLRB election subject matter experts asserted that 
employees do not understand that the collective bargaining process can result in more, 
less, or even the same pay and benefits. In one interview it was asserted that employees 
believe that they will simply get more as a result of unionization. Consequently, it is 
important in any NLRB election that employers thoroughly explain the collective 
bargaining process to voting employees.  
A collective bargaining process is intended to result in a collective bargaining 
agreement between the employer and the union. This study found that it is important to 
provide voting employees with examples of union contracts and comparisons of their 
own pay and benefits with similarly situated employees at other unionized companies. 
Again this is a message which was the most frequently used in 87% of the 32 elections 
and it resulted in exactly 39% employer election wins.  
This study also found it important that employer campaign messaging explain 
why unions engage in strikes and most importantly the resulting impact on striking 
employees. 
In order to communicate campaign messaging, this study found employers should 
utilize group meetings paired with one-on-one meetings featuring a persuader or 
supervisor communicating directly with employees to answer employees’ questions. 
The foregoing recommendations are graphically illustrated in the model below in 
Figure 19. 
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Figure 19. Voice of the Employer - Winning NLRB Elections© model. 
Limitations of the Study
While this study generated a conceptual model for employers responding to 
NLRB elections, the research itself was not without limitations. First, the focal period of 
this study of workplace representation elections was limited to April 14, 2015 to May 1, 
2017. As noted, this period represents the major portion of the effective period of the 
2015 election rule, before the announced Dec 18, 2019 revisions to the election system, 
effective May 31, 2020.  
Second, the database of 305 elections provided no information regarding 
employer messaging and communication tactics. This researcher does not foresee that 
such information will likely be contained on the NLRB database and makes no such 
respective recommendation.  
• CONDUCT GROUP MEETINGS
• SEND LETTERS TO HOMES
• MEET ONE-ON-ONE: SUPERVISOR 
& EMPLOYEE ANSWERING 
QUESTIONS
• ESTABLISH TRUST USING FACTS
• EXPLAIN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
• COMPARE CURRENT PAY/BENEFITS 
WITH OTHER UNIONIZED 
COMPANIES
• EXPLAIN UNION'S USE OF STRIKES
• ENLARGE COMMUNITY OF 
INTEREST
• LENGTHEN CAMPAIGN 
DURATION
• HIRE ATTORNEY FOR LEGAL 
TASKS
• HIRE CONSULTANT FOR 
CAMPAIGN MESSAGING GET HELP CONTEST UNIT
COMMUNICATION 
TACTICS
CAMPAIGN 
MESSAGING
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Third, to collect information regarding employers’ use of campaign messaging 
and communication tactics in NLRB elections it was necessary to conduct a survey. 
Unfortunately, the survey yielded only an 11% response rate. While this response rate 
was sufficient for the practical and descriptive comparisons included within this research, 
it was limited by the 11% response rate which prohibited statistically significant findings 
and the ability to represent these results beyond this study. As a result, the findings of this 
research are limited to the data and election information included within the scope of this 
study and are not generalizable to predict or forecast elections outside the scope of this 
study.  
A fourth limitation is that revealed by the interviewed seven NLRB election 
subject matter experts, who consistently theorized that employers elected not to 
participate in this study’s survey questionnaire due to distrust of academic organizations 
as well as their own perceived inability to control the data or messaging included in the 
study. Employers were reluctant to reveal information the use of which they could not 
control; the basis for their concern was damage to their employer brand. 
Lastly, another important limitation of this study is the researcher’s own 
background and biases in support of employers. Through reflection and bracketing, a 
self-awareness was maintained throughout the data collection, data analysis, and 
interpretation phases of the study. This bias was addressed in an effort to limit 
subjectivity and to increase reliability and validity. 
Recommendations 
This study validated the difficulty in obtaining employers’ input and willingness 
to discuss or reveal the messaging and communication tactics used in NLRB elections. 
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Interviews with the NLRB election subject matter experts consistently theorized that 
employers elected not to participate due to distrust of academic organizations as well as 
an inability to control the data or messaging to be included in the study. It is 
recommended that future research should resolve this limitation through a sponsorship or 
direct involvement by an employer association such as the Society for Human Resource 
Management or any other supportive labor relations-related employer association.  
Additional future research should attempt to ascertain the rationale regarding 
employers’ practice of stipulating to the unit petitioned for by the union. There is likely 
benefit in greater transparency on the benefits and costs of the stipulate or contest 
employer decision.  
Most importantly, after the NLRB regulations published in December 2019 
become effective, future studies should assess the impact on all parties of the NLRB 
election system. While there is a tendency to view the actors in the NLRB election 
system as participants in a conflict of management versus labor, there is another forgotten 
voice, that of the employee. Future research should study representative samples of those 
employees involved in NLRB elections who did not support unionization, in order to 
learn of their lived experience. 
When an employer receives the notice that a petition for election has been filed 
with the NLRB to decide whether its workers will unionize or remain union-free, it must 
decide first whether to stipulate and agree to the unit of employees the union seeks to 
represent. This decision is perhaps the most significant finding of this study and perhaps 
the most valuable recommendation for employers. The larger the unit the greater the 
percent of the vote in favor of the employer.  
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Implications 
While many of the theoretical recommendations included within Chapter Two 
have been proposed by the National Labor Relations Board since the initiation of this 
research study, the December 2019 revisions with planned implementation in 2020 are 
subject to litigation. In March of 2020 the AFL-CIO filed litigation arguing the NLRB 
violated administrative law by issuing a substantive rule without going through the full 
notice-and-comment rulemaking process. The labor federation also filed a preliminary 
injunction to block the rule (Opfer, 2020, p. 1; Iafolla, 2020c). The National Labor 
Relations Board has responded to the litigation by delaying any changes to the April 2015 
NLRB election regulations until May 31, 2020. As of the conclusion of this study, the 
court on June 7 struck down a limited portion of the 2020 regulations (AFL-CIO v. 
NLRB, 2020; see also Kanu, 2020c; Kanu, 2020d; National Labor Relations Board, 
2020). 
There is a lack of transparency in the NLRB election process as a petitioning 
union can file a petition at any point of the year without prior notification to either the 
employees in the petitioned for unit or the affected employer. The NLRB should require 
transparency. 
Unionization is determined by whether a majority of voting employees elect to 
unionize rather than a majority of the unit of employees. Since all of the unit of 
employees will be bound by the result of those who vote, a system theorist would expand 
the requirement that unionization is determined by all of the unit employees rather than 
just those who voted. 
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The employer’s decision on whether to stipulate or to contest the unit can expedite 
or potentially extend the campaign duration. The effect of the decision carries numerous 
implications. The first decision an employer makes in a campaign conveys its willingness 
to agree with the union. A decision whether to stipulate or contest may reveal the 
employer’s negotiation posture, or even whether the employer will contest the unit in 
favor of a larger group with a greater community of interests. The data in this study 
indicates that a company which does not expand the number of eligible voters is 
minimizing its opportunity to win the election. The National Labor Relations Board’s 
most recent data indicates employers contest the union’s petitioned unit size in 
approximately only one of 10 elections (NLRB, 2019).  
An understanding of the correlations of the 305 elections would prompt unions to 
focus upon lobbying for rules which enable unions to petition for smaller and smaller 
units of voters. Conversely employers should lobby regulatory bodies in order to inhibit 
smaller units of employees.  
Conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to capture the voice of the employer regarding its 
messaging and communication tactics in response to the conflict associated with an 
NLRB election. Results of this study indicated there are practical steps included within 
this research model that are available to any and all employers faced with responding to 
an NLRB election. 
This triangulation of a quantitative (database and survey) and qualitative (semi-
structured interviews) methodology, when combined with theoretical solutions involving 
structural violence and systems theory, will bring transparency: greater opportunity for all 
173 
 
 
actors in the NLRB election system to freely participate and benefit from the discourse 
and messaging made possible by longer election periods.  
The most important statistical finding of this study is that with one decision 
employers can increase the percent of the vote in favor of the employer. The employer 
can increase the size of the unit and increase the duration of the election—either through 
negotiations with the union and the NLRB or through contesting the unit in order to gain 
a unit that logically has a larger community of interests. Given the complexity of such 
negotiations as well as the potential pitfalls associated with contesting the petitioned-for 
unit, hiring an attorney is strongly recommended. After the employer obtains the NLRB 
decision on the size of the unit and duration of the election the campaign will begin in 
earnest (Bergeron, 2008). Figure 19 above provides a summarized result, a graphical 
model that is directed by the answers to the research questions in Chapter Four and meets 
the objectives of the study.  
Despite a dismal 31% national employer win rate in NLRB elections, employers 
are not without options to win. This study—informed by the voice of employers who 
have won and lost such elections—provides an evidence-based path to victory. 
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Appendix A: Glossary of Labor Relations Terms 
Many terms listed below can be found at the website maintained by International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters at http://www.teamster.org/join/glossary.htm 
Accretions: Employees added to the bargaining unit once a union is certified as a 
representative of the bargaining unit. 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ):  A civil service appointee of the National Labor 
Relations Board who conducts unfair labor practice hearings in the region where such 
cases originate 
Area Standards Picketing: A form of picketing with the purpose of encouraging an 
employer to observe the standards in that industry in that locality. This kind of picketing 
has legal restrictions. 
Authorization Card: A union card filled out by pro-union workers during a 
representation campaign. The card usually specifies the union as a collective bargaining 
agent of the employees and must be dated and signed. The National Labor Relations 
Board will accept 30% of the employees signatures on cards or petitions as the sufficient 
“showing of interest” required to conduct an election. Usually unions will not file for an 
election unless a majority of the bargaining unit members have signed authorization 
cards. 
Bargaining Agent: Union designated by a government agency, such as the National 
Labor Relations Board, or recognized voluntarily by the employer, as the exclusive 
representative of all employees in the bargaining unit for the purposes of collective 
bargaining. 
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Bargaining Rights: The rights outlined in section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. 
Rights of workers to negotiate the terms and conditions of employment through their 
chosen representatives. The bargaining agent is designated by a majority of the workers 
in a bargaining unit to represent the group in collective bargaining. 
Bargaining Unit: A group of workers who bargain collectively with the employer. The 
unit may include all the workers in a single location or in several locations or it may 
include only the workers in a single craft or department. Final unit is determined by the 
National Labor Relations Board, or agreed to jointly by the union and the employer. 
Blocking: A National Labor Relations Board decision not to proceed with an election in 
a bargaining unit where there are unresolved Unfair Labor Practice charges. 
Boycott: A concerted refusal to work for, purchase from, or handle the products of an 
employer. Where the action is directed against the employer directly involved in the labor 
dispute, it is termed a primary boycott. In a secondary boycott, the action is directed 
against a neutral employer in an attempt to get him/her to stop doing business with the 
company with which the union is having a dispute. Secondary boycotts are illegal under 
the Taft-Hartley Act. 
Business Agent (B.A., Union Representative): A full-time representative of a local 
union whose job is to represent members in the local. 
Campaign Consultant or Persuader: Individuals or businesses utilized by employers 
for their expertise and sophistication in guiding the strategy, tactics, and messages to 
respond to the conflict inherent within a workplace representation election. 
Canvass: A method of talking individually to every member of a bargaining unit to either 
convey information, gather information on the survey, or plan for united action. 
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Canvass Coordinator: A term sometimes used for the person at the top of a member to 
member action network. Other terms include “network coordinator” or “campaign 
coordinator”. This person is responsible for establishing the one on one network and for 
planning and scheduling activities of the network. 
Captive Audience Meeting: Typically, a union term for a meeting held on company 
time and property, between employees and the employer’s representative to explain the 
benefits of maintaining a direct relationship between employees and the employer- 
without the influence of a party unaffected by the success or failure of the employer or its 
employees. In other words the purpose of the meeting is to persuade employees to vote 
against union representation. 
Card Check: Procedure whereby signed authorization cards are checked against the list 
of employees in a prospective bargaining unit to determine if the union has majority 
status. The employer may recognize the union on the basis of this card check without the 
necessity of a formal election. Often conducted by an outside party, e.g. a respected 
member of the community. 
Certification: Official designation by the National Labor Relations Board of a labor 
organization entitled to bargain as the exclusive representative of employees in an 
appropriate unit 
Certification Bar:  The National Labor Relations Board and many public sector agencies 
will prohibit another election in a bargaining unit for one year after a union has been 
certified following a workplace representation election. 
Certified Union: A union designated by the National Labor Relations Board as the 
exclusive bargaining agent of an appropriate unit of employees. 
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Check-Off: A contract clause authorizing the company to deduct union dues from 
paychecks of those members who so authorize deductions. The company then transfers 
the money to the union. 
Collective Bargaining: A process which employees, through their bargaining committee, 
deal as a group to determine wages, hours and other conditions of employment. 
Normally, the result of collective bargaining is a written contract which covers all 
employees in an appropriate unit. 
Communication Tactics: For employers engaged in the conflict of a workplace 
representation election, communication tactics are the modalities, or methods by which it 
will communicate its messages to the voting members of the bargaining unit. Such 
communication tactics can include captive audience meetings typically held on the 
employer premises while employees are on the clock, posters, home mailings, websites, 
social media platforms and applications, as well as other communication modalities.  
Company Union: An employee organization, usually in one company, that is dominated 
by management. The National Labor Relations Act declared that such employer 
domination is an Unfair Labor Practice. 
Complaint: Formal papers issued by the National Labor Relations Board to start an 
Unfair Labor Practice hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. The complaint states 
the basis for the National Labor Relations Board’s jurisdiction and the alleged Unfair 
Labor Practice. 
Concerted Activity: The rights, protected by the National Labor Relations Act, of two or 
more employees acting in concert to form, join, or assist labor organizations to affect 
their wages, hours or work or working conditions. 
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Consent Election: An election for union representation agreed to by management, 
employees, and the union. The National Labor Relations Board oversees the election 
Corporate Campaign: The use of strategic pressure on an employer’s weak areas to 
gain leverage during a contract campaign or organizing drive. These campaigns involve 
analyzing an employer’s social, financial, and political network and mobilizing union 
members and community members in a comprehensive approach which does not rely on 
the strike alone as the basis of the union’s power. 
Decertification: Withdrawal by a government agency, such as the National Labor 
Relations Board, of a union’s official recognition as the exclusive bargaining 
representative. The National Labor Relations Board will withdraw certification if a 
majority of employees vote against union representation in a decertification election. 
Double Breasted Operation: A condition where an employer operates two closely 
related companies – one with the union contract and one without. Under such operation, 
the employer will normally assign most of the work to the non—union segment of his 
two companies. 
Duty of Fair Representation (DFR): A union’s obligation to represent all employees in 
the appropriate bargaining unit as fairly and equally as possible. This requirement applies 
both in the creation and interpretation of collective bargaining agreements. A union is 
said to have violated its Duty of Fair Representation when a union’s conduct toward a 
member of a collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. A 
union steward, for example, may not ignore a grievance which has merit, nor can that 
grievance be processed in a perfunctory manner. It should be noted, however, that the 
employee in the bargaining unit has no absolute right to have a grievance taken to 
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arbitration. The union is obligated to give fair representation to all union members, and 
also to collective bargaining unit members who have not joined the union in right– to–
work states or in public service units. 
Excelsior List: Established in the case of “Excelsior Underwear”, the list of names, 
addresses and other personal information of employees eligible to vote in a union 
election. It is normally provided by the employer to the union within 10 days after the 
election date has been set or agreed upon at the National Labor Relations Board. NOTE: 
The requirements of this list, now referred to as a Voter List after the 2015 changes to the 
election system, must be provided to the union within eight days of the petition for 
election. 
Exclusive Bargaining Rights: The right of the union which is been certified by the 
National Labor Relations Board or other government agency to be the only union 
representing a particular bargaining unit. 
Exempt Employee: An employee who is not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act 
and is therefore not eligible for time-and-one-half monetary payments for overtime. 
Exempt employees are generally paid a salary rather than an hourly rate. 
Fact Finding:  Investigation of labor – management disputes by a board, panel, or 
individual. A report is issued by the panel describing the issue in dispute, and may make 
recommendations for a solution. 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA): The 1938 federal Wage –Hour Law which 
establishes minimum wage and overtime pay requirements for industries engaged in 
interstate commerce. The law also prohibited the labor of children under 16 years of age. 
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Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS): Independent agency created by 
the Taft – Hartley Act in 1947 to mediate labor disputes which substantially affect 
interstate commerce. 
Field Examiner: An employee of the National Labor Relations Board whose primary 
duties are to conduct certification elections and carry out preliminary investigations of 
Unfair Labor Practices. 
Free Riders:  Used in an open shop to refer to non—union members who receive all the 
benefits derived from collective bargaining without paying union dues or equivalent fees. 
Good Faith Bargaining: Negotiations in which two parties meet and confer at 
reasonable times with open minds and the intention of reaching agreement over a new 
contract. 
Housevisits, Homecalls and Housecalls: Terms used to describe visits by union staff, 
volunteers, or organizing committee members to the homes of employees they are 
attempting to organize. Such visits give organizers an opportunity to discuss the union 
and answer questions of unorganized employees in a relaxed and secure atmosphere. 
Industrial Union: A union whose membership includes all employees in a particular 
industry, regardless of the particular skills the employee exercises. 
Informational Picketing: Picketing done with the express intent not to cause a work 
stoppage, but to publicize either the existence of a labor dispute or information 
concerning the dispute. Picketing done with the express intent not to cause a work 
stoppage but to publicize either the existence of a labor dispute or information concerning 
the dispute. 
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Injunction: A court order which either imposes restraints upon action, or directs that a 
specific action be taken and which is, in either case, backed by the court’s power to hold 
disobedient parties in contempt. 
Inside Strategy: The use of mass grievances, working to rule, rolling sick outs, 
informational picketing, and other forms of resistance designed to pressure an employer 
to meet the union’s demands without the union resorting to a strike. 
Intervenor: A union which wants to be on the ballot when another union has already 
petition for an election. 
Job Action: A concerted activity by employees designed to put pressure on the employer 
without resorting to a strike. Examples include: wearing T shirts, buttons, or hats with 
union slogans, holding parking lot meetings, collective refusal of voluntary overtime, 
reporting to work in a group, petition signing, jamming phone lines, etc. 
Jurisdiction: The specific industry, craft and/or geographical area which a local union is 
chartered to organize or represent. 
Jurisdictional Dispute: A conflict involving a dispute between two unions over which 
union shall represent a group of employees in collective bargaining or as to which 
union’s member shall perform a certain type of work. 
L-M Reports: The annual financial statement of income and expenses submitted to the 
Department of Labor’s Office of Labor Management Standards. The reports include the 
salaries of union officers and staff. Unions are required by law to file annually.  
Mass Picketing: Patrolling by large numbers of people in close formation, often 
preventing access to company premises. 
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Member-to-Member Network: A communication system designed to allow the leaders 
of a local union to communicate rapidly and personally with the members. A coordinator 
at the top of a pyramid communicates with approximately 10 leaders, each of whom 
communicates with approximately 10 members, each of whom may communicate with 
10 other members, etc. See also Canvass. 
Messages: The statements and themes used by employers in order to respond to the 
conflict within the workplace representation election. Messages are intended to persuade 
the employees to accept and support the employer’s position. 
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA): Federal law guaranteeing employees 
the right to participate in unions without management reprisals. It was modified in 1947 
with the passage of the Taft – Hartley Act, and modified again in 1959 by the passage of 
the Landrum – Griffin Act. 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB): Agency created by the National Labor 
Relations Act of 1935, and continued through subsequent amendment whose functions 
are to define appropriate bargaining units, to hold elections, to determine whether a 
majority of workers want to be represented by a specific union or no union, to certify 
unions to represent employees, to interpret and apply the Act’s provisions prohibiting 
certain employer and union Unfair Labor Practices, and otherwise to administer the 
provisions of the Act. 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA): The law which authorizes the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration agency to set standards, obligates 
employers to provide a safe workplace, and provides for enforcement of the standards. 
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The law encourages the states to develop their own safety laws which displace the federal 
law. 
Open Shop: Where employees do not have to belong to the union or pay dues to secure 
or retain employment in a company, even though there may be a collective bargaining 
agreement. The union is obligated by law to represent members and non—members 
equally regardless of whether it is an open shop or a union shop. 
Organized Labor.  As defined by the National Labor Relations Act, organized labor is 
the organization elected by employees to represent their interest and to engage in 
collective bargaining with their employer, also known as a union. 
Organizing Committee: The employees in a non—union shop who are designated to 
represent their co – workers during the representation campaign. Organizing committee 
members, among other things, usually sign up their coworkers on authorization cards or 
petitions, hand out leaflets, attend meetings and visit employees at home to gain support 
for the union effort. 
Organizing Model of Unions: The concept that the primary function of a union’s 
officers and staff is to organize members to exert collective power to solve problems. 
This is in contrast to the Service Model of Unions. 
Pattern Bargaining: Collective bargaining in which the union tries to apply identical 
terms, conditions, or demands to several employers in an industry although the employers 
act individually rather than as a group.  
Permanent Replacements: Under current labor law, when employees engage in an 
economic strike, the employer has the right to hire permanent replacements. After the 
strike has ended, if there is no back to work agreement reached between the union and the 
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employer, employees replaced during the strike are put on a preferential hiring list and 
must wait for openings to occur. 
Phone Banking: The organized telephoning of large numbers of members to inform 
them of a union policy or action or to gather information. This is often done by 
volunteers who come into the union hall and telephone members during a certain time 
period.  
Phone Tree: A network of volunteer members in which one member calls a list of 
members, each of whom calls another list of members, etc. 
Raiding: A union’s attempt to enroll employees belonging to or represented by another 
union. 
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO): Federal law 
allowing the federal government to place in trusteeship organizations which are convicted 
of being dominated by racketeers of organized crime. The U.S. Department of Justice 
filed suit against the International Brotherhood of Teamsters under the RICO Act, and 
this lawsuit was settled by the 1989 Consent Decree. 
Rank and File: The members of a union. 
Recognition: Employer acceptance of the union as the exclusive bargaining 
representative for all employees in the bargaining unit. 
Recognition Picketing: Picketing to pressure or coerce an employer to recognize a union 
as a bargaining agent for the employees. Recognition picketing is subject to certain 
restrictions under the amendments to the National Labor Relations Act. 
Replacement: Workers hired to replace employees on strike. In the case of economic 
strikers, the strikers retain their employment status while on strike; However,, the 
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company may hire permanent replacements, and may legally refuse to reinstate strikers 
who have been permanently replaced. In this situation, if there are permanent 
replacements, economic strikers are generally entitled to reinstatement when the 
replacements leave. In the case of unfair labor practice strikes, the strikers must be 
reinstated with few exceptions. 
Representation Election: Election conducted to determine by a majority vote of the 
employees whether they want to be represented by a union. Whether to vote or not is 
voluntary and the employee must mark a paper ballot with an “X” on a square for yes or 
no. 
 “Right to Work” States:  States which have passed laws prohibiting unions 
from negotiating union shop clauses in their contracts with employers covered by the 
National Labor Relations Act. Unions often refer to these as “right to work for less” 
states. 
Runaway Shop: A plant transferred to another location, usually another city, to destroy 
union effectiveness and evade bargaining duties. The best block to a Runaway Shop is 
unambiguous contract language which prohibits any move or relocation of a plant. 
Secondary Activities: Strikes, picketing, boycotts, or other activities directed by a union 
against an employer with whom it has no dispute, to pressure that employer to stop doing 
business with, or to bring pressure against another employer with whom the union does 
have a dispute. 
Service Model of Unions: The concept that the primary function of the union, its staff, 
and its officers is to service the members or solve the member’s problems for them. This 
is in contrast to the Organizing Model of Unions. 
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[Sufficient] Showing of Interest: A requirement by the National Labor Relations Board 
that must be met by the union when a union wishes to represent a group of employees. 
There are several showing of interest requirements used by the National Labor Relations 
Board. A) A petitioning union needs 30% of the eligible members in the unit. B) Where a 
union has petitioned and another union wishes to intervene, the second union must have 
30% of the unit it seeks. C) Where a union petitions and another union wishes to 
intervene in the same unit to the extent of blocking a consent election agreement, it must 
have 10%. D) Usually, a showing of one or two cards is enough for a second union to 
intervene only to have their name on the ballot or to participate in a hearing. E) A current 
or recently expired contract is also a criterion for showing of interest. 
Sitdown Strike: A work action which is currently illegal in which strikers refuse to leave 
the employer’s premises. 
Strike Force:  A group of volunteer members who have agreed to help picket or leaflet in 
support of an organizing drive, strike, or other campaign which the local has initiated. 
Struck Work: A term to define a product which is produced by an employer during the 
period of a labor dispute with its employees. An employee who refuses to handle struck 
work is engaged in a sympathy work action. Employees who refuse to do the work of 
employees engaged in a strike may be replaced; However,, they generally cannot be 
discharged. A struck work clause in some collective bargaining agreements protects the 
rights of employees not to handle goods of a struck employer. There are limitations on 
such clauses in section 8( e ) of the National Labor Relations Act.  
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Successor Employer: An employer which has acquired an already existing operation and 
which continues those operations in approximately the same manner as the previous 
employer, including the use of the previous employer’s employees. 
Supervisor: Those employees who have management rights such as the right to hire, fire, 
or recommend such action. The employees who are defined as supervisors under the 
National Labor Relations Act are not permitted to become members of the bargaining 
unit at the work location. In organizing campaigns, most employers will try to enlarge the 
ranks of their supervisory personnel. The employer will try to keep a certain group of 
supervisors as an anti—union workforce for future labor disputes. 
Taft-Hartley Act or Labor Management Act of 1947: An amendment of the National 
Labor Relations Act which added provisions allowing unions to be prosecuted, enjoined, 
and sued for a variety of activities, including mass picketing and secondary boycotts. 
Unfair Labor Practices: Those employer or union activities classified as “unfair” by 
federal or state labor relations acts. Under the National Labor Relations Act, an employer 
Unfair Labor Practices include employer threats against protected concerted activity, 
employer domination of unions, discrimination against employees for collective activity, 
and employer failure to bargain in good faith with union representatives. Union Unfair 
Labor Practices include failure to represent all members of the bargaining unit and failure 
to bargain in good faith, and secondary boycotts. The Railway Labor Act and many state 
and public sector labor laws contain definitions of unfair labor practices which are similar 
to the National Labor Relations Act definitions. 
Union Buster: A professional consultant or consulting firm which provides tactics and 
strategies for employers trying to prevent unionization or to decertify unions. 
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Union Shop: A form of union security provided in the collective bargaining agreement 
which requires employees to belong to or pay dues to the union as a condition of 
retaining their employment. It is illegal to have a close shop which requires workers to be 
union members before they are hired. The union shop is legal, except in right-to-work 
states, because it requires workers to join the union or pay dues within a certain time 
period after they are hired. 
Volunteer Organizing Committee (VOC): A term sometimes used to describe union 
members who volunteer for the union during organizing campaigns. Volunteers may 
donate their time and/or be compensated for lost wages while they assist the campaign by 
visiting workers at their homes, distributing leaflets, and attending meetings, etc. 
Wildcat Strike: A strike undertaken without official union authorization. Although not 
necessarily illegal, they are not necessarily protected by the National Labor Relations 
Board.  
Workplace. The physical and abstract environment represented by the employment of 
employees within a company.  
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Appendix B: Pilot Study Participation Agreement 
Each participant in the pilot study will be required to agree to a participation letter 
for the research study entitled: Reducing Organizational Conflict:  A Quantitative Study 
of the Multivariate Determinants of Employer Workplace Representation Election 
Success.  
The agreement provided to research participants will include the following 
information: 
What is the study about? 
This study will develop a mathematical model to identify winning campaign 
themes and messages as well as communication tactics which lead to an employer victory 
in workplace representation elections supervised by the National Labor Relations. 
The researcher postulates that the results of this study can direct employers’ 
financial allocations during the highly contentious and costly workplace representation 
election for optimal success.  While there is significant anecdotal and qualitative 
guidance that employers rely upon to expend significant financial resources in this 
conflict, there is not a quantitative model in existence. There is a whole industry of 
consulting and persuasion that exists to exploit and profit from an employers’ inability to 
rely upon a quantitative model for responding to workplace representation elections 
supervised by the National Labor Relations Board. This dissertation will bring clarity to 
heretofore ambiguous and ill-defined significant employers’ financial decisions that 
increase organizational conflict within the workplace.  
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Why are you asking me? 
You are identified as a subject matter expert in workplace representation elections 
from your selection as a speaker at industry and professional organizations and 
conferences.   As a result, your participation in this research is critically important to and 
will be instructive to both the researcher and all other employers may face similar 
elections in the future. Your participation in this research and survey is strictly voluntary 
and is greatly appreciated again by this researcher and all other employers who will face 
such an election in the future.   
Your role is simply to complete the pilot study of the drafted survey instrument to 
aid in assessing participants ability to understand and complete the instrument.  This pilot 
study asks no questions about you or your experience but is instead limited to the 
completion of the survey instrument.  The pilot study is expected to last less than 15 
minutes of your time.   
What will I be doing if I agree to participate in this study? 
As a participant in this research you will complete a pilot survey instrument and 
provide information regarding the extent you understood the questions or had any 
difficulty navigating the instructions or instrument. Your participation entails a phone call 
expected to last less than 15 minutes.  
Will there be audio or video recording of the focus groups? 
The conference call with the pilot study participant will not be recorded, though 
research notes will be taken in order to incorporate any potential changes to the survey 
instrument. 
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Are there dangers to the research participants? 
No, participation is voluntary and there is no foreseeable danger to the participant. 
Any pilot test participant may refuse to participate and can withdraw from the study at 
any time. 
What if I have questions about the research? 
If you have any questions about the research, your research rights, or have a 
research related injury, please contact this researcher or the IRB contact numbers listed 
above to learn more about your research rights. 
Will I be paid or receive other for benefits participating in this study? 
No pilot study participant will be paid. Results of this study will be compiled and 
reported in academic and professional publications. Participants name and contact 
information will not appear in the study. Participants will receive a copy of the report and 
summary findings upon request. 
How will you keep my information private? 
The confidentiality of the pilot study participants is of the utmost importance. All 
information obtained in this pilot study is strictly confidential unless disclosure is 
required by law. However, the Internal Review Board regulatory agencies and or may 
review the handwritten research records if deemed necessary. 
All printed notes and material will be maintained under lock and key. Should any 
pilot study research participant choose to withdraw from the study, their information will 
be destroyed at the conclusion of the study and not included within the reported results. 
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Acknowledgement 
I have thoroughly read this consent form and by my own admission without being 
coerced, acknowledge my voluntary participation in this research project.  
______________________________________________________________ 
PARTICIPANT SIGNATURE AND DATE  
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Appendix C: NLRB Election – Voice of the Employer Survey© 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes No
Don't 
know
Not 
Influentia
l
Slightly 
Influentia
l
Neutral
Influentia
l
Strongly 
Influentia
l
Not sure
Not 
Influentia
l
Slightly 
Influentia
l
Neutral
Influentia
l
Strongly 
Influentia
l
Not sure
Yes No
Don't 
know
1 2 3 4 5+ Not sure
What is/Definition of a Union
Benefits you have now
What is collective bargaining? (may include gambling with and 
realities of bargaining)
Union's strike history
Analysis of the union's Constitution/Bylaws
Comparing existing company benefits/wages with union's 
contracts elsewhere
Layoffs at union companies/Job security
The Union is a business and needs your dues
Calculators showing how much dues costs or amount lost in a 
strike
Get out the vote/ You need to vote
Give us [employer] another chance
NLRB Election- Voice of the Employer Survey©
For each of the campaign themes listed below, indicate whether or not your company used this theme during the 
campaign. 
Then, IF YES, please indicate how impactful you believe the theme was towards influencing the outcome of the election.
Campaign Themes
Communication Tools
IF YES, how many different themes were 
involved?
Indicate whether or not your company used each of the following tools to communicate with employees during the 
campaign.
Then, IF YES, indicate how many different themes were conveyed using this tool (i.e., how many different versions of this 
communication tool were used in the campaign?)
Captive audience/Group meetings of employees (How many 
with different themes)?
Did your company 
use this theme?
Did your company 
use this tool?
Please write any other major themes you used that are not listed above, 
and indicate how influential this was at the time the theme was used.
Write-in message 1
Write-in message 2
Write-in message 3
IF YES, how influential was this theme at the 
time it was used?
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Yes No
Don't 
know
Yes No
Don't 
know
Twitter for communicating persuasive campaign messages
Other social media communication tool not listed above
Did the company hire an attorney to assist in the company's election strategy?
Did the company hire a persuader to communicate directly to employees?
A podcast featuring company election messages 
Online/ conference calls to employees at remote locations with campaign messaging
Posters posted in the work areas (How many with different 
messages)
Letters to employees homes (How many letters with different 
themes)
Thank you for completing this survey and for returning it in the SASE. 
Communication Tools, continued
1 on 1 meetings (Mgr with Employee) to discuss election issues
Videos to persuade employees 
A Website to persuade employees 
Text Messaging to employees as company election communication tool
Facebook as company election communication tool
Did the company contest the union's petitioned for unit of employees? (e.g. have a hearing to decide the unit)
Did the company implement a pay increase to employees during the election?
Please provide your email address in order to receive the study results 
_____________________________________
Did the union file challenges to the election result?
Did your company use 
this messaging tool?Please indicate whether or not your company used each of the following tools to communicate 
with employees during the campaign.
Information about the company and election campaign
Was this the first election at this company location?
Is the company unionized at other locations?
Is the company unionized at portions of this location?
Did the company hire a consultant to guide the company's election strategy?
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Appendix D: Booklet Accompanying Survey Mailed to Employers 
 
DATE:  
EMPLOYER NAME: [Column H] 
[Column C] 
[Column D] 
[Column E] 
 
Regarding NLRB ELECTION CASE NUMBER [Column A] 
DATE FILED: [Column Q] 
DATE VOTE: [Column R] 
VOTES IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER:  [Column AB] 
VOTES IN FAVOR OF COMPANY:  [Column AE] 
 
[Column H] Representative:  
Thank you in advance for completing this quick survey about your company’s 
experience in the NLRB election referenced above. This survey is part of a PhD 
dissertation study designed to assist employers in future elections by providing a 
quantitative predictive analytic model regarding election messaging themes and other 
factors which influence a victory for the employer. Approximately 350 other elections are 
also included as part of this study. Your name was obtained from the NLRB database as 
the employer representative during the election. If someone else in your organization is 
more knowledgeable of the company’s election messaging themes and other factors of the 
campaign, please forward this survey to that person for completion. 
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Again, thanks for your participation on this study, and all those companies who 
return this survey in the self-addressed self-stamped envelope will receive a copy of the 
results free of charge to the email you provide. 
Should you have questions about the study or the survey instrument please feel 
free in contacting me at (863) 286-7239. If you would like more information about my 
research or work history, you can access my resume/CV on LinkedIn by searching for 
Mark Codd, Director of Labor Relations, where you would note my role supporting 
major corporations. 
I sincerely thank you for helping my research and for helping other employers 
faced with an NLRB election. 
John Mark Codd 
 
 
APPROXIMATE DESCRIPTION OF MESSAGING THEMES 
NOTE: The question regarding influence refers to how influential the employer 
believed the theme was at the time the message theme was delivered. 
• What is/ Definition of a Union. 
A popular theme generally that can include the description of what a union 
is, how it makes its revenue and the scope of union’s authority and other close 
variations of this theme. 
 
• What is collective bargaining? 
Employers often learn that employees misunderstand that collective 
bargaining is simply the right of the union, and the obligation of the employer to 
listen and bargain in good faith. Neither side can be compelled to agree to the 
terms of the other. This theme often includes phrases like “horse trading” and 
“gambling” with the benefits employees currently have.  
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• Benefits you have now. 
This theme focuses on educating employees on the benefits that 
employees possess without a union. 
 
• The union is a business and needs your dues 
This theme focuses on the financial status of the union and how it both 
earns and spends dues money. 
 
• Layoffs at unionized companies/ Job security 
This theme often focuses upon the closure, or bankruptcy or layoffs at 
unionized businesses as a comparison to the existing job security of the employer 
in the campaign. 
 
• Comparing existing company benefits/wages with union’s contracts 
elsewhere 
Employers in NLRB elections often obtain contracts the union has 
negotiated elsewhere and provide comparisons to voting employees. 
 
• Analysis of the union’s Constitution/Bylaws 
This theme centers upon the rules that unions use to hold their members 
accountable. This often focuses upon dues amounts, fines, fees, assessments and 
disciplinary hearings for those members who violate union rules. 
 
• Union’s strike history 
This theme focuses upon the union’s experience in past strikes at other 
companies. This theme is not always limited to the union involved in the 
campaign, but often showcases strikes by unions in general. 
 
• Calculators 
This theme is often referred to as Dues Calculators or Strike Calculators. A 
dues calculator yields the amount of dues an employee or even the group of 
employees will pay over some period of time- often annually.  A strike calculator 
asks the employee to enter their wage, the monetary amount of raise in dispute 
which prompts the strike, the duration of the strike and it calculates the amount of 
time necessary to earn back the money the employee lost in the strike. This 
payback period is often compared with the duration of other strikes and is often a 
surprise to employees.  
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• Give us another chance 
This theme recognizes the mistake of the employer’s culture and decisions 
and requests that employees vote no to unionization. Since the union and 
employees can file a petition for election one year from the election vote in 
question, the employer seeks another chance from employees to create the culture 
supporting a non-union environment. 
 
• Get out the vote/ You need to vote 
This theme recognizes that the union is urging its own supporters to vote 
and consequently the employer is prompted to urge as many of the eligible voters 
to go to the poll and vote. 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
APPROXIMATE DESCRIPTION OF COMMUNICATION TOOLS 
 
NOTE: The questions ask about the number of unique themes for each 
communication tool. Examples include how many different captive audience 
meetings were held that included a different theme (not how many meetings of the 
same theme were held). 
 
• Captive Audience 
A union term for meetings of workers called by management and held on 
company time and property. Usually the purpose of these meetings is to persuade 
workers to vote against union representation. 
 
• Posters 
Typically wall hangings in the workplace designed to communicate the 
employer’s theme. Again, the question asks how many different themed posters 
were used. 
 
• Letters to employees’ homes 
Again, referencing the number of unique themes. For example, a round of 
letters sent to employees’ homes showcasing the current benefits the company 
offers followed later in the week with another explaining how and when to vote 
would count as two letters. 
 
• 1 on 1 meetings 
Some employers task managers to campaign 1 on 1 (1 manager/1 
employee) with given themes to discuss with individual employees. 
 
• Videos 
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During meetings employers often use videos to illustrate its thematic 
messaging. 
 
• Website, text messaging, Facebook, podcasts, Twitter are self-explanatory, 
and the questions ask whether the employer used each as a communication 
tool. 
 
• Online/conference calls include employer tools such as gotomeeting, WebEx, 
and other video or conference call tools to reach remote employees during 
the campaign. 
 
 
Survey Respondent Participation Agreement 
Reducing Organizational Conflict:  A Quantitative Study of the Multivariate 
Determinants of Employer Workplace Representation Election Success 
What is the study about? 
This study will develop a predictive analytical model to identify winning campaign 
themes and messages as well as communication tools which lead to an employer victory 
in workplace representation elections supervised by the National Labor Relations Board. 
This researcher believes that the results of this study can direct employers’ financial 
allocations during highly contentious and costly workplace representation elections.  
While there is significant anecdotal guidance that employers rely upon to expend  
financial resources in election conflicts, there is not a predictive analytical model in 
existence.  
Why are you asking me? 
Your organization is listed as having participated in a workplace representation 
election between April 14, 2015 and May 1, 2017, the research period of this study. You 
were listed as the employer representative within the NLRB database found at nlrb.gov. 
As a result, your participation in this research is critically important to both the researcher 
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and all other employers who may face similar elections in the future. Your participation in 
this research and survey is strictly voluntary and is appreciated by this researcher and all 
other employers who will face such an election in the future.   
Your role is simply to enable someone familiar with the details of the election to 
complete the survey. This survey asks no questions about you or your experience but is 
instead limited to the company messaging themes, tools used in election  communication 
and general information about the employer facility. The anticipated time to complete this 
survey is less than 10 minutes of your time.   
Are there dangers to the research participants? 
No, participation is voluntary and there is no foreseeable danger to the participant. 
Any survey respondent may refuse to participate and can withdraw from the study at any 
time. 
What if I have questions about the research? 
If you have questions about the research, your research rights, please contact this 
researcher at (863) 286-7239, or the IRB contact Elena Bastidas Ph.D., Associate 
Professor, Department of Conflict Resolution Studies at (954) 262-3021. 
Will I be paid or receive other for benefits participating in this study? 
No, survey respondents are not paid, however every survey respondent who provides an 
email address will receive an electronic copy of the report and summary findings. The 
results of this study will be compiled and reported in academic and professional 
publications. Participants name and contact information will not appear in the study.  
  
222 
 
 
How will you keep my information private? 
The confidentiality of this study’s participants is of the utmost importance. All 
information obtained in this study is strictly confidential unless disclosure is required by 
law. The University’s Internal Review Board may review the handwritten research 
records if deemed necessary. All printed notes and material will be maintained under lock 
and key. Should any survey participant choose to withdraw from the study, their 
information will be destroyed at the conclusion of the study and not included within the 
reported results. 
Acknowledgement 
I have thoroughly read this consent form and by my own admission without being 
coerced, acknowledge my voluntary participation in this research project as evidenced by 
my completed survey submission. 
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Appendix E: Election Campaign Poster Examples 
 
 
Source: https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Anti-union-flyers_fig1_228799876 
Below is a copied screen shot of a google search for "anti-union posters." There 
are hundreds of images available to employees and employers with a simple Google 
search at: https://www.google.com/search?q=Anti-
Union+Posters&safe=active&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwipsvPEgJj
oAhUQQq0KHSymDaIQ_AUoAXoECAwQAw 
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Appendix F: Example of Form LM-0 Report, 2015 
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LM-20 reports are available on the OLMS.gov website and were also posted by the IAM 
for Walgreens employees to review during the February 2019 election.  
Source: 
https://www.facebook.com/goiamwalgreens/photos/a.840379849334575/1334596176579
604/?type=3&theater  
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Appendix G: Interview Respondent Participation Agreement 
Each participant in the interview is required to receive a notice regarding their 
participation for the research study entitled:  
 
Voice of the Employer: A Mixed-Methods Study of Winning Messages for NLRB Elections 
 
What is the study about? 
This study will develop a model to identify winning campaign themes and messages as 
well as communication tools which lead to an employer victory in workplace 
representation elections supervised by the National Labor Relations Board. 
The researcher believes that the results of this study can direct employers’ financial 
allocations during highly contentious and costly workplace representation elections.  
While there is significant anecdotal guidance that employers rely upon to expend 
significant financial resources in election conflicts, there is not a model obtained from 
employer representatives’ input in existence.  
 
Why are you asking me? 
Your organization is listed as having participated in a workplace representation 
election between April 14, 2015 and May 1, 2017, the research period of this study. You 
were listed as the employer representative within the NLRB database found at nlrb.gov. 
As a result, your participation in this research is critically important to and will be 
instructive to both the researcher and all other employers who may face similar elections 
in the future. Your participation in this research and Interview is strictly voluntary and is 
greatly appreciated again by this researcher and all other employers who will face such an 
election in the future.   
Your role is simply to consider your experience and career as an employer 
representative involved in NLRB elections and to comment on the efficacy of a select 
group of messaging and communication modalities. This interview asks no questions 
about you personally other than to establish that you were involved in NLRB elections. 
The anticipated time to complete this interview is approximately 15-20 minutes of your 
time.   
 
Are there dangers to the research participants? 
No, participation is voluntary and there is no foreseeable danger to the participant. 
Any interview respondent may refuse to participate and can withdraw from the study at 
any time. 
 
What if I have questions about the research? 
If you have any questions about the research, your research rights, please contact this 
researcher at (863) 286-7239, or the IRB contact numbers listed to learn more about your 
research rights.  
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Will I be paid or receive other for benefits participating in this study? 
No, interview respondents are not paid, however every interview respondent who 
provides an email address will receive an electronic copy of the report and summary 
findings. The results of this study will be compiled and reported in academic and 
professional publications. Participants name and contact information will not appear in 
the study.  
 
How will you keep my information private? 
The confidentiality of the pilot study participants is of the utmost importance. All 
information obtained in this study is strictly confidential unless disclosure is required by 
law. The University’s Internal Review Board may review the handwritten research 
records if deemed necessary. All printed notes and material will be maintained under lock 
and key. Should any interview participant choose to withdraw from the study, their 
information will be destroyed at the conclusion of the study and not included within the 
reported results. 
 
Acknowledgement 
I have thoroughly read this consent form and by my own admission without being 
coerced, acknowledge my voluntary participation in this research project as evidenced by 
my completed interview.  
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Appendix H: Semi-Structured Interview Guide 
_NAME_ Thank you for participating in this interview to support the research study of 
the multivariate determinants of employer workplace representation election success. Did 
you have a chance to review the interview respondent participation agreement? 
You were selected to participate in this interview because of your prior presentations 
about responding to union organizing campaigns and because you are a subject matter 
expert in responding to NLRB election campaigns. I will ask a couple of very general 
questions about your experience in responding to NLRB elections and follow up with 
questions about specific campaign messages and different communication tactics within 
campaigns. 
This study seeks to evaluate the effectiveness of messages used by employers in NLRB 
elections.  
Q 1. Why do you think prior studies have not obtained information from employers 
directly before? 
Q 2. Over your career how many elections would you guess you have been involved as 
an employer or employer representative?  If you had to guess, what is your win/loss 
ratio? 
Q 3. How similar are these elections with respect to the employer’s messages and 
communication tactics? 
Q 5. Recent data shows employers stipulate to the unit in 92% of the elections. Why 
would an employer do that? What are the advantages in challenging the petitioned-for 
unit? 
Q 6. What is the single most effective message an employer utilizes to influence the vote 
in favor of the employer? 
Q 7. Of the many different communication methods available to employers, such as 
meetings, letters, Facebook, Twitter etc. which in your experience is the most effective in 
increasing the vote in favor of the employer and why? 
Q 8. Why should employers hire a consultant to guide the employer’s response to the 
union’s campaign? 
Ask whether the participant has any questions of the researcher. Then close the interview 
by thanking the participant. 
